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Abstract
Fusion tokamak reactors might become a valuable source of energy for the future if
experiments prove that commercial operation is possible under profitable conditions. Safety
considerations would also play an important role in future decisions regarding fusion power. Abnormal
events can lead to radioactive releases to the environment, and those have to be addressed by
designing a confinement strategy. To ensure a defense-in-depth approach, several confinement
barriers surrounding the process systems are to be employed.
The objective of the present research project is to develop a methodology using probabilistic
risk assessment techniques for evaluating the performance of the design of the radiological
confinement barriers of tokamak fusion reactors within the context of a limited allowable risk. Thus,
accident sequence models are developed for each of the confinement barriers whose performance
should be evaluated. The undesired consequences at each step are radioactive releases from the
corresponding confinement barrier.
The first step is to describe the conceivable accident sequences that might lead to failure of
the first confinement barrier through various failure modes. Each accident sequence is characterized
by a pair of parameters consisting of an annual frequency and a radioactive release. The second step
is to continue the branches where the first confinement barrier has failed with accident sequences for
the second confinement barrier. These latter accident sequences will end with events expressed in
terms of the second confinement barrier failure modes.
A new approach is used in this work for the development of the accident sequences.
Combined influence diagram/event tree models are developed instead of the reliance on event trees
alone, which is the traditional probabilistic risk assessment tool. This way conditional events and
probabilities can be explicitly defined in the influence diagram, which also contains all the frequency,
probability and consequence data, while the time sequence is represented in the event tree. Thus,
more compact system models are obtained, rather than the usual very large event trees.
A challenge was to find an appropriate form to express the results of the accident sequences
analysis for each barrier in a meaningful way that allows comparison of the results to a design
requirement for limiting the releases. A complementary cumulative frequency of radioactive releases is
proposed, because it takes into considerations important criteria such as: the overall plant risk, the rate
at which accident frequency decreases with increasing accident consequences (risk aversion attitude),
and the impact of high frequency-low consequence accidents from a public policy stand point.
The International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) was used as a reference
design. The Design Description Documents as published in June 1995 contain the confinement
strategy analyzed in this project. The current ITER design requirements set radioactive release and
dose limits for individual event sequences grouped in categories by frequency. We argue that this form
presents drawbacks such as not considering a limit on the plant overall risk, and the difficulty of
accounting for event uncertainties in both frequency and consequence. Thus, an analytical form for a
limit line is derived having the form of a complementary cumulative frequency of radioactive releases to
the environment satisfying the three criteria mentioned above.
After building and analyzing the models for the first and second confinement barriers of ITER,
we concluded that a third confinement barrier may be required in order to comply with restrictive design
limits on radioactive releases, particularly for events with large uncertainties. However, confidence in
this result needs to be gained by improving the failure probability data. A database containing the
failure probabilities (conditional or independent) corresponding to various systems failure modes was
developed based on the available references, but a comprehensive fault tree analysis was not
performed as part of this work.
Finally, a decision model using multi-attribute utility function theory was constructed to help
with choosing the type of the ITER tokamak building (the third barrier). Besides safety of the design,
other attributes such as construction cost, project completion time, public attitude and technical
feasibility were considered. The decision model allows for performing sensitivity analysis on relevant
parameters, and for design features of new options for the ITER tokamak building.
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1. Introduction
Fusion, a source of nuclear energy, may become an immense energy resource if the requisite
scientific and engineering advances to obtain more energy than required to produce such reaction can
be achieved. The temperatures required for controlled thermonuclear fusion are far too large to allow
containment by material structures. One major confinement method would employ magnetic fields to
hold nuclei in an evacuated space as they undergo the fusion reaction. One type of fusion reactor
using magnetic confinement is the tokamak. The nature of the tokamak is well described by this word
of Russian origin, roughly translates as: TO - toroidal, KA - chamber, MAK - magnetic.
The potential safety and environmental concerns for tokamaks appear to be of lesser
magnitude than those for fission systems. Specific advantages may include lower radionuclide
inventory and relative biological hazard, reduced hazard from long-lived wastes, low decay heat,
minimal material safeguards requirements.
For tokamaks to be an attractive power solution, a number of issues must be addressed
adequately, such as tritium escape in water (as HTO) or air (as HT), activation of materials in plasma
chamber, and strong magnetic fields.
This work presents a probabilistic methodology that allows the evaluation of the performance
of the radiological confinement barriers for a tokamak reactor. The confinement must function during
tokamak operation, maintenance and accidents. A probabilistic approach allows for consideration of all
conceivable accidents that can affect the integrity of the confinement barriers. While it is true that a
database for frequencies and consequences for fusion reactors is not yet developed, our probabilistic
model can be used for sensitivity analysis of various design parameters. Information developed in the
analysis could help in making decisions about the allocation of resources for safety improvements. The
fusion plant models developed in the assessment provide a basis for evaluating alternative changes to
improve safety.
1.1 Background
The two major motivations for developing fusion energy are the potential to be environmentally
better than the competition and the potential to secure a virtually unlimited future energy source. In the
early stages of development of fusion systems, safety and environmental impact evaluations are
somewhat difficult to make. However, they are very useful in directing the design process toward
minimizing potential vulnerabilities. To better understand the safety issues of a tokamak reactor, a
concise conceptual design presentation is given.
The conceptual reactor for deuterium - tritium (DT) fusion would require features such as: first
wall, blanket, shielding, and superconducting magnets. The first wall encloses the plasma-containing
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vacuum chamber and absorbs up to 20% of the fusion reaction energy. The moderating-blanket region
provides necessary space for tritium breeding with lithium, and absorbs 70% of the fusion energy. It
also moderates and reflects neutrons to enhance the breeding of tritium. The shield of iron, lead and
probably boron is designed to protect the superconducting magnets and operating personnel from the
effects of electromagnetic radiation and neutrons. The magnets must be superconducting to avoid
excessive power requirements. Other necessary systems include those for fueling, neutral beam or
other heating method, tritium removal and recycle, and conversion of fusion energy to electrical energy.
There would be tremendous temperature differences in tokamak reactors: the extremes of 108
K in the DT plasma and 4 K required in the superconducting magnets would present many difficult
problems of thermal insulation.
An important research area in fusion reactors is related to the first wall: if plasma interactions
lead to vaporization of the first wall, impurities are introduced which have the effect of cooling the
plasma and reducing reaction efficiency. Damage and activation of the wall by DT neutrons' are also of
concern. Selection of first wall material is thus quite important as are design provisions for effective
remote repair and maintenance operations.
The basic tokamak houses low fusion energy per unit volume, hence the size must be
relatively large. The tokamak devices in operation around the world represent much of the effort toward
controlled nuclear fusion. There are a variety of large machines, none of which has yet satisfied the
Lawson break-even criterion2, although certain reactors have achieved one parameter. Many of the
devices have not used a DT fuel mixture. However, valuable experience has been gained in system
design and operation.
The major drawbacks of the tokamaks are the large size (1000 to 1500 MWe) and the
enormous associated capital cost. Because small prototype units are not feasible for physics, a full -
scale reactor must be built from non - power - machine experience.
The Tokamak Fusion Test Reactor (TFTR) at Princeton has reached some of the highest
temperatures and nt values, but not at the same time. TFTR operated on DT for a relatively small
number of pulses.
Tore-Supra at Cadarache in France was the first tokamak to use superconducting magnets.
The Soviet Union's T-1 5 followed with superconducting magnets of a different design.
The Doublet Ill at GA Technologies has achieved high enough plasma pressure for a fusion
reactor. Other US tokamak projects include the Advanced Toroidal Facility at Oak Ridge and Alcator
C-Mod at MIT.
D + T -> He + n
2 'Break-even' concept refers to plasma producing as much energy as it consumes. The Lawson criterion for DT
plasma break-even requires: T = 8.6 keV a 108 K, and ne a 1020 m3s, for plasma temperature T, particle
density n, and confinement time T.
12
The largest fusion machine in the world is the European Economic Community's (EEC) Joint
European Torus (JET) at Culham, England. JET has come closest to break-even, and expects to
surpass it and to approach ignition3.
Japan's JT-60 is being used to demonstrate heating concepts. The follow-on Fusion
Experimental Reactor (FER) is likely to have similar aims to those of JET.
The Next European Tokamak (NET), planned as a successor to JET, is intended to achieve
ignited plasmas routinely and for extended periods (i.e., several minutes). It is also expected to
develop and demonstrate fusion reactor technology for superconducting magnets, first wall materials,
and a lithium - compound blanket to produce tritium and absorb energy.
The International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) has been planned as a joint
project of the EEC, United States, Russian Federation, and Japan under auspices of the IAEA. The
overall system is 30 meters high and 30 meters in diameter with a plasma major radius of 8.14 meters,
which would make ITER the largest tokamak in the world.
Construction and siting requirements for fusion reactors are expected to be somewhat similar
to those for fission systems. Ultimately, regulatory officials will decide what is an acceptable
radioactivity confinement for any fusion facility and how much credit it has for reducing postulated
public doses. Reference [1-1] gives a survey of existing regulatory documents that refer to fusion
facilities.
For fusion to fulfill its goals and become an economical and publicly acceptable major source
of energy in the future, the reliable and safe operation of future fusion devices must be proven along
with the technical feasibility. At the present time, the design of fusion systems involve large
uncertainties about their reliability. Reliability and safety considerations need to be incorporated into the
design of fusion machines during all phases of the design. Design decisions should be based on an
overall design concept and be reviewed continuously as more detailed information becomes available.
1.2 Objective
The objective of this research project is to develop a methodology using probabilistic risk
assessment techniques for evaluating the performance of the radiological confinement barriers of
tokamak fusion reactors. Confinement system in this work refers to the confinement structures, as well
as the systems designed to mitigate the consequences of accidents,-limit the challenge to confinement
integrity, reduce the amount of radioactivity available for release, and the systems designed to render
the containment spaces habitable.
Functional considerations for selecting a confinement configuration require that the
confinement must retain structural integrity and acceptable leak tightness during normal operation,
Ignition refers to self-sustaining hot plasma.
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anticipated transients, and design basis and severe accidents, such that the releases to the
environment meet the design requirements and safety goals. These considerations require that
appropriate pressures and temperatures be selected, and that care be taken to prevent containment
leakage or bypass. This can be achieved by proper selection of the design of the penetrations, the
confinement isolation system, and the systems required to remove energy released in containment and
prevent reaching high values of pressures and temperatures that could cause containment failures.
The above translates into consideration of:
" design and ultimate pressure capacity at the corresponding temperature;
" material control (material selection and corrosion protection);
* leakage control (e.g., leakage monitoring);
" penetration design for isolation and minimal leakage under accident conditions, including material
selection;
* confinement cooling system design;
* behavior under severe external events (particularly for the last confinement barrier).
The assurance of proper functioning is also achieved by assessing the ability of the
confinement systems to perform their intended function in an acceptable manner under a set of
unlikely sequence of events.
Probabilistic methods, correlated with deterministic ones, are more appropriate for analyzing a
first-of-a-kind design such as a fusion reactor, since they are more able to encompass the multiple
uncertainties in parameters and phenomena than the deterministic methods alone could do. In a
deterministic approach, consequences are postulated and compared to an upper limit, but the accident
mechanism is not always identified and the likelihood of the accident is not estimated. In the
probabilistic approach, accident mechanisms are postulated and both the likelihood and consequences
are estimated, usually quantified, to provide a measure of total expected risk.
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) has been successfully used to analyze the risk
associated with different nuclear power plant designs. Most PRA studies are performed on plants that
are already built and modifications recommended by the PRA studies are generally difficult to make.
However, PRA can be effectively incorporated at an earlier stage in the design process. First,
qualitative insights gained from previous PRAs are important to the designer. These point out the
strengths and weaknesses of existing designs and thus help him direct his efforts. Such qualitative
information can be provided at an early stage in the design process. Second, PRA can be used as an
interactive quantitative tool for evaluation during design process. By providing a rapid feedback on
design performance, the quantitative results of a PRA can be input in overall decision process.
Reference [1-2] gives an overview of how to incorporate safety and economical considerations into
design decision making. The approach is a risk-based design, suggesting PRA as the basis for
decision making in order to enhance fusion safety and plant availability, and for developing a method to
compare design options.
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PRA is an analytical methodology that identifies and delineates the combinations of events
that, if they occurred, would lead to an accident and estimates the frequency of occurrence for each
combination of events, and then estimates the consequences. This method involves the development
of models of the system, databases giving component failure rates, and baselines of the dominant risk
sequences. Generally, three categories of systems or processes are targeted: changes in the
hardware of the system, changes in the normal operations of the system, and changes in the off-
normal operations of the system.
Although not generally established as legal standards, several countries are moving in the
direction of limiting accident probabilistic risk4. To the extent that regulatory officials can judge on the
basis of risk instead of maximum accidents, the overall effectiveness of design actions to protect
against conceivable accidents might be enhanced as effort is concentrated on actually reducing
accident risk, rather than concentrating on highly improbable or even inconceivable events.
The goal of this work is to use PRA tools to develop a model that can be used to study the
behavior of the radioactivity confinement barriers in tokamak reactors, by evaluating the compliance
with the design requirements. The model should:
" consider all the conceivable accident scenarios;
* allow for implementation of design modifications and comparison of different designs of each
confinement barrier;
" estimate the number of confinement barriers needed to comply with the design guidelines.
A design guideline for radioactivity releases as consequences of individual accident sequences
with the corresponding frequencies is also proposed in the present study. Approaches similar to the
Farmer limit line [3-12] have been commonly used, but they do not include important considerations
such as overall risk and uncertainties in both frequency and consequence of accident sequences.
Previous work showed that the regulation of risk from technological systems should take into account
several aspects of risk: overall risk, the rate at which accident frequency decreases with increasing
consequences, the impact of high frequency - low consequence accidents. The present study contains
a rigorous derivation of a parametric complementary cumulative frequency (CCF) for ITER which
complies with all of these requirements. Moreover, CCF allows for the treatment of uncertainties in
accident frequencies and consequences unlike the Farmer limit line approach. Therefore, defining the
ITER risk limit in a CCF form is more appropriate than the current formulation of the limit line. Chapter
3 contains more details regarding this matter.
An ongoing debate in the ITER safety community is role of the tokamak building as a third
confinement barrier. Because it is a very large building, it would be too costly to design it at the
standards of the fission power plants containment's. Different options are currently considered, and we
4 The probabilistic risk is a controversial concept, and will be more thoroughly discussed in Chapter 3.
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believe that a decision model considering different attributes such as risk, cost, technical feasibility etc.
would provide a useful structures for the decision makers. Such a model is developed in Chapter 8,
1.3 Scope
The International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) is the baseline design
considered for developing our model. An important objective of ITER is to demonstrate the potential for
safe and environmentally acceptable operation of a power producing fusion reactor. ITER will be by far
the largest source of information on which to base the design of subsequent fusion reactors. The ITER
major design parameters are given in Table 1-1.
ITER must follow the nuclear regulations of the country which will host the construction site.
The country is not decided at this time. Regulatory approval is required before construction, therefore
ITER should be designed with a robust safety envelope in order to consider national differences and
uncertainties. In order to reflect these requirements in the engineering design, first safety design
guidelines should be proposed at an early stage of the design. Due to the fact that large uncertainties
exist in the fusion reactor conditions, a probabilistic approach seems to be more suitable for analyzing
a particular design.
Underlying the development and implementation of the ITER safety design approach are the
following general principles [1-3]:
" make maximum use of the inherent favorable safety characteristics of fusion;
* meet dose/release limits based on International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP)
and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and further reduce releases and doses to the
public and site personnel to levels as low as reasonable achievable (ALARA);
" minimize the safety role and credit taken in safety analyses and assessments for uncertain plasma
physics and experimental in-vessel components.
The ITER radioactivity confinement will be an integrated system, including various confinement
zones, and configuration control for each zone. Since the confinement should be as passive as
possible, the recommended approach emphasizes natural forces and passive features, minimizing the
need for operator or equipment action. The first priority will be the prevention of accidents through the
intrinsic features of the facility, quality assurance in design, construction, operation and maintenance,
and appropriate provisions for human factors and anomalous events. Safety margins and mitigative
features have to be added to protect the public even against extremely rare and unforeseen events.
This implies methods for confinement analysis which are suitable for severe accident loading. Severe
accidents, as they are defined in the nuclear power industry, are those that result in significant reactor
damage and release of radioactivity, but they have a very low probability of occurrence.
The basic approach recommended for containment/confinement of airborne tritium and
activation products at ITER is the defense-in-depth strategy which involves the use of multiple barriers.
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By ensuring that there are three successive envelopes which have to be breached before radioactivity
can be released to the environment, the probability that all three will be unavailable when necessary
should be acceptable small. The final (third) barrier could be the building containment.
The tritium processes should be designed to minimize the tritium inventory to the lowest
practical level. In addition, process systems should be designed for independent operation to prevent
cascading failure propagation. The tritium inventory should be distributed and isolated so that even if all
barriers are breached, the maximum inventory released will be a small fraction of site inventory.
Confinement should be provided as close to the tritium source as possible to minimize the
spread of activity and to limit the volume of atmosphere which must be monitored and possibly
filtered/dried. Confinement barriers should be of sufficient number, strength , specified performance
(e.g. leak tightness, decontamination factors etc.) and reliability. In the design of confinement barriers,
the principles of redundancy, diversity and independence should be followed. Specifically, in the case
of multiple barriers, failure of one barrier should not result in the failure of another barrier.
Chapter 2 presents a more detailed description of the ITER confinement strategy.
Table 1-1: Major Design Parameters of ITER
Nominal Fusion Power 1.5 GW
Nominal Wall Loading 1 MW/m 2
Maximum additional Heating Power 100 MW
Plasma Major Radius (R) 8.14 m
Plasma Minor Radius (a) 2.8 m
Reference Pulse Duration:
- Inductive pulse flat-top under ignited conditions 1000s
- Nominal repetition time 2200 s
Total Number of Pulses: 50000
- During the Basic Performance Phase 13000
- During the Enhanced Performance Phase 30000
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2. ITER Radiological Confinement Strategy
ITER's operational record will be an important step in the demonstration of the environmental
potential of fusion power. ITER's operation will have to involve proper control of any hazardous
materials and energy sources that could lead to their releases. By providing multiple independent
confinement barriers, the possible releases to the public can be reduced to acceptable limits.
2.1 Hazardous Materials
The major potentially hazardous materials in ITER are tritium, activation products, and
beryllium. The first two are radioactive, while beryllium is a chemically toxic material.
Tritium is present in a fusion reactor in the fuel for deuterium-tritium (DT) reactions as sources
of thermal energy:
1D+ T-+4He+ +17.6 MeV (2-1)
Tritium is the most mobile of the ITER radioactive sources, and requires special handling and
confinement procedures to prevent it escape. The total tritium inventory on the site may be up to 4 kg
(5 kg if carbon is used), which represents an order of magnitude larger inventory than the previous
fusion related installations. However, there is also considerable non-fusion related experience, for
example, in CANDU reactors, where inventories of similar magnitude are safely handled.
Tritium is active radioactively emitting a weak beta particle with a half-life of 12.3 years. The
biological hazard of tritium strongly depends upon its chemical form. Both the gaseous elemental and
the oxide form will be present in a fusion reactor. The gaseous elemental forms of tritium (HT, DT or
T2) are relatively difficult to contain and can permeate through most materials. This provides a path for
tritium to enter the first wall/divertor coolant streams, where it is converted to the oxide form, whose
escape via coolant leaks must be controlled. The oxide form (HTO, DTO, or T20) or organic forms of
tritium are approximately 10,000 times more hazardous than the elemental form, per gram of tritium
taken into the body. The oxide form is readily assimilated and distributed throughout the human body
water, while the elemental form is not. The biological half-life of oxidized tritium in the human body is
about 10 days and can be reduced by increasing the normal fluid intake.
One significant difference between the fusion and fission reactors is that the fusion fuel is not
contained in a compact reactor core, but the tritium is spread among various systems, some of them
even in different buildings, and it flows between systems. The hazard is determined by the size of
inventory, the extent it can be mobilized, and the chemical form. With the exception of much of the
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tritium in plasma facing components and storage, most of the inventories are mobilizable. Figure 2-1
shows the location of major tritium inventories and tritium flows.
The activation products are the result of the interaction of neutrons with high energies - 14.1
MeV from the DT fusion reaction with the structural materials of plasma facing components, and
vacuum vessel. It is important to note that the amount and the nature of the activation products is
determined by the structural materials that ITER will use. The activation products will produce an
intense radioactive field inside the cryostat and vacuum vessel, leading to the requirement for remote
maintenance for systems and components inside these structures.
The majority of activation products will be bound in solid metal structures of the in-vessel
components. Smaller inventories will be found in structures outside the vacuum vessel or circulating as
corrosion products in first wall, blanket, and divertor coolant streams. Some could also be generated in
air inside the tokamak building by neutrons streaming through penetrations.
Beryllium might be used as a coating or tiles for the plasma facing components of ITER.
Beryllium is a toxic material for humans, a possible carcinogen. In the solid metallic form, beryllium
pose little danger, but small particles (usually less than 10 gm) can enter the body through the
respiratory tract.
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2.2 Confinement of Radioactivity
ITER's confinement design must ensure compliance with the design guideline of permissible
releases.[2-3] These values are currently being formulated, and will be reviewed after site selection
with respect to the environmental regulations of the country. An important safety related decision,
made early in the ITER project, was to shift safety burden from experimental components and
uncertainties in physics phenomena to conventional components based on well proven technology.
This decision was taken to make the safety case more robust and demonstrable. In this context, it was
conservatively determined not to take credit for in-vessel components (e.g. the divertor, the first wall) in
formulating a safety strategy for the tokamak, but rather to emphasize confinement and control of
energy sources that could damage the confinement (decay heat and fusion power). Consequently, the
major safety functions for the tokamak are confinement, decay heat removal and plasma power
shutdown.
The majority of radioactive inventories in ITER can be found in two buildings: the tokamak
building and the tritium plant. Hence, one can describe the confinement strategy for these two buildings
separately, since they contain different types and quantities of radioactive inventories. Here, we will
only be concerned with the confinement strategy for the tokamak building; it is the one we use to
develop our method. Table 2-1 and Figure 2-2 represent the confinement configuration inside the
tokamak building.
The first confinement boundary includes the vacuum vessel (VV), the primary heat transport
(HTS), the vacuum ports, other penetrations, and isolation valves to segregate the tokamak inventories
and energy sources from the tritium plant. The second tokamak confinement boundary includes the
HTS vaults, HTS guardpipes, local boxes around cryostat penetrations, the cryostat, and the NBI
vaults. It shall enclose the first confinement boundary. Table 2-1 lists the first confinement barriers with
the corresponding second confinement barriers enclosing them.
The tokamak building's confinement strategy is complicated because of its
compartmentalization. The compartmentalization is motivated by the following:
" Experience in tritium facilities indicates that tanks, piping, gloveboxes, vaults are the way to confine
tritium - not buildings.
* The inventories "at risk" differ in type and character at different locations, and the confinement
barriers are tailored to each.
" The pressure sources and other threats to confinement barriers differ spatially, and the barriers are
tailored to each.
" To operate, the tokamak needs two robust vacuum barriers (vacuum vessel and cryostat), and the
confinement strategy makes appropriate use of each.
" Compartmentalization minimizes spread of contamination.
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* Compartmentalization means that in an individual accident event sequence, only those
compartments involved must operate - the rest are irrelevant.
In conclusion, one of the most important reasons that compartments are used is to segregate
the radioactive inventories. Therefore, for events where there is only localized damage, then only one
portion of the inventory is released.
It is interesting to note that all confinement barriers during operation have lower pressure than
their surrounding volumes. In most accident sequences, this negative pressure is maintained. A large
break of liquid helium from the magnet coolants would slowly pressurize the cryostat. This has no
public consequences unless there is concurrent mobilization of radioactivity from a coolant line or
vacuum vessel failure. However, preliminary calculations for the Non Site-specific Safety Report
(NSSR) show that one coolant loop breach into the cryostat gives about 0.8 atmosphere, and the ten
loop beyond design basis accident gives significantly higher pressures.[4-13]
Another issue is releasing the overpressure from water breaks. Breaks within the first
confinement barrier (vacuum vessel) trigger opening of pressure relief at 0.2 MPa, leading to the
suppression tank. The first confinement barrier itself is designed up to 0.5 MPa and calculations show
that although 0.2 MPa is exceeded because of the finite blowdown capacity, 0.5 MPa is sufficient even
for a break involving all first wall coolant systems. Breaks of the primary HTS, also part of the first
confinement barrier, are surrounded by guard pipes inside the CV, and the HTS vault outside the CV.
This has several advantages: the guard pipes and vault are more independent from the first barrier
than is the cryostat; water blowdown pressure is routed to the vaults, away from other radioactivity
sources; magnets are protected. More details about the design of the confinement barriers inside the
tokamak building are presented in the following sections.
Table 2-1: Confinement Barriers in Tokamak Building
First Confinement Barriers Second Confinement Barriers
Vacuum Vessel Cryostat Vessel
Vacuum Vessel NBI' Penetration Neutron Beam Cell
Vacuum Pump Ports and Isolation Valves Guard Pipe to Tritium Plant
PHTS2 inside the CV3  Guard Pipes and Cryostat Vessel
PHTS inside the HTS4 Vaults HTS Vaults
VV5 Pressure Suppression Tank Suppression Tank Vault
Diagnostics Windows Isolation Valves Diagnostics Rooms
Vacuum Vessel Penetrations Local Boxes
'NBI: Neutron Beam Injection 4 HTS: Heat Transport System
2 PHTS: Primary Heat Transport System 5 VV: Vacuum Vessel
3 CV: Cryostat Vessel
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Table 2-2: ITER Design Guidelines for Releases to the Environment [2-3]
1 11 Ill IV
EVENT OPERATIONAL LIKELY UNLIKELY EXTREMELY
SEQUENCE EVENTS SEQUENCES SEQUENCES UNLIKELY
CATEGORY SEQUENCES
Category Events and plant Event sequences Event sequences Event sequences
Description conditions not planned but not likely to occur not likely to occur
planned and likely to occur one during the life of during the life of
required for ITER or more times the plant. the plant with a
normal operation, during the life of very large margin;
including some the plant but not limiting events for
faults and events including category "design basis" (a)
which can occur I events.
as a result of the
ITER
experimental
nature.
Typical list of operational f > _ 10 2/a 10~4/a < f < 102/a 1 0'6/a < f < 1 04/a
Annual events to be
Expected defined explicitly
Frequency
Release limit 0.5 g-T/a (c) 1 g-T/event 50 g-T/event 100 g-T/event
for HTO (b)
(not including (1 g-T/a integrated
maintenance to be over all Category
defined) I events)
Release limit TBD (e) 0.5 g-metal /event 25 g-metal/event 500 g-metal/event
for divertor-
first wall (0.5 g /a
activation integrated over all
products (d) Category 11
I events)II
(a) Beyond Category IV, some hypothetical category V events with even lower frequency will be
assessed for compliance with the no-evacuation goal and for reducing the associated risk, if
necessary; category V events are outside the "design basis."
(b) These are release limits for design purposes, based on the dose limits in General Safety
Evaluation Document (GSEDC), assuming atmospheric, elevated release. For tritium in HT
form, use 10 times the values shown here. For ground level release, use 10% of the values
shown here.
(c) This is a design guideline value of tritium release in routine operation, not including
maintenance operation to be defined.
(d) These are release limits for design purposes for 316SS, Cu-alloy, and W at the first wall or
divertor, based on the dose limits in GSEDC, assuming atmospheric elevated release. For
corrosion products in in-vessel systems, use 10 times the values shown here as a temporary
limit until the HTS systems are better defined and assessed. For ground level release, use 10%
of the values shown here.
(e) Appropriate release limits for activation products will be estimated later.
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2.3 Vacuum Vessel (VV)
2.3.1 General Design Description
The Vacuum Vessel is a part of the Tokamak Basic Machine and provides the primary high
vacuum and tritium boundary for the plasma. The main vessel is toroidally shaped and is located inside
the cryostat. It is supported from its lower side by steel structures that pass through the cryostat to the
concrete floor below. The twenty superconducting magnet toroidal field (TF) coils fit around the vessel
and define the details of its outer shape and the space available for ports, supports, and utility
connections. The blanket and divertor are mounted on the vessel interior and all loads are transferred
through the vessel to the vessel supports. The blanket and divertor provide shielding for the vessel
and all three provide shielding for the coils.
The vacuum vessel is divided toroidally into twenty sectors joined by field welding at the central
plane of the ports. The vessel has twenty upper, midplane, and lower ports which are used for
equipment installation and maintenance, utility feed-throughs, and vacuum pumping. The cover plates
for the upper ports of the vacuum vessel are used as feed-throughs for the blanket cooling pipes, a
viewing system, and diagnostics. Bellows around the blanket coolant feed-throughs must absorb
differential thermal expansion between the blanket and the vacuum vessel, and withstand the high
pressures resulting from off-normal conditions. The midplane ports are used for replacement of
primary first wall / shield modules, test modules, the ICRF and/or ECRF systems, diagnostics, and
installation of remote handling tools. The lower horizontal ports are used for replacement of divertor
cassettes and vacuum pumping. Bellows are employed between the port ducts and the cryostat.
The four main sub-components of the vessel system include the main vessel, port assemblies,
support structures for in-vessel components, and gravity supports.
The main vessel is made from SS 316 LN and has a double wall structure. The minimum and
maximum radii of the vacuum vessel are 4.1 m and 13 m respectively, and the overall height is 14.5
m. The inner and outer shells are made of welded plates, 40 mm in thickness. The inner and outer
shells and stiffening ribs between them are joined by welding, which gives the vessel the required
mechanical strength. The total thickness of this structure is typically in the range of 0.45 - 0.83 m. One
of the major functions of the vacuum vessel is neutron shielding, and the space between the shells will
be filled with an array of plate inserts. Water flowing in the space between the plates is required to
remove nuclear heat deposition of 3 - 5 MW.
The support structures are used to mechanically support the vessel, blanket, and divertor, and
must withstand structural loads due to gravity, earthquakes, and induced electromagnetic loads. Each
vessel sector is supported by a single support at the bottom of the sector in an area centered between
the TF coils. Once the support extends below the TF coil, "A" - frame structures are used to transfer
the load to the cryostat and to the cryostat supports below. The inboard and outboard blanket
segments are supported from brackets attached to the inner wall of the vacuum vessel. The support
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structures must withstand a large vertical force due to vertical disruption events (VDE), and allow for
differential thermal expansion. The divertor cassettes are supported by two rails that extend around the
bottom of the vessel.
Figure 2-3 represents one of the twenty segments of the vacuum vessel.
2.3.2 Vacuum Vessel Functions
The primary functions performed by the vacuum vessel are listed below [2-6]:
1. Provide the first confinement barrier around the radioactive materials in the plasma, the in-vessel
components and the related loops, and withstand accidents without losing confinement. The VV
also provides one of two barriers that separate air from hydrogen that could be generated by
accidents inside the VV boundary.
2. Remove nuclear decay heat of all in-vessel components, even in conditions when the other
coolants are not functioning.
3. Limit the pressure due to accidents inside the VV using a pressure suppression system (connected
to the VV) which is part of the first confinement barrier.
4. Provide a boundary consistent with the generation and maintenance of a high quality vacuum, to
create conditions for plasma fusion reaction.
5. Mount in-vessel components and support electromagnetic loads during plasma disruptions and
vertical displacement events.
6. Together with the first wall and blanket, maintain a specified toroidal electrical resistance and
contribute to plasma stability.
7. Together with the first wall, blanket, and divertor, provide adequate radiation shielding for the
superconducting coils.
8. Provide access ports for in-vessel components maintenance equipment, diagnostics and plasma
heating methods, and blanket test modules.
The first three functions on the above list are also the Safety Functions of the VV.
To meet its confinement function, the VV shall reduce the potential for the release of
radioactive materials and ensure that any releases are within prescribed limits during and after
operating states and within acceptable limits during and after accident conditions. The design basis for
confinement barrier shall take into account all initiating events and loads due to accidents as identified
by the safety analyses.
The main vessel is a first strong safety confinement barrier and must be designed to withstand
the following loads during normal or off-normal operation without losing confinement:
* All possible combinations of internal and external pressure due to off normal conditions such as
coolant (water) or cryogenic fluid leakage;
0 Electromagnetic loads:
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0 during normal operation: experienced as a result of eddy currents in the vessel interacting
with the magnetic field crossing them;
0 during faults such as: control failures, power supply failures, bus opens or shorts, magnet
faults;
0 vertical displacement events (VDE), plasma disruptions: induced in the vessel as a result
of control loss of the plasma;
" Static loads: self-weight and weight of internal components;
" Interaction loads: forces induced on the internal components, blanket back plate and divertor
mounts, that are transmitted to the VV during normal or fault conditions;
* Forces applied during installation and removal of in-vessel components; forces to remove failed
components may be much higher than for installation due to components deformation, welding, or
seizing;
" Natural phenomena such as: seismic loads on the vessel and seismic loads transmitted to the VV
from the in-vessel components; wind; floods. These are site-specific loads, and will be evaluated
after choosing the ITER site;
* Thermal loads: the normal operating thermal load shall include transient thermal loads during
pulsed operation as well as the temperature distribution during bakeout and wall conditioning;
" Loss of coolant loads;
" Hydrogen detonation loads;
" Site-generated missile impact loads.
The list above refers to individual loads, but consideration should be given to the possibility of
having combined loads acting simultaneously on the vacuum vessel. In addition, the vacuum vessel is
subject to cyclic loading during normal operation. Thermal cycling and unavoidable disruption loads are
expected. Cyclic loading can be defined on load-time diagrams so that fatigue analysis can be
performed.
The VV and its HTS shall remove the heat generated at normal fusion power and, according
to its safety function, the decay heat released after operational states (including off-normal burn
conditions) and accidents. Heat removal should be as passive as possible. It is suggested to design
the HTS to allow for removal of the decay heat by natural coolant circulation.
During normal operation, the total heat deposition in the vacuum vessel is 3 MW with a
maximum nuclear heating rate of -0.04 MW/m 3. The heat load on the vessel due to the decay heat
from all in-vessel systems is even higher at 5 MW. The vacuum vessel heat transfer fluid is water for
both cooling and baking. The coolant enters through the wall of the divertor port and flows around the
vessel and finally exits at a point near the coolant entrance. This design allows all vessel cooling piping
to be located on the outside of the cryostat eliminating the need for piping to be double contained and
making the addition of instrumentation and leak testing systems much easier. There are two
independent cooling loops (100% redundancy) each composed by ten sectors (every other one)
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connected in series with a given loop. A valve in the pipe connecting adjacent sectors allows a sector
to be isolated for leak testing. The main conditions of the water cooling are summarized in Table 2-3.
Table 2-3: Vacuum Vessel Cooling Parameters
State Parameter
Normal Operation
Off-Normal Operation
Normal Operation
Total Heat Load
Maximum Heat Deposition Rate
Coolant Flow Rate
Inlet/Outlet Temperature
Coolant Velocity
Inlet/Outlet Pressure
Maximum Vessel Wall Temperature
Total Heat Load
Maximum Heat Deposition Rate
Coolant Flow Rate (natural convection)
Inlet/Outlet Temperature
Coolant Velocity
Inlet/Outlet Pressure
Maximum Vessel Wall Temperature
Maximum Heat Up Time
Maximum Heat Deposition Rate
Maximum Inlet Temperature
Inlet/Outlet Pressure
Maximum Vessel Wall Temperature
Value
3 MW
-0.04 MW/m 3
-65 kg/s (0.065 m3/s)
~100 C/111 C
-0.01 - 0.3 m/s
-2.0/1.9 MPa
-160 C
5 MW
-0.07 MW/m 3
-36 kg/s (0.36 m3/s)
-150 C / 182 C
-0.005 - 0.15 m/s
-2.0/1.9 MPa
-280 C
-100 hr.
-0.0 MW/m 3
-200 C
-2.5/2.4 MPa
-200 C
During normal operation, the large variation in the flow velocity is caused by the parallel circuit
design and the large change in the flow cross-section around the sector.
The pressure suppression system is a large tank used to limit the maximum vessel pressure
during an off normal event. The connection to the vacuum vessel is by four 1 m2 ducts located on the
bottom of four divertor ports. The ducts, which lead to the suppression tank, are fitted with rupture
discs which isolate the tank from the vessel during normal operation.
The vacuum vessel pressure suppression system will be similar to that of a commercial BWR
suppression system. The system is foreseen as consisting of 4 relief pipes of 1 m bore, equispaced
around the tokamak, which connect to the vacuum vessel at their inlet end and to the suppression tank
at the outlet end. The relief pipes have rupture discs to separate the ultra high vacuum environment
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inside the vacuum vessel from that of the suppression tank, which will contain water and its vapor at a
saturation pressure corresponding to room temperature.
To protect the vacuum vessel and internal components from the effects of premature opening
of the rupture discs when not pressure loaded, double disc assemblies are used, one at the vacuum
vessel end of the relief pipe and the other at the suppression tank end (a rupture disc assembly is
required at the vacuum vessel end to disconnect the relief pipe from the vacuum vessel to avoid
interference with the in-vessel gas introduction system dynamics). Both these assemblies have two
discs with controlled interspaces for leak monitoring. Additionally the pipe interspace between the disc
assemblies is also a controlled interspace. These three interspaces will be evacuated under normal
operation conditions to lower the absolute pressure at which the discs open in order the reduce the
fluid inertia loading on the internal components of the suppression tank.
The internal components of the suppression tank consist of manifolds which distribute the
incoming steam from the 1 m diameter relief pipes into many small bore so-called "organ" pipes, the
discharge ends of which are below the free surface of the suppression water. The function of these
"organ" pipes is to form a discharging steam jet of small enough diameter so that when it breaks up in
the water, the resulting steam bubbles have a short enough collapse (condensation) time to maintain
the pressure in the suppression tank at a value close to the prevailing water saturation value. The
design is such as to limit the final water temperature, after a loss of in-vacuum coolant event, to 770C,
in line with current BWR suppression practice.
The suppression tank will have pipe connections from the water and gas spaces to the tritium
plant, so that tritiated water and non-condensable gases can be routed there for processing. The
portion of the suppression system outside the cryostat will be contained in a ferro-concrete cell which
will form part of the radiological second barrier.
The instrumentation and control for the VV include monitoring vessel and cooling water
temperature, water pressure, and local vessel stresses.
The VV safety assessment should include the analysis of the following events:
Vacuum vessel
0 Overpressure from water LOCAs in the VV;
0 Pressure loads to the VV from rupture of water coolant or cryogen pipes in the cryostat;
0 Temperature transients of in-vessel and VV equipment from LOFAs and from in- and ex-vessel
LOCAs;
0 Pressure transients from air ingress into the VV;
0 Electromagnetic loads under disruptions;
0 Mechanical loads to the VV from magnet accidents;
0 Thermal loads to the VV from magnet accidents (such as electrical arcs).
Pressure suppression system
0 Overpressure transients from water LOCAs into the VV which trigger venting.
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2.3.3 Vacuum Vessel Interfacing Systems
The VV Interfacing Systems are as follows:
" Magnet Structure : the main vessel will provide the structural mount points where the "A" frame
supports will be attached;
* Blanket: the main vessel will provide the structural mount points on the inner skin of the vessel
where the blanket support structures will be attached; the VV port assemblies provide the cover
plate for the upper port and the feed-throughs and bellows required for blanket cooling;
" Blanket Test Modules: the middle vessel ports will be access ports for these systems;
" Divertor: the main vessel will provide mounting rails along the inner skin of the vessel for divertor
attachment. The port extensions for the lower ports will provide a weld interface flange for the
divertor feed through flange. The lower port will also have a port opening for the pressure
suppression system;
* Thermal Shield: The VV will provide mounting bosses on the outer skin for attachment of the
thermal shield.
" Cryostat: the middle and lower vessel port assemblies interface with the cryostat. Extensions and
bellows from the cryostat will weld directly to the vessel ports. The lower port will also have a port
opening for the pressure suppression system;
" Vacuum Pumping System: the vacuum pump will mount to the shield plug in the lower port. The
shield plug will provide the required feed-through holes;
" Diagnostics: Some diagnostics will be mounted directly to the inner wall of the vessel. Some small
diagnostic ports may be required for diagnostics.
* Heating and Current Drive Systems: the middle vessel ports will be access ports for these
systems;
" Vacuum Vessel Coolant System: the cooling pipes for the vessel and port assemblies will route
water for cooling and baking to the vessel sectors.
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Figure 2-3: ITER Vacuum Vessel Segment
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2.4 Cryostat Vessel (CV)
2.4.1 General Design Description
The cryostat is the vacuum vessel containing the ITER tokamak. It consists of a cylindrical
section bolted to torispherical heads at top and bottom. The top head is split into flanged concentric
sections to permit PF and CS coil removal without removing the entire head. The vessel is made up of
two walls connected by horizontal and vertical ribs. The space between the walls is normally filled with
helium at slightly above atmospheric pressure, so that any leaks developing in the outer wall are
outward and any leaks developing in the inner wall are detected at maximum sensitivity by the cryostat
leak detection cryosorption pump. Temporary mitigation of any inner wall leaks (until the next planned
machine shutdown) can be obtained by reducing the interspace pressure down to a lower limit of 1
kPa, this pressure being the minimum required to ensure that the inner and outer walls are adequately
thermally coupled to limit interwall stresses to acceptable values during a loss of magnet cooling
helium event.
The cryostat is 36.5 m outside diameter and height. The inside wall radius is 18 m and the
height of the cylindrical section is 20.9 m. The head spherical and knuckle radii are 30 and 3 m,
respectively. There is 1.75 m minimum gap between the inner cryostat wall and the machine. The walls
are nominally 20 mm thick and the separated by a 200 mm interspace. The interspace region is
divided into at least 5 compartments, 3 in the top cover, and one each in the cylinder and in the lower
cover.
The cryostat mass is 2165 tones including ribs, flanges, reinforcement and support skirt. Its
internal surface area and volume are 5,030 m2 and 31,400 m3 , respectively. With 12,800 m3 taken up
by the machine, main bellows, and cooling pipe shrouds, the cryostat free volume is 18,600 M3 .
The cryostat design loading is 0.1 MPa (abs) external and 0.2 MPa internal. The latter
pressure which would stem from venting of coil helium into the cryostat vacuum due to a fault
condition. This helium, which contains no radioactivity, is vented to a stack should internal pressure go
above the 0.2 MPa limit.
The cryostat must provide the vacuum for the machine superconducting magnets, form part of
the radiological secondary containment, and provide removal of decay heat during beyond design
basis events. Also, it must provide access ways and corridors for diagnostic lines of sight, the
introduction of additional heating beams and the deployment of remote handling equipment, and
provide feed-through penetrations for all the equipment connecting elements of systems outside the
cryostat to the corresponding elements inside the cryostat.
The cryostat and all appendages forming part of its vacuum envelope shall be of double wall
structure with controlled interspaces for leak detection. This configuration is required to satisfy the CV
Safety Function as a Second Tokamak Confinement Boundary. The controlled interspaces help to
maintain a satisfactory low leak rate by providing a secondary leak barrier.
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The cryostat vessel is designed to withstand all loads applied during the normal and off-normal
operational regimes, and at specified accidental and fault conditions. Specific loads are given in Table
2-4.
Table 2-4: Cryostat Operating State Parameters
Parameter Value
External pressure (absolute) 0.1 MPa
Nominal max internal pressure 0.2 MPa
Max interspace pressure 0.2 MPa
Min interspace pressure 0
Free internal volume 18,600 m3
Normal temperature 300 K
Maximum temperature 500 K
Minimum temperature 4.5 K
Maximum in/out wall AT 40 K
During normal operation the temperature of the cryostat metallic structure will remain
close to room temperature. Under design basis accident conditions of loss of magnet or primary heat
transport system coolant, the cryostat metallic structure may be subject to transient contact by low
temperature (4.5 K) or high temperature (up to 500 K) fluids.
The nominal pressure inside the Cryostat Vessel at the start normal operation conditions shall
be less than 10-3 Pa total gas pressure with the partial pressure of residual air or nitrogen not to exceed
10% of the total.
The position of the CV in the tokamak pit is represented in Figures 2-5 and 2-6.
2.4.2 Cryostat Vessel Functions
The CV safety functions are as follows:
1. Provide the second confinement barrier for radioactive materials in the loops and in the torus;
2. Provide a barrier for air to separate it from hydrogen that could be generated by accidents in the
torus boundary;
3. Limit the pressure due to accidents inside the CV;
4. Provide thermal shielding for the superconducting magnets during normal operation;
5. Provide first barrier during some maintenance operations on the torus boundary.
The cryostat should be designed to withstand the following individual loads:
. Static load: the weight of the cryostat and all supported hardware;
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* Normal operating pressure and thermal load;
" Interaction loads imposed by other components during normal or fault conditions:
0 Disruptions and VDE: interaction loads on the cryostat from the vacuum vessel and in-
vessel hardware;
0 Vacuum Vessel: loads on the cryostat due to the vacuum vessel transient response to
design basis accidents;
0 Magnet system: loads on the cryostat due to the magnet system transient response to
design basis accidents;
" Natural phenomena hazard loads: earthquake, wind, flood;
" Site-generated missile impact load;
" Cryogen evaporation load.
Combined loads and cyclic loads (thermal and disruption loads) should also be considered in
the cryostat vessel design.
The cryostat overpressure protection system will consist of two relief paths connected in
parallel. The first will comprise a remote operated vacuum valve (operated from the ITER main control
room). This valve is used to mitigate overpressures which build slowly following loss of magnet helium
coolant into cryostat vacuum. The helium efflux temperature is in the region of 55 K and for the design
basis spillage the cryostat pressure just after the spillage is less that an atmosphere absolute, building
slowly thereafter on a time scale of hours. In these circumstances, the helium is vented to stack when
the pressure inside the cryostat exceeds atmospheric. In this way, opening of the rupture disc, and its
subsequent replacement are avoided. The second overpressure protection element is a rupture disc,
the discharge line from which is connected directly to the stack. This protects against overpressures
which build quickly, following for example, the rapid volatilization of air ice which had been frozen on
the magnet structures after an undetected air in-leakage, and which had fallen off after a coil quench.
Subsequent to such an event, the rupture disc would have to be replaced.
Instrumentation and Controls are required for the cryostat vacuum system, the interspace
leak detection system, the air ice detection system and the cryostat overpressure protection system.
The cryostat safety analysis should include but not be limited to the following events:
0 Over pressure transients from cryogen release;
0 Over pressure from water LOCA in the cryostat;
0 Overpressure from water LOCA in the vacuum vessel propagating into the cryostat;
0 Pressure transients from air breaks into the cryostat;
0 Risk of ozone explosions;
0 Ice buildup;
0 Arcing from magnets and busbars;
0 Internal and external missiles.
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2.4.3 Cryostat Vessel Interfacing Systems
Cryostat Interfacing Systems are as follows:
" Superconducting coils and structures (vacuum and thermal);
" Heat Transport System (secondary containment and leak mitigation);
* Vacuum vessel (pressure suppression);
" Tritium Plant (detritiation systems);
* All systems using cryostat penetrations ( Diagnostics, additional heating, HTS etc.);
* Remote handling;
* Vacuum leak detection (magnet performance and detection of accident precursors);
* CODAC (integrated control and interlocking).
2.5 Primary Heat Transfer Systems (PHTS)
The PHTS consists of pipework containing the pressurized water coolant, valves, pumps, heat
exchangers, pressurizes, drain tanks, a blow down tank and associated instrumentation and auxiliary
equipment. During plasma operation, the PHTS transfer heat generated in components (first wall,
blanket shield, vacuum vessel, divertor, auxiliary heating systems, test blanket modules, diagnostics)
to the environment (air, water) via Secondary Heat Transfer Systems (SHTS) or directly to cooling
towers, or air. The total heat load to be dissipated during a plasma pulse is in the order of 2.6 GW. In
between pulses, the PHTS remove decay heat from the plasma facing components (first wall including
baffles and limiters, divertor) as well as shield and vacuum vessel. The expected maximum decay heat
generation at plasma shutdown is < 25 MW, decreasing after one day to less than 5 MW.
The PHTS also provide the baking function' of the in-vessel components and the vessel itself
(up to 200*C or higher consistent with saturation pressure) as well as the temperature control function
for the coolant feed streams to keep the components within a specified temperature window.
Due to the build-up of activated corrosion products and permeation of tritium through the first
wall into coolant, the PHTS, especially the loops serving first wall including baffles and limiters, as well
as divertor, will gradually build up radioactive inventory. To keep the activity to acceptably low levels,
the affected PHTS loops will be connected to a chemical control system (to scrub suspended activation
products and to inhibit corrosion) as well as to a water detritiation plant. PHTS loops with anticipated
higher levels of activated corrosion products and tritium are expected to require a secondary loop in
order to avoid that a heat exchanger tube failure results in unacceptable environmental release. It is
'in-vessel components and the inner vessel walls will require periodic surface conditioning to maintain
acceptable plasma operating conditions.
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assumed that the divertor and first wall (including baffles and limiters), and the blanket test modules
will have secondary loops.
With respect to overall functional requirements, the PHTS loops can be divided into three
categories:
1. loops that remove the heat deposited during plasma pulses, and provide baking and temperature
inlet control function as well as decay heat removal (all in-vessel components and systems located
in main ports, e.g. test blanket modules etc.);
2. the VV PHTS loops which, in addition to the functions above, also provide heat removal safety
function, i.e. decay heat removal, when all other loops are not available for this function;
3. loops that simply provide a heat removal function during operation but have no baking or decay
heat removal function (NBI, certain diagnostics etc.).
At the time of publication of the present work, no design work has been undertaken for the heat
transfer systems in the category 3. As far as categories 1 and 2 are concerned, the layout of the loops
will probably not change; however, the thermohydraulic parameters are not yet frozen. We will present
here the description and parameters of categories 1 and 2 as given in the Design Description
Documents published in June 5, 1995.
2.5.1 First Wall and Shield Blanket PHTS
The FW/SB PHTS is divided into four loops. Two of these loops include all the baffle and
limiter modules, whereas the other two include only "normal" blanket modules. The former, due to high
heat fluxes, dominate the pressure drop requirement, and to reduce the overall amount of coolant
required, the flow through blanket modules with less heat input will be appropriately throttled (baffle,
limiter and other coolant flows). Each loop serves ten inboard and ten outboard sectors comprising
each of three outboard and two inboard arrays of blanket modules. The present pipework layout work
is based on routing all these pipes from their connection point to the FW/SB arrays to the HTS vaults
where they are manifolded into headers and collectors. These are then connected to the heat
exchanger and the pump. The pump, heat exchanger and pipework diameter are all being sized for the
maximum heat load. Within the vault, the PHTS pipe diameter is 1,200 mm, and the approximate size
of the intermediate heat exchangers is 4.5 m diameters, 14.2 m high. Integrated in the first wall are the
ICRF antennae and ECH mirror assembly. Their power loading is very similar to the FW/SB modules,
and their cooling is integrated in parallel with blanket modules.
Due to the large variation in heat input in the individual blanket modules, both temporal and
geometrical during a pulse, the overall temperature increase of the coolant will be below 400C, which
results in large loop components. Due to build up of activated corrosion products and the gradual
tritiation of the coolant due to permeation of tritium through FW material, the use of a secondary,
intermediate loop is being considered in the present design.
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Baking will be achieved by heating up the water by the pump power combined with bypassing
of the heat sink, the intermediate heat exchanger. This requires also good thermal insulation of all the
loop components. During detailed design it will be decided whether additional external heating will be
required, by means of electrical heaters in a bypass of the main loop, in order to arrive within an
acceptable time frame at the baking temperature which will be 200 - 2200C for an inlet pressure of 3
MPa.
During an operational period, the FW components should be maintained within a prescribed
temperature window despite the pulsed nature of plasma operation. Temperature control is intended
to be achieved by controlled bypassing of the heat exchanger. During the dwell time (between pulses),
only a trickle stream needs to be cooled commensurate with the decay heat deposited in the FW. Due
to the fact that the FW components have a high thermal capacity, valve activation may be slow thereby
avoiding any cavitation problems.
The use of the large pumps is not economically justifiable for removal of decay heat and
control of temperatures during extended interpulse periods. Hence it is intended to fit small (possibly in
the range of 20 kW or so) pony motors for this mode of operation. These could be also powered by
emergency power, if required. The large thermal capacity of the FW/SB should be amenable to start up
of the pony motors one or two hours after failure of site power. While not a mandatory requirement,
establishment of natural convection for removal of decay heat would be considered a safety advantage
and the detailed loop design will consider this issue. Maintaining regular forced circulation is also
important during long shutdown periods for maintaining good chemistry control of the coolant
throughout the loop.
The main loop data are listed in Table 2-5 and Table 2-6 for the loops serving "normal" blanket
modules and those serving baffle, limiter modules respectively.
37
Table 2-5: Main Data for FW/SB PHTS Loops 1 and 3 (only normal modules)
Parameter Value
Thermal Power/Loop 603 MW
Coolant Inlet Temp. 100 "C
Coolant Outlet Temp. 134C
Coolant Inlet Pressure 3.0 MPa
In-Vessel Pressure Drop 0.1 MPa
In-Vessel Water Holdup 102 m3
Number of Loops 2 Loops
Flow Rate/Loop 4195 kg/s
Loop Pipe Diameter (*1) 1.2 m
Pressure Drop (*2) 0.56 MPa
Total Water Holdup (*3) 842 m3
Pumping Power/Loop 3.5 MW
Pump Size 3.2 m-D x 6.7 m-H
Heat Exchanger:
- HX Size 4.5 m-D x 14.2 m-H
- Heat Transfer Surface 11430 m2 /Loop
- Tube Number 12520 Loop
Pressurizer Size 3.2 m-D x 8.5 m-H
(*1) Fluid velocity: v = approx. 4.0 m/s
(*2) Total pressure drop including In-vessel components, Heat exchanger and piping
(*3) Assumed Pipe length : (Loop) = 40 m/Loop, (Sub-1) = 40 m/Loop, (Sub-2) = 7000 m/Loop
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Table 2-6: Main Data for FW/SB PHTS Loops 2 and 4 (including baffles, limiters, ICRF, ECH)
Parameter Value
Thermal power/Loop 358 MW
Coolant inlet temp. 100 *C
Coolant outlet temp. 122 0C
Coolant inlet pressure 3.0 MPa
In-vessel pressure drop 0.3 MPa
In-vessel water holdup 41 m3
Number of Loops 2 Loops
Flow rate/Loop 3860 kg/s
Loop pipe diameter (*1) 1.2 m
Pressure drop (*2) 0.7 MPa
Total water holdup 745 m3
Pumping power/Loop 4.0 MW
Pump size 3.3 m-D x 6.9 m-H
Heat exchanger:
- Size 4.3 m-D x 12.5 m-H
- Heat transfer surface 8520 m3/ Loop
- Tube number 11460 / Loop
Pressurizer size 3.1 m-D x 8.0 m-H
(*1) Fluid velocity: v = approx. 3.6 m/sec
(*2) Total pressure drop including In-vessel components, Heat exchanger and piping
(*3) Assumed pipe length: (Loop) = 40 m/Loop, (Sub-1) = 40 m/Loop, (sub-2) = 7000 m/ Loop
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2.5.2 Divertor PHTS
Four loops have been selected as this allows a single very large pump per loop. Also this
division into loops does match the quadrant of individual modules that would be replaced (if required)
through a single maintenance port, so that this would allow replacement of a complete quadrant of
divertor cassettes without having to drain the other quadrants.
Several options for the routing of pipework from the divertor ports to the HTS vaults are still
under consideration. Components for two loops are located in each of the two vaults. The pipes to
each individual cassette are approximately 150 mm in diameter. The diameter of the combined pipes
to the pump and heat exchanger is approximately 600 mm. Due to the very high heat loads on
components of the divertor cassettes, high pressure drop and flow requirements exist and therefore
large and powerful pumps are required (2.2 MW) as well as a high coolant inlet pressure (4 MPa).
The heat exchangers between the primary and secondary coolants have been tentatively
sized. They will be of the tube and shell type with floating end developed for PWRs for improved
inspectability and minimization of exposure of maintenance personnel.
The high pumping power coupled with good thermal insulation of the pipework and other loop
components may suffice for baking the divertor cassettes without use of external heat source. It does,
of course, require valves to bypass the intermediate heat exchanger in this mode of operation.
Controlled bypass valves will be required for cassette inlet temperature control in any case.
Having two identical loops side by side in each vault opens up the possibility of interconnecting
the loops by non-automatic valves so that pump and/or heat exchanger of one loop could be used for
both loops simultaneously in case this is required for maintenance or other operation. Such an
interconnection will not allow, however, full power operation but some reduced power operation may be
feasible. During non operation period, the Divertor PHTS still has to remove decay heat. It would not be
very economic to run the large pumps for this, and hence it is planned to have additional small pony
motors that provide the power for the pumps to generate forced circulation under these conditions.
With the heat exchanger positioned at a level some 25 - 35 m above the cassettes, it is likely that
natural circulation will develop as well.
The very high thermal flux in certain position dictates the use of copper components wetted by
coolant in the cassettes, which may produce erosion and corrosion products. A dedicated chemical
and volume control system will be required and the present design assumes the use of a secondary,
intermediate loop.
The main loop parameters are given in Table 2-7. The loop layout, temperature control, etc. is
more or less identical to that of the FW/SB PHTS loops.
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Table 2-7: Main Data for Divertor PHTS Loop
Parameter Value
Thermal Power 400 MW
Coolant Inlet Temp. 150 *C
Coolant Outlet Temp. 175 *C
Coolant Inlet Pressure 4.0 MPa
In-Vessel Pressure Drop 0.85 MPa
In-Vessel Water Holdup 42 m3
Number of Loops 4 Loops
Flow Rate 3690 kg/s
Loop Pipe Diameter (*1) 0.6 m
Pressure Drop (*2) 1.53 MPa
Total Water Holdup (*3) 281 m3
Pumping Power 2.2 MW / Loop
Pump Size 2.7 m-D x 6.0 m-H
Heat Exchanger:
- Size 1.9 m-D x 6.7 m-H
- Heat Transfer Surface 900 m2 /Loop
- Tube Number 192/Loop
Pressurizer Size 1.8 m-D x 5.0 m-H
(*1) Fluid velocity: v approx. 4.0 m/sec
(*2) Total pressure drop including In-vessel components, Heat exchanger and piping
(*3) Assumed pipe length : (Loop)=20m/Loop,(Sub-1)=20 m/ Loop, (Sub-2) = 2400 m/Loop
2.5.3 Vacuum Vessel PHTS
The VV PHTS is divided in two loops. Each of two independent loops serves half each VV
sector (1/20 - th of VV), so that, in case of failure of a complete loop, the other loop can take over its
duty. Each loop will be designed for removing the full in-vessel decay heat (< 5 MW after one day) by
natural convection. The thermal capacity of the in-vessel components is such that removal of decay
heat could be disrupted for several hours without adverse effects on components. Normal removal of
heat would be by forced circulation as this will allow to achieve the temperature control function.
To bake the vessel at 200 *C will require heating of the coolant by external means. Electrical
heaters mounted inside a bypass line of the main loops are envisaged for this purpose.
To keep the water inlet temperature during normal operation at a reasonably constant value,
bypassing, probably using three - way control valves, of the heat exchanger will be required. The loop
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pumps will be located in the vaults together with the valves and heaters. The two water to air heat
exchangers are intended to be positioned on top of adjacent buildings. This gives a high height
difference between the vacuum vessel and the heat sink which is promoting natural convection. For
each of the two loops, the pipe diameter will be approximately 100 mm, the pump will have a power of
50 kW.
It should be noted that double containment around the VV PHTS pipework is not strictly
necessary, as the VV itself will be designed and built to a stringent code of practice forming barrier
number one and therefore the PHTS pipework .and components provide the second barrier.
Consequently, the VV PHTS does not have to be secondary contained, thereby allowing the HXs to be
positioned outside the HTS vaults. The main VV HTS loop data are given in Table 2-8.
The requirement that the VV PHTS must be available under all circumstances as it is a safety
system for decay heat removal is covered by simplicity and redundancy. Simplicity is given by the
natural convection capability, and redundancy by having two loops each of which able to transfer
passively the full decay heat burden. It should be noted that the total decay heat will fall to
approximately 1 MW a few days after shutdown. The very large thermal capacity of the in-vessel
components and the vessel itself could then allow interruption of the cooling function of the VV PHTS
and all other PHTS loops probably for days or even weeks without adverse effect. This shows that,
while eventually heat needs to be dissipated, the so-called safety function of the VV PHTS in this
respect is not comparable to that of the emergency cooling system of a fission reactor.
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Table 2-8: Main Data for VV PHTS Loop
Normal Operation
Thermal Power/Loop 1.5 MW
Coolant Inlet Temp. 100 *C
Coolant Outlet Temp. 111 *C
Coolant Inlet Pressure 2.0 MPa
In-Vessel Pressure Drop 0.1 MPa
In-Vessel Water Holdup 425 m3
Off-Normal Operation
5 MW
100 *C
195 *C
2.0 MPa
0.04 MPa
425 m3
Number of Loops 2 Loops 1 Loop
Flow Rate/Loop 32 kg/s 12.35 kg/s
Loop Pipe Diameter (*1) 0.15 m 0.15 m
Pressure Drop (*2) 0.1 MPa 0.04 MPa
Total Water Holdup (*3) -725 m' -725 m3
Pumping Power/Loop 0.5 MW -
Pump Size 0.6 m-D x 2.4 m-H -
Heat Exchanger (*4):
- Size 12 m-L x 6.5m-W - 12 m-L x 6.5m-W
- Heat Transfer Surface 9135 m2/Loop 9135 m2/Loop
Pressurizer Size 2.7 m-D x 7.7 m-H 2.7 m-D x 7.7 m-H
(*1) Fluid velocity: v = approx. 1.9 m/sec
(*2) Total pressure drop including In-vessel components, Heat exchanger and piping
(*3) Assumed pipe length : 230 m/Loop
(*4) Air Cooled Type HX
2.5.4 Blowdown Tank and Refilling System
Short term malfunctions may lead to the pressure relief valves of the PHTS loops being
actuated. To catch the released water/steam mixture, it is intended to install a blowdown tank, common
to all PHTS systems, alongside the drain tanks at the lower pit level. The tank will be partially filled with
water into which the incoming water/steam mixture will be injected. Tentative sizing is based on 20 m3
tank volume.
44
2.6 PHTS's Secondary Confinement
Within the cryostat, PHTS pipework is secondary contained for reasons of machine protection,
i.e. to ensure that primary pipework leaks do not cause failure of in-cryostat component (particularly
coils). Outside the cryostat, the PHTS is secondary contained for a different reason: it is a requirement
that there shall be always at least two barriers between plasma and environment. As discussed in
Section 2.2, it is difficult to claim safety barrier credit for the first wall and hence the requirement for at
least two barriers leads to the need to envelope the PHTS by a second barrier. The pipework
penetrating through the cryostat are therefore enclosed by a secondary pipe. As such an individual
envelope is very difficult to apply to large components like pumps, heat exchangers, etc., it has been
decided to locate these inside special rooms - vaults, which form the secondary barrier. These vaults
are inside the Reactor Hall along the East and West side of the pit. These positions give the shortest
pipe lengths between first wall components and the large PHTS components.
A large ex-vessel LOCA within the secondary pipework to the HTS vaults or within the vaults
will cause flashing to steam of the released water and, depending on the loop hold up, could rapidly
cause overpressurization of the secondary containment provided by the HTS vaults which have a
design pressure of 0.17 MPa.
To prevent overpressurization and to reduce to low levels environmental release of radioactive
material (activated corrosion products and tritium) contained within the coolant, it is intended to
connect to each vault a filter vent system which are connected to the vaults by large diameter ducts
(several meters diameter) and rupture or blow panels.
Different concepts of filter vent or vent systems have been developed for water-cooled power
plants (PWR/BWR) including pressure suppression pool, gravel beds and ice condensers. Although
design conditions for the ITER filter vent system are quite different from those for PWR/BWR, similar
design technology will be applicable.
The configuration of a water pool/bed type filter vent system is relatively simple and composed
of low pressure blow panels and/or rupture discs, high throughput vent duct, high speed steam
distributor, high efficiency steam condenser (water pool), HEPA filters, and isolation valves. A
preliminary sizing of a filter vent system has been made for the ITER HTS vaults based on obsolete
PHTS parameters. The location of the system should be as close as possible to the vaults to minimize
friction losses in the duct. The systems have been tentatively sized an located inside the Reactor Hall
building, adjacent to (just North of) the HTS vaults.
A preferred alternative from a safety point of view is to relief the overpressure into a
suppression tank, but that is less likely due to the very large tank volumes required to mitigate a
guillotine break of a large pipe of the FW or Divertor loop.
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2.7 Tokamak Building (TB)
2.7.1 General Design Description
The primary functions performed by the tokamak building are to house, support, protect and
provide a suitable environment, and control access to the components and systems which are located
inside the building. In addition, the building provides some general services such as lighting, power,
and fluids. The building has also been assigned some of the functions which contribute to the
protection of the safety of workers and the public.
The Tokamak Building is located in the center of the hypothetical site. It is composed of three
contiguous halls with the Tokamak Hall at the center, the Assembly Hall at the south end and the
Laydown Hall at the north end. Tokamak Hall is structurally attached to the Tritium Building at the east
end and to the Electrical Termination Building at the west end for the purpose of being structurally
stable. At the east and west sides of the Assembly Hall, there are Tokamak Services Buildings and at
the east side of the Laydown Hall, there are Hot Cell and Radwaste Buildings. Figures 2-5 and 2-6
represent the TB layout and cross-section.
The Tokamak Hall consists of the cryostat pit and crane hall. The structure of the Tokamak
Hall is reinforced concrete. The bottom of the pit basemat is -53 m relative to nominal grade. The
thickness of the basemat is 6 m. The pit is configured as a cylinder with 67 m inside diameter and 2 to
3 m variable thickness from the basemat to -9 m below grade level. From -9 m to grade, the pit has a
square shape, 67 m inner dimension with 2 m thickness wall.
The above-grade portion is the crane hall with a square shape, 71 m outer dimension, and 61
m height. At the east and west sides in the crane hall, there are vaults to accommodate Heat
Transport System. The crane hall is composed of frame structure in the east-west direction, which is
arranged on a 6.9 m pitch, and wall structure in the north-south direction. The frame consists of steel
reinforced concrete columns with the dimensions of 2 m width and 3.5 m depth and structural steel
trusses with 8 m depth. To make the frame stable, the adjacent buildings, Tritium and Electrical
Termination Buildings, are structurally attached to the Tokamak Hall. Those buildings are steel
reinforced concrete structures and are symmetrical. The dimensions of both buildings are 71 m north-
south length, 30 m east-west width, -11.5 m depth and 35 m height from the grade.
ITER buildings or rooms are classified into the following four zones:
1. WHITE ZONE: This includes offices and control rooms where the ventilation rates are decided by
the conventional standards.
2. GREEN ZONE: This comprises the radiation working areas which includes general working and
cell operating face zones within a building handling radioactive materials but which should not
become contaminated under normal conditions.
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3. AMBER ZONE: This includes service and maintenance areas for process equipment, cells and so
on. These zones can be contaminated when cell doors are opened, cell roof blocks removed for
transfer of materials, maintenance and similar purpose. Access between amber and green zones
should be under controlled conditions using interlocks and the transition zones where necessary.
4. RED ZONE: This comprises the internal cave or cell areas which are closed off from all access
under normal working conditions and which can be contaminated by the operations carried out in
the zone.
The areas in the Tokamak Buildings are assigned to the following classification.
" Cryostat extension vault and HTS vaults Red Zone
" Tokamak pit and Laydown basement Amber Zone
* Tokamak and Laydown crane halls Green Zone
" Assembly crane hall and basement White Zone
2.7.2 Tokamak Building Functions
The TB functions are the following:
* Accommodate Equipment
The largest single component in the building is the 40 m diameter cryostat which is centered in the pit.
The pit also contains all the components which must be in close proximity to the cryostat, such as
diagnostics, plasma heating, plasma fueling, remote maintenance equipment, and a large number of
service penetrations in the cryostat.
0 Protect Components from External Hazards
The building provides the resistance to the seismic load, wind load, snow load, tornado and wind
generated missiles as required. The magnitude of each load is determined by the site conditions and
the classification of the building. Because the building is not a strong safety barrier in the regulatory
sense, protection is provided if the building does not collapse or damage the equipment under design
basis conditions. The building must also continue to function as a ventilation system boundary,
directing all exhaust air to the stack.
& Tritium Control
The entire Tokamak building does not have a containment function, however the Heat Transport
System (HTS) vaults within the Tokamak building do have a confinement function. Primary coolant
system equipment and other components containing tritium will have confinement systems (e.g. HTS
vaults with vent-scrubbers) built around them. Additional tritium bearing equipment is located in the pit
area which will have a separate (higher velocity) ventilation system at negative pressure relative to the
rest of the building. This system will safely handle any small leaks from the confinement systems or
chronic releases during maintenance when confinement is breached. The crane hall and the other
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areas, which do not include tritiated equipment have a conventional ventilation system because tritium
leakage to these areas during machine operation is very unlikely. If tritium does enter the crane hall
area during major (open cryostat) maintenance of the machine, the ventilation system is reconfigured
and it is exhausted through the stack. This approach to tritium control by the ventilation systems
requires that tritiated components (such as Divertor cassette, Shield/Blanket segments, etc.) removed
from the machine must be placed in sealed containers to prevent the release of tritium to the building
atmosphere.
0 Provide Radiation Shielding
During the operating phase, there is protection against activated material inside the cryostat because
the cryostat is surrounded by a reinforced concrete bioshield. The bioshield is a load bearing structural
member supporting the floor slabs in the pit. Therefore while the Tokamak Hall does not have a
biological shielding function, the pit structures and crane hall floor have a major shielding function.
Additional shielding during tokamak operation is provided for the radiation leakage from the
penetrations of the cryostat/bioshield and from high energy N6 radiation from the primary coolant
loops. The Assembly and Laydown Halls have no shielding function. During maintenance activities,
activated components such as Shield/Blanket, Divertor, Diagnostic equipment, etc. will be transported
using casks. The building does not have the shielding function for the top access ports, but provides
shielding for components removed from horizontal access ports in the cryostat pit. Casks (top access)
may be transported using building cranes or on special trolleys that carry casks to the Hot Cells.
Containers with irradiated components from horizontal access ports are remotely moved around the pit
to a tunnel connecting with the Hot Cells.
A project requirement which applies to all design solutions is that the building and
components whose design interacts with the building (e.g. cryostat, lifting device(s), remote
maintenance casks, etc.) shall be evaluated to ensure that the minimum total proiect cost solution is
obtained consistent with the requirements for the building and the interfacing components.
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Table 2-9: Tokamak Building Compartments Parameters
Area V
Tokamak & Laydown Area Crane Hall 43
HTS Vault (No. 1) 17
HTS Vault (No. 2) 17
Tokamak Pit (Outside bioshield) 85
Tokamak Pit (Inside bioshield excluding Cryostat) T
Laydown Basement 23
Assembly Hall 30
Assembly Basement 36
Alume (m)
0,000
,000
',000
,000
3D
,000
0,000
,000
Pressure (cm H2 0)
atmospheric
-2
-2
-2
-3
-2
atmospheric
atmospheric
2.7.3 Tokamak Building Interfacing Systems
The TB Interfacing Systems are given in Table 2-10.
Table 2-10: Tokamak Building Interfacing Systems
Interfacing System Requirement
including parameters
The dimensions of the cryostat are
36.48 m diameter and 34 m height.
The cryostat does not have a
shielding function.
Ex-vessel LOCA primary loop
blowdown to HTS vault.
Vacuum pumping systems
Secondary heat transfer systems
Additional heating power supplies
Neutral beam injection
Radiological protection
Feature which responds to interfacing requirement
including parameters
The Tokamak pit is sized to accommodate the cryostat.
There are 1.2 m thick cylindrical concrete bioshield walls
and 1 m thick concrete slab around the Cryostat to provide
shielding function.
All HTS vault walls, slabs, penetrations and doors must
withstand 70 kPa pressure and each HTS sub-vault has
rupture disk to adjacent sub-vault. Sub-vault with highest
steam blowdown load has connecting duct to vent/scrubber.
The building provides required space for the system.
The building provides required space for the piping.
The building provides required space for the cable.
The building provides required space for the system.
Some parts of the walls and slabs are seized to satisfy
required shielding function.
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3. Method Development
This chapter describes the methodology developed for evaluating the performance of the
radiological confinement barriers of a tokamak reactor, using ITER as a baseline design. The
methodology includes several steps, some of them already well established in PRA studies, others
being new approaches proposed for solving similar problems encountered in PRA studies. Finally,
these methods are integrated to meet the objective of the present study.
The steps involved can be delineated as follows:
" Define the objectives of the study;
" Acquire and understand the fusion plant information;
" Determine safety functions and systems required for success;
" Identify a set of accident initiating events;
* Develop all conceivable accident scenarios starting with the initiating event and ending with failure
of the first confinement barrier to retain radioactive releases;
" Develop containment models for the second confinement barriers and attach them to the accident
sequences ended with failure of first confinement barrier;
" Recommend appropriate requirements concerning radioactive releases to the environment;
" Compare radioactive releases from each confinement barrier against the proposed requirements;
" Perform sensitivity analysis on confinement barrier parameters to evaluate their performance and
the number of boundaries required to comply with the proposed requirements;
* Build a decision model for choice of tokamak building type.
The first step in performing a probabilistic risk assessment is the task of accident sequence
definition and system modeling. This task begins with a definition of the objectives of the study and the
acquisition of a substantial amount of information of plant design and operation. Recognizing the
objective is important because the level of truncation in the analysis of various systems and sequences
will depend on the desired product, which could be design optimization, estimation of public risk to
provide information on the value of plant modifications aimed at reducing the risk level, selection of
optimal testing frequencies, etc. For the present study, the objective is presented in Chapter 1 Section
2. Based on PRA methods, the objective is to develop a methodology to assess the performance of
each radiological confinement barrier. The ITER is still in the design phase, so our methodology should
be capable of performing sensitivity analysis to identify design weaknesses and recommend design
remedies. Thus, the method could be used for comparing competing designs. At this stage in ITER
design, basic information (such as design descriptions, preliminary safety analysis reports, and piping
diagrams) is available, but the lack of detailed design and operational information limits the level of
detail that can be included in the study. Detailed information on support system requirements,
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instrumentation, and operational and maintenance procedures is not available, and will not be available
until the plant is completed.
Design information about ITER is presented in this study as follows: general information in
Chapter 1 Section 3, radiological confinement barriers in Chapter 2, and a system block diagram in
Chapter 3 Section 1. The system block diagram was developed to understand the role of various
systems in a fusion power plant, as well as interfaces and interactions among the systems, in terms of
energy and materials (e.g., coolant, particles) flows.
In any PRA study, it is necessary to define a "freeze point", a time after which design or
operational changes are not incorporated into the PRA until it is finished the first time. We chose the
"freeze time" for our study to be June 5, 1995, when the first version for ITER Design Description
Documents were made available to the ITER community. Declaring a freeze point does not usually
eliminate the responsibility of updating the model to include subsequent design changes, but that is
outside the scope of this thesis. We hope that the way we developed the models and the way they are
presented in this thesis will facilitate an eventual updating in a convenient manner.
The task then progresses through the identification of required safety functions and accident
initiating events. Chapter 3 Section 2 contains a description of the method employed - Master Logic
Diagram, and a list of the initiating events identified and grouped by the systems where they occur. The
grouping of initiators defines of number of accident sequences models required and simplifies the
analytical process, because models are typically developed for groups of initiating events with similar
characteristics rather than individual initiating events.
Then, the response of the plant to the identified group of initiating events must be evaluated.
Detailed information on safety functions, systems, dependent-failure mechanisms and operational
schemes is required to identify responses and define criteria for successfully meeting the challenges to
plant safety. The common tool used in PRA studies for this part of the analysis is the event tree. The
event tree construction is an inductive process requiring considerable iteration. Usually, the first step is
to develop functional models which are then converted into system models. This is done by identifying
the systems that satisfy the various functions and reconstructing the event tree accordingly. The ITER
Early Safety and Environmental Characterization Study [3-1] presents functional event trees for
selected initiating events. We used those as a basis for developing systems models, but we chose to
employ a new approach for sequence development: the influence diagram/event tree combined model.
This method and the advantages of using it are presented in Chapter 3 Section 3. It produces an
inductive plant model that is consistent with the methods chosen for quantifying the frequency and the
consequences of the sequences. It is desired to keep the models as flexible as possible to
accommodate changes in the design, and even use for other objectives.
In order to meet the objectives of the study which is concerned with the confinement barriers,
the analysis is performed in three consecutive steps: develop accident sequences for the failure of the
first barrier, then for the failure of the second barrier, and finally for the third barrier, and present the
results for each confinement barrier. The form of results presentation is discussed in Chapter 3 Section
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4, and naturally, it has to be similar to the regulatory requirements formulation, so that the results for
each barrier can be compared against the regulatory requirements (see Chapter 3 Section 5).
Consequently, an assessment of the number of barriers sufficient to comply with the requirements can
be performed. The required number of barriers is directly dependent on the their design, since different
designs reflect different probabilities of failures for the confinement systems.
In PRA analysis, success (or failure) states for systems depicted on the event trees must then
be defined to allow the development of system models. Deterministic analyses may be required in
some cases to define the success states realistically. These definitions, converted to statements of
undesired events, constitute the top events of the logic models used to analyze specific system failure
modes. Deductive system logic models are constructed to determine the causes of system failure. The
fault trees must include not only component failures but also the effects of testing, maintenance, and
human errors on system performance. The structure of the trees is also influenced by the techniques
used for dependent failure analysis and the scope of the overall analysis. This work is usually the result
of a team of safety analysts, and it is not the goal of the present study to perform a rigorous analysis of
the ITER systems. Rather, we present an analysis to a degree that defines the approach and
demonstrates its applicability. As an example, we developed a fault tree with the top event 'DIV PHTS
fails to remove decay heat', which is presented in Appendix D, but all the other events in the accident
sequences are assigned estimated values, some based on literature as specified in Appendix D, and
others based on engineering judgment. To gain more confidence in results, a more thorough system
analysis should be undertaken by a safety team.
3.1 Systems Block Diagram
Before the detailed analytical work, it is necessary to become familiar with the design and
operation of the plant, to help insure that function and system dependencies are appropriately
considered. In important activities such as defining success criteria, care must be exercised not to use
information that cannot be properly documented and justified. A significant task is the identification and
listing of the front-line systems (i.e., the systems that directly perform the safety functions and thereby
have a direct impact on the course of potential accident) and the support, or auxiliary systems that are
associated with each front-line system. Since an understanding of the interactions between systems
and the dependence of one system on another is vitally important, and overview of system operations
should be performed to identify dependencies among systems, and a systems block diagram is a good
tool for performing this analysis.
Moreover, a preliminary system analysis can be a vital step in the search for initiators, helping
to ensure completeness in the definition of accident sequences. Plant familiarization provides baseline
information for starting the definition of accident sequences and the modeling of plant systems. Initial
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requirements for the types and number of influence diagram/event tree models can be developed and
documented, key systems are identified, and their success criteria is defined.
The ITER systems block diagram is presented in Figure 3-1. It is a conceptual representation
of the systems and their interfaces, as opposed to Figure 2-2 in Chapter 2 that gives a physical
representation. Materials, energy, and coolant flows between systems are pictured as described in the
legend. A short description of the systems follows, inspired by references [3-5] and [3-6].
The major components of the tokamak are the toroidal and poloidal magnets, which confine,
shape and control the plasma inside the evacuated torus. The magnet coil systems include 20 toroidal
field (TF) coils, 7 poloidal field (PF) coils, the central solenoid (CS) and the mechanical structure. The
magnets are superconducting and cryogenically cooled; they are powered from the grid via a large
AC/DC power supply. The TF coils provide a constant magnetic field to stabilize the plasma. The PF
coils provide the magnetic field which changes over time to control the plasma position and shape. The
CS provides the majority of the, magnetic flux change needed to initiate the plasma, generate the
plasma current, and maintain current during burn time. The mechanical structure integrates the TF
coils, PF coils, and CS into the mechanical system for electromagnetic and gravity loads equilibration.
Inside the vacuum vessel are internal, removable components; these include the first wall
(FW), the shield/blanket (SB) modules, and divertor (DV) cassettes. The blanket system, acting as a
shield, removes the surface heat flux from the plasma, reduces the activity in the vacuum vessel
structural material for the ITER fluence, and, in combination with the vacuum vessel, protects the
superconducting magnets from excessive nuclear heating and radiation damage. The main
components of the blanket system are as follows:
1. a structural toroidal shell, called back plate;
2. combined First Wall and Shield modules attached to the back plate; and
3. manifolds welded to the back plate that supply cooling water to the modules from the primary heat
transport.
The main function of the divertor system is to exhaust impurities and reaction products from
the plasma (material flow). As the main interface component under normal operation between the
plasma and material surfaces, it must tolerate high heat loads while at the same time provide shielding
for the vacuum vessel and magnet coils in the vicinity of the divertor. The main components of the
divertor systems are:
" the divertor cassette body which provides a mechanical support;
" the inner and outer targets, which are high heat flux components;
" the dome, located below the separatrix X-point, to baffle neutrals and shield the wings from plasma
interaction;
" the support pads mounted at the bottom of the cassette to provide locking and alignment of the
divertor cassettes;
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" earth straps connecting the cassettes with each other, the baffles and the vacuum vessel to
prevent arcing and provide defined current paths;
* the divertor to blanket back plate gas seal to prevent backstreaming of target gas into the plasma
chamber;
" the cooling pipe interface connecting the divertor cassettes to the radial cooling pipes at each
divertor port;
" special diagnostic cassettes providing access for optical diagnosis.
The additional heating and current drive systems, capable of driving part of the plasma
current, are provided to bring the plasma to ignition, to help in controlling the DT burn and extending it
to steady-state. These systems are as follows: Ion Cyclotron Radio Frequency (ICRF), Electron
Cyclotron Radio Frequency (ECRF), and Neutron Beam Injection (NBI) systems. Two main auxiliary
heating methods envisaged for heating to ignition temperatures are the injection of energetic neutral
beams (NBI system) and the resonant absorption of radio frequency (RF) electromagnetic waves. The
beams (NBI) used for heating have to be composed of neutral particles because ions would be
reflected by the magnetic fields. Ions must first be produced and accelerated, then neutralized by
charge exchange in a gas target and the unwanted residual ions removed. In the plasma, the neutral
particles become charged again so that they can be confined by the magnetic fields. They are then
slowed by collisions with the plasma particles giving up their energy in the process.
There are several types of RF heating, the three principal ones involving waves around the ion
cyclotron frequency, the electron cyclotron frequency, and the lower hybrid frequency. The high-
frequency waves are generated by oscillators outside the torus. The design of the system must be
such that the waves propagate to the central region of the plasma and are then get absorbed by the
charged particles of the plasma, which in turn collide with other plasma particles, thus increasing the
temperature.
Particle control in ITER is achieved by fueling in the divertor and main chamber and by active
pumping in the divertor. The primary functions of the fueling system are to inject DT fuel and other
impurity gases into the vacuum vessel at the required fueling rate and response time to maintain the
fusion power at the required level, and to provide impurity pellets to rapidly terminate the discharge.
The fueling system will use a combination of gas puffing and pellet injection to achieve and maintain
ignited DT plasmas. For gas puffing, a system of reservoirs, manifolds and injection valves will deliver
hydrogenic (H, D, T) and other gases (for divertor radiation enhancement and wall conditioning) at two
poloidal elevations: the top of the plasma and in the divertor chamber, and toroidally to five discrete
locations. A separate delivery system will deliver reactive gases to the vacuum vessel as required for
wall conditioning. The centrifuge pellet injector design consists of multiple hydrogenic extruders feeding
a rotating wheel. The pellet injectors will be located external to the cryostat and will interface with the
torus via a flight tube. A torus interface valve will be provided to isolate the pellet injector from the
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machine. A separate pellet injector is provided to reliably and quickly deliver impurity pellets to the
torus for discharge termination in response to a precursor signal of a VDE.
The torus primary pumping system is based on 16 cryogenic pumps, independently
controlled to allow individual pumps to be regenerated, shut down in the event of failure or to regulate
the pumping speed of the torus. Each pump will be located in the pump port directly behind the
divertor. The pump is designed to pump impurities, hydrogenic species and helium on separate
pumping surfaces and provide the capability to regenerate the hydrogenic species separately allowing
direct recycling to the fuel re-injection system. A flap valve, mounted on the inlet to the pump is
provided to allow regulation of pumping speed and total regeneration of the pump. A second flap valve
and movable shroud are provided to allow regeneration of the hydrogenic pumping panels.
The external pumping for each of the three NBI enclosures are independent systems. The high
vacuum pumping subsystem is used to pump trace of helium during NBI operations.
The fueling and pumping systems are part of the ITER fuel cycle, and are connected to the
Tritium Processing Building, located adjacent to the tokamak building. The tritium plant processes the
torus exhaust, separates the tritium and deuterium, and returns them to the fueling system. The tritium
plant also detritiates the heat transport system coolant and the atmosphere in spaces where potential
contamination can occur. Lastly, it provides the torus and attached spaces with inert gas for
maintenance operations, and detritiates the gas upon exhaust.
The heat deposited in the internal components and the vessel is rejected to the environment
via a set of heat transport systems designed to preclude releases of tritium and other radionuclides to
the environment. Portions of the heat transport systems are also used to heat the inside of the vessel
to bakeout temperatures above 2000C for impurity control. The heat transport system is comprised of:
the primary heat transport systems (PHTSs), secondary heat transport systems (SHTSs), chemical
and volume control systems (CVCSs), and the heat rejection systems.
The power supply system consists of the pulse power supply system and the steady-state
power supply system. The pulse power supply system provides electrical power to the TF and PF
superconducting magnets, and the auxiliary heating and current drive systems. Steady-state power
supply system is for the plant electrical equipment which requires a steady supply of alternating current
power.
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3.2 Initiating Events Identification
The objective of event tree development is to define a comprehensive set of accident
sequences that encompasses the effects of all realistic and physically possible potential accidents
involving the reactor core. By definition, an initiating event is the beginning point in the sequence.
Hence, a comprehensive list of accident initiating events must be compiled to ensure that the
event trees properly depict all important sequences.
The selection of initiating events for inclusion in event trees consists of two steps:
* Definition of possible events;
* Grouping of identified initiating events by the safety function to be performed or combinations
of system responses.
A clear understanding of the general safety functions and features incorporated into the
ITER plant design, supplemented by the preliminary system reviews presented in the previous
section, provide the initial information necessary to select and group the initiating events.
Two approaches can be taken for identifying the accident initiating events. One is a
comprehensive engineering evaluation, where the available information is evaluated and a list of
initiating events is compiled based on the engineering judgment derived from the evaluation. This
is called Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), and is used by the ITER safety team. FMEA
is a tabular approach, where typical headings identify the system and component under analysis,
possible failure modes, the effect of failure an estimate of the criticality, the estimated probability
of failure, mitigators, and possibly the support systems.[3-21 Another approach is the Master Logic
Diagram, which more formally organizes the search for initiating events by constructing a top-level
logic model and then deducing the appropriate set of initiating events. In this study, the later is
used.
3.2.1 Master Logic Diagram for ITER
A summary fault tree, or master logic diagram (MLD), can be constructed to guide the
selection and grouping of accident initiating events and to ensure completeness. Figures 3-2 and
3-3 show the ITER Master Logic Diagram (MLD).
The event "Excessive offsite release" of radionuclides is the top event. The events in the
MLD are identified by the level they appear in the tree, with the top being level 1. The use of levels
is an ordering technique to assist in locating events by approach to an offsite release. The
strategy is to achieve completeness of events by level.
"Excessive offsite release", level 1, can result from either (OR gate) an excessive release
from the tokamak building or from other building containing systems with radioactive inventories.
Since these and only these release paths exist at ITER power plant, first step of level 2 is
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complete. The scope of the present study encompasses only the accidents in the tokamak
building, thus we do not develop the branch of "Excessive releases from non-tokamak building".
Although there is an inherent linkage between the tokamak building and the tritium plant (e.g.,
fueling, vacuum pumping), that is neglected in the current work assuming that it has a small
contribuition to the overall plant risk. A second step of level 2 follows from the "Excessive releases
from the tokamak building", which can come either (OR gate) from the vacuum vessel, or from the
primary heat transfer systems, or from other systems containing radioactive inventories and
situated inside the tokamak building. Level 2 is now complete.
Level 3 refers to the confinement barriers. An excessive release from the vacuum vessel
would require vacuum vessel failure, cryostat vessel and/or extensions failure, and tokamak
building failure (AND gate). Similarly, an excessive release from the primary systems would
require failure of the PHTS piping or equipment, failure of piping guard pipes or heat transfer
system vault, and tokamak building failure. Other systems in tokamak building contain relatively
small amounts of radioactive materials compared with the vacuum vessel and primary heat
transport systems, therefore, we disregard them for now.
For these events to occur, some of the safety functions would have to fail. Thus, failure of
the vacuum vessel could be caused by events such as: insufficient heat removal and chemical
energy control, insufficient magnetic energy control, insufficient overpressure control, insufficient
plasma control or support. Similarly, the failure of the cryostat vessel and its extensions could be
the result of: insufficient control of overpressure caused by water or cryogenic fluid spills,
insufficient air leakage control, insufficient radioactive inventories cleanup. The inclusion of safety
functions completes level 4.
When the diagram reaches level 5, equipment failures or misoperations that could
threaten each safety function are identified. A comprehensive listing of such events defines all
important accident initiating events.
External events such as earthquakes, tornado, fires, floods, have not been included in
this MLD for simplicity reasons.
Reference [3-3] developed a MLD for INTOR, as being representative for tokamak
reactors, and it was the main reference we used for developing the ITER MLD.
The rhomboid under a rectangle containing the event name means that the event is not developed further
due to lack of sufficient information, or lack of interest for the purpose of the respective study.
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3.2.2 Initiating Event Categories
The initiating events defined by the MLD are already grouped by the safety function they most
threaten. Figure 3-4 contains the list of initiating events grouped by the systems where they start.
Chapter 5 presents accident sequences using the influence diagram/event tree model for all of these
initiating events. However, only one IE in each category will be included in our model for simplicity
reasons, and those lEs are shown in bold letters in Figure 3-4. The methodology we developed allows
for the addition of an indefinite number of initiating events.
Initiating Events List
1. COOLANT ACCIDENTS: 1.1 LBV1: Small in-vessel LOCA from FW/SB system
1,2 LDO1: Ex-vessel LOCA in the divertor loop
1.3 LF02: Ex-vessel LOCA of the FW/SB coolant loop
1,4 LFO3: Heat exchanger tube rupture in a FW/SB loop
1.5 LFV99: Large in-vessel LOCA from FW/SB loops
1.6 LGC: Generalized rupture of coolant lines in cryostat
1.7 FF2: Loss of flow in a FW/SB coolant loop
1.8 HB99: Loss of heat sink to divertor, blanket, and FW
2. MAGNETS ACCIDENTS: 2.1 MPOI: TF coil overcurrent
2.2 MPO2 CS/PF Coil Overcurrent
2.3 MS: TF coil case failure from initial defect
2.4 MAC: Short between busbars outside the ciyostat
2.5 M: Insulation failure (Turn and Pancake arcs)
2.6 MCC1: Cryogen leaks in cryostat
3. FUEL SYSTEM ACCIDENTS:
3.1 TVP1: Vacuum pump process boundary failure
3.2 TGP3: Failure of gas puffing valves in open position
4. PLASMA ACCIDENTS: 4.1 OP: Overpower transient
5. LOSS OF VACUUM ACCIDENTS:
5.1 VCL: Large leakage of air in the cryostat
5.2 VCS: Small leakage of air in the cryostat
6. LOSS OF AUXILIARY SYSTEMS:
6.1 LOSP: Loss of offsite power
Figure 3-4: ITER Initiating Event Categories
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3.3 Accident Sequences Development using Influence
Diagram/Event Tree Models
Given an IE, the question is asked: What plant systems or actions are involved in responding
to this IE? In the fission power plant, where the goal is often to calculate the core meltdown frequency,
the accident sequences are developed to the point where the core is damaged (this means that the
first confinement barrier - the fuel cladding - has been breached); then, several core damage states
are defined. Thus, many event sequences will lead to the same damage state. By equivalence, we will
develop our ETs to the point where the first confinement barrier is breached. From the point of view of
consequences, instead of damage states, we evaluate releases of radioactive inventories.
The Event Tree (ET) analysis was first introduced in the nuclear industry by the NRC WASH-
1400, and has been used in the PRAs sponsored by the NRC and by utility PRAs. The ET analysis is
an analytical tool that can be used to organize, characterize, and quantify potential accidents in a
methodical manner. An ET models the sequence of events that results from a single initiating event, by
postulating the success and failure of the mitigating systems and continue through all alternate paths,
considering each consequence as a new initiating event.
The basic steps to constructing an event tree include the following:
1. list all possible initiating events;
2. identify functional system responses;
3. identify support system responses;
4. group initiating event with all responses;
5. define accident sequences: each system response has a corresponding branch that indicates
whether or not it was successful; at the end of each sequence is an indication of the consequences
that can be expected;
6. probabilities can be assigned to each step in the event tree to arrive at total probability of
occurrence for each accident sequence.
The technique can be exhaustively thorough, while having two theoretical limits:
" the presumption that all system events have been anticipated;
" the presumption that all consequences of those events have been explored.
A potential disadvantage is that event trees can appear very impressive but contain serious
errors. Care must be taken to thoroughly review the resulting tree against system descriptions,
assumptions, and judgment factors.
In an actual ET, either systems or functions can serve as headings. There is considerable
latitude as to the definition of event headings, but they have to be consistent with actual plant-response
modes and to ensure that the heading can be precisely related to system-success criteria that can be
translated for system-fault modeling. The placement of events across the tree is based on either the
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time sequence in which they occur, proceeding from left to right, or some other logical order reflecting
operational interdependence.
In general, if there are n event headings representing system functional responses, there are
2" potential sequence associated with each initiating event. Because of the logic inherent in the ET
process, only meaningful sequences are retained for further evaluation and illogical sequences are
eliminated during the development of the tree, thus greatly reducing the total number of sequences to
be evaluated.
The functions that must be performed to control the sources of energy in the plant and the
radiation hazard are called "safety functions". The concept of safety functions forms the basis for
selecting accident-initiating events and delineating potential plant responses. Generally, safety
functions are defined by a group of actions that confinement barriers failure or minimize radionuclide
releases. Such actions can result from the automatic or manual actuation of a system, from passive
system performance, or from the natural feedback inherent in the design of a plant.
ITER Safety Functions are presented in Figure 3-5.[3-5]2 Within the design, major lines of
defense are identified and an achievable reliability target is allocated to each such that the overall plant
event sequence meets category release limits. The limiting accident cases are specified more or less
independently for each line of defense as the basis for defining the reliability targets. By integrating the
safety role of these lines of defense, an acceptable level of risk can be expected.
The confinement approach includes provision of multiple barriers, for example:
* vacuum vessel/cryostat;
* process lines/glove boxes;
" the ventilation system to ensure elevated releases for accidents.
For heat removal, the lines of defense involve:
* multiple normal heat removal paths and systems provided for machine operation;
" two independent loops of the vacuum vessel cooling systems;
" natural circulation capability of the vacuum vessel cooling system (should power be lost);
" the possibility of cooling the machine by introducing gas into the cryostat.
For fusion power, the lines of defense involve:
* normal plasma control and interlocks;
" safety fusion power shutdown system;
* the inherent characteristics of nuclear fusion, whereby impurities introduced into the plasma by off
normal conditions act to terminate the plasma.
The ET technique was actually inspired by the decision trees used in decision analysis. A
decision tree is a graphical representation of the decisions, uncertainties and values in a problem. The
2 "General Design Requirements Document (GDRD)" and "General Safety and Environmental Design Criteria
(GSEDC)" are chapters of [3-5].
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nodes in the decision tree display all the possible combinations of decision and chance event states
and show the impact (value) of each combination. There are two kinds of nodes: decision nodes and
chance nodes. Each node has branches that represent possible sates, and chance node branches
have associated probabilities. Thus, the ET is a decision tree which only has chance nodes, and those
usually have only two possible states: success and failure. The probability of these two states adds to
one, and hence it is sufficient to give the probability of either one state. In our analysis, we define the
events in terms of system success, and supply the probability of system failure.
An alternative way of solving decision problems is the influence diagram, which is a graphical
structure for modeling uncertain variables and decisions and explicitly revealing probabilistic (functional
or system) dependence and the flow of information. It is an intuitive framework to formulate problems
in a network representation, which includes all the components of a decision problem - decisions,
uncertainties, and values - and the relationships among them. The rectangle indicates a decision node,
the rounded rectangle is a value node, and a circle represents a chance node. The arrows between the
nodes represent conditioning - the probabilities and values associated with the states of the
conditioned event depend on the states of the conditioning event. The detailed data about the variables
are stored within the nodes, so the diagram graph is compact and focuses attention on the
relationships among the variables.
The major advantage of influence diagrams is an unambiguous representation of probabilistic
and value dependencies. The directional arcs between chance nodes clearly indicate dependence;
absence of arcs indicate independence. Hence, influence diagrams can graphically represent much
larger models than decision trees can, because each additional influence diagram variable requires
only a node and appropriate arcs, whereas a new decision tree variable typically requires multiplying
the number of branches.
The disadvantage of the influence diagrams is that they are structurally symmetric in the sense
that every scenario includes the same sequence of decisions and chance events. That leads to
difficulties when trying to develop an influence diagram from an inherently asymmetric problem. In this
case, it is possible to assign probabilities of 0 and 1 to set the state of an event, but that is not a
convenient representation of accident sequences for a power plant. Influence diagrams also do not
have a natural way to represent the results, an are difficult to debug and validate.
The use of influence diagrams in risk management was explored in [3-7] and [3-8]. The
authors introduce the concept of conditional influence diagrams as an alternative to decision trees in
risk management, and emphasize the advantage of the influence diagrams of being more compact,
and displaying the dependencies among variables in a visible and understandable format.
References [3-9] and [3-10] offer a comprehensive description of methods to evaluate the
influence diagram, pointing out that the influence diagram not only fosters good communications
among people who are developing, analyzing, and using a model, but also it.is a convenient structure
for computer manipulation and solution procedures.
66
Decision trees have two main limitations in practical applications. First, they become very large
very quickly, making them difficult to display and intimidating to work with. Second, they do not show
probabilistic and value dependencies very well - although probabilities on the branches of one event
can depend on the state of a previous event, there is no easy way to identify which previous event is
conditioning the current probabilities.
As we discussed in previous paragraphs, traditional decision trees and traditional influence
diagrams are very useful tools for modeling many problems. However, when trying to work on realistic
problems, their limitations may seriously affect the models. In conclusion, it is far simpler and much
clearer to use combined models with both an influence diagram and a decision tree to develop
accident sequences for each initiating event. The model is described in Figure 3-6. The software we
used to build and analyze the ITER models for the selected initiating events is called DPL (Decision
Programming Language), and it provides a synthesis of decision trees and influence diagrams,
allowing for capture of the benefits of each without having to obide by the limitations.[3-1 1] In DPL, the
influence diagram (ID) and the event tree (ET) of a model - each contains only part of the model and
requires the other for a complete picture of the analysis. The ID defines the events involved in the
accident sequences and the relationships among them. Here, too, the data - the failure probabilities,
the frequency of the initiating event, and the consequences in terms of radioactive inventories releases
- are entered. This diagram does not contain information on the actual sequence of the events; as a
result, ID of a combined model can be more compact than a traditional ID. The ET shows the
chronology of the events that were defined in the ID. Because all the Probabilities and data are entered
in the ID, the tree does not display this information. As a result, ET of a combined model is much more
compact than a traditional ET.
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3.4 Method of Evaluating Performance of Confinement Barriers
ITER confinement strategy refers to multiple confinement barriers around any process system
containing radioactive inventories. The reason is to preclude unacceptable radiological doses in case
of normal operation and accidents. Since ITER is a first-of-a-kind machine, uncertainties both in
physics and engineering are unavoidable. These reflect uncertainties in the frequency and
consequence of each accident sequence. Thus, a probabilistic methodology for evaluating the
performance of each confinement barrier can be an important tool for the design process. The goal of
the present research is to develop a methodology that presents the results of accident sequence
analysis for each confinement barrier individually. That allows sensitivity analysis for failure modes of
each confinement barrier to be performed, which can be then used as a decision aid for choosing the
most appropriate design.
In the fission power plants' Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), the system analysis goal is to
calculate the probability of core meltdown frequency potentially leading to radioactive releases to the
environment. Thus, the accident sequences are developed up to the point where the core is damaged,
and a few core-damage states are defined. Several event sequences can lead to the same damage
state. In other words, damage of the reactor core means that the first confinement barrier - the fuel
cladding - has been breached. By equivalence, we will develop the present event trees down to the
point where the first confinement barrier integrity is lost due to one of the failure modes considered.
Instead of damage states, values of radioactive releases such as tritium or activation products are
considered.
For a multiple barrier confinement strategy, the analysis should have as many steps as the
barriers required to comply with the ITER design requirements. These are given in Table 2-2 in
Chapter 2. That table presents various radioactive release limits for individual event sequences
according to the frequency of the sequence. The straight forward approach would have the following
steps:
1. Analyze all the conceivable accident scenarios leading to possible damage of the first confinement
barrier, and obtain a list of triplets <si, fi, ci>, where si is a scenario description, fi is the frequency
of that scenario (per year), and ci is the consequence (i.e., radioactive release from the first
confinement barrier) of that scenario. Build a frequency-consequences graph including those
points along with the limit line based on Table 2-2; if there are points above the limit line, then a
second confinement barrier is needed;
2. Develop containment models for the second confinement barrier representing its possible failure
modes. Attach those models to the corresponding accidents sequences, and obtain a new set of
frequency-consequence points representing scenarios for failure of the second confinement
barrier. These points represented on the same graph from step 1 will correspond to lower
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frequencies and consequences (due to confinement barrier retention factor); if there are still points
above the limit line, then a third confinement barrier is required, and so on.
The position of the points representing scenarios on the frequency-consequences graph
ultimately depends on the design parameters of the confinement barriers, which affect their probability
of failure and retention factors.
The approach delineated above is similar to the European approach known as the ENEA
Fusion Plant Safety Assessment (EFPSA), based on a "semi-probabilistic methodology" [3-24]. That is
consistent with the limit line for ITER given in Table 2-2, which the authors of reference [3-241 call 'risk
curve'. The only difference would be that we look at each confinement barrier independently instead of
only comparing releases to the environment against the design limit.
'Risk' regulation is a very controversial concept. Approaches to the regulation of risk from
technological systems, such as nuclear power plants, in which potential accidents may result in a broad
range of adverse consequences must take into account several aspects of risk. Each country solves
this problem in a different way, defining regulatory limits by employing more or less probabilistic
criteria. Generally, probabilistic safety objectives or criteria for maintaining the public health level are of
a political nature and therefore often phrased in broad terms. An extensive literature search was
performed during this project to review the risk concepts and their use in the regulatory process.[3-2, 3-
12 to 3-25] While most authors refer to 'risk' as the probability times consequences of an event, others
believe that a single number is not a broad enough concept to communicate the idea of risk. In case of
multiple scenarios, the probability times consequence view would correspond to the expected
consequence per unit time:
n (3-1)R= I c
i=1
where R is the risk, fi is the frequency of scenario i, ci is the consequence of scenario i, and there are n
conceivable scenarios.
In 1967, Farmer wrote a paper [3-12] which pulled together many of the issues over which
safety regulators and analysts have been struggling ever since. Farmer suggested that the right format
for capturing the results of a safety evaluation should be a "probability-consequence diagram". Farmer
limit line can be used as a safety criterion by defining a limit on the frequencies for a given level of
consequences. Several authors interpreted the Farmer limit line in different ways. For example, Cox
and Baybutt [3-17] explain that the Farmer limit line sets acceptability criteria only for the risk due to
individual accident sequences. Meleis and Erdmann [3-27] consider that Farmer criterion specifies
upper limits for the releases of iodine (1I) in accident situations of a given frequency. In response,
Farmer published the definition of the Farmer limit line.[3-28) He defined a function g(C) such as the
probability dP(C) that a release will occur in the interval C to C+dC is as follows:
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dP(C) = g(C) dC
The Farmer limit line is defined by the following equation, since Farmer used logarithmic rather than
linear scales:
dP(C) = F(C) d(logio C) (3-3)
In logarithmic scales, the line of constant risk (risk = frequency times consequence) has a
slope equal to -1. Consideration of risk aversion lead Farmer to propose a line of slope -1.5. In the
low consequences range, the line is curved to control nuisance releases. The exact location of the line
is adjusted in accordance with the requirements of the regulatory agencies or public opinion.
Kaplan and Garrick [3-15] introduced a graphical representation in a logarithmic scale of the
first-level definition of risk as the set of triplets:
R ={< si,fi,ci >}, i =1,2,..., n (3-4)
Furthermore, if the consequences ci obey the ordering relationship:
G1:5 C2 !9 C3 ... : Cn (3-5)
a cumulative frequency can be calculated as shown in Table 3-1. This is another way to represent the
risk by the so called "risk curves", which is the complementary cumulative frequency of consequences3
(CCF) of consequences plotted against the consequences in logarithmic scales. CCF(co) is the
frequency of events with consequences greater than or equal to co. WASH-1400 is a well known
example of presenting the results in the CCF form [3-16]. Risk curves can be built both when using
point estimates and probability distribution functions for the frequencies and consequences of the
accident scenarios, so that the propagation of uncertainties is possible in this approach. Some other
advantages are presented in [3-18].
3 F(y)= Ef(x), where f(x) is the cumulative frequency (CF) function, and x is the release for each accident
x<y
sequence. CCF = 1 - CF.
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(3-2)
Table 3-1: Scenario List with Cumulative Frequency
Radioactive Releases (xi) Frequency (fi) Complementary Cumulative
Frequency (CCFi)
X1 f1 CCF1 = CCF 2 + f1
X2 f2 CCF 2 = CCF 3 + f 2
xi fCCFi = CCF+,l + fi
Xn-1 fl.1 CCFr.1 = CCF, + f, 1
xn fn CCF, = fn
We decided to represent the results from the analysis of each confinement barrier by a CCF of
consequences. In the quantitative representation of the CCFs, it is important to affirm the following
assumption: the scenarios should be chosen so that they are mutually exclusive4, meaning that the
simultaneous occurrence of two or more scenarios is practically impossible. This is intuitively true when
the scenarios follow from the same initiating event, but it is not necessarily the case when the
scenarios are caused by distinct initiating events.
The result of running the ID/ET model of each initiating event in DPL [3-111 is a frequency
histogram of consequences. DPL does not offer the choice of explicitly seeing the list of scenarios with
corresponding consequence and frequency, but it sums the frequencies corresponding to the same
consequence. This is just a step forward towards calculating the CCF of consequences for each
confinement barrier.
DPL has the option of exporting the histogram data to another application such as a
spreadsheet package (i.e., EXCEL or LOTUS 1-2-3). In the present work, we export the frequency
histogram for each IE in EXCEL in a .csv file format. For a number of n lEs, n EXCEL files will be
generated and they have to be combined in a single CCF for the given confinement barrier. This is an
exhaustive operation which is performed in several steps as shown in Figure 3-8:
* link each .csv file with the corresponding IE's worksheet in the EXCEL file for the first confinement
barrier lEs_1st.xIs;5
4 For two mutually exclusive events A and B, Pr(A or B) = Pr(A) + Pr(B). If A and B are not mutually exclusive,
Pr(A or B) = Pr(A) + Pr(B) - Pr(A and B), where Pr(A and B) = Pr(A)Pr(B) if the events are independent, and
Pr(A and B) = Pr(A) Pr(BIA) = Pr(AB) Pr(B) if the events are dependent.
5 EXCEL allows Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) between cells in separate workbooks, and separate worksheets
in the same workbook. If two cells are linked, one being the source and the other the target information, when
the value of the source changes, EXCEL automatically updates the value of the target.
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" a 'data advanced filter' operation is performed on each histogram to cut the frequencies lower than
1 0~/yr;6
* the worksheet are linked together in a pivot table that adds frequencies corresponding to the same
release value, to calculate the overall frequency histogram for the first confinement barrier;
* The frequency-consequence table is sorted by releases in increasing order in preparation for the
CCF calculation;7
" the overall CCF for the first confinement barrier is calculated according to the Table 3-1, and it is
represented graphically in a scattered plot on a log-log scale.
Eventually, the same steps are performed for the second and third confinement barriers,
except that the .csv input files are obtained by running the DPL ID/ET models that include the second
and third confinement barriers models respectively.
Instead of performing all these steps manually for a large number of times required for
sensitivity analysis, a Visual Basic macro was created for the EXCEL operations and a button was
assigned to it. The macro for the first confinement barrier CCF calculation is attached in Appendix A.
Sensitivity analysis entails the determination of how rapidly the output of the analysis changes
with respect to variations in the input. Sensitivity analysis can be particularly useful in this study for
assessing the impacts of different failure modes on confinement barriers.
6 ITER has a proposed cut-off frequency for the design basis accidents of 10,6/yr.
7 The 'data sort' operation is not very reliable, and it has to be done in a separate worksheet than the one
containing the pivot table.
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3.5 Uncertainty Analysis Considerations
Uncertainty analysis is an integral part of a risk assessment. There are uncertainties in every
step of a PRA, and some of them may be large. Whether qualitative or quantitative in nature, the
analysis should consider uncertainties in the data base, uncertainties arising from assumptions in
modeling, and the completeness of the analysis. To the extent possible, these uncertainties should be
propagated through the analysis. Where this is impractical, a sensitivity analysis provides insight into
the possible range of results, and this is what we choose to do in the present work.
This section will give an overview of reasons the uncertainty analysis is important, and a
suggestion for the integration of the frequencies and uncertainties in the risk curve.
The uncertainty analysis addresses those factors that cause the results of the analysis to be
uncertain, due to a variety of causes. The causes of uncertainty fall into three basic categories:
uncertainties in the parameter values8, uncertainties in modeling9, and uncertainties in the degree of
completeness 0 . Parameter uncertainty may be quantitatively analyzed using standard propagation
methods such as the Moments Methods or Monte Carlo simulation method.[3-26]
A concise method of displaying the uncertainties in the overall results of a PRA is to represent
a series of CCFs. The risk will then be represented by a family of CCF curves that could represent, for
instance, the best estimate and the upper and lower bounds. If a full uncertainty analysis were done, it
would be possible to produce a series of curves at different probability levels.
When considering the parameter uncertainties, each accident sequence si could be associated
a probability distribution function (PDF) for frequency and another one for consequence. Using the
CCF definition, the CCFs of consequences for all the accident scenarios can be calculated and plotted
on a log-log scale as in Figure 3-8. Figure 3-8 gives Pr obability(c cilsi) for three scenarios: i = 1, 2,
3. Each of these consequence CCF has an associated frequency PDF, thus, at each value of
consequences cj, a PDF for the overall CCF(ci) can be obtained. Monte Carlo simulation can
propagate the uncertainties through the equation (3-4) to obtain a PDF for the CCF at each value of
consequences. Then, the mean values of these PDFs at each ci can be calculated resulting in the best
estimate of the risk curve: CCFso%(ci). Similarly, lower and upper bounds risk curves can be obtained
by calculating the 10-th and 90-th percentiles of the PDFs respectively.
The values of the input parameters are not exactly known. Data limitations or uncertainties in component failure
rates require the use of probability distributions or interval estimates to model frequencies for the lEs and
probabilities for system failures, as well as consequences.
9 Basic assumptions about accident sequences, system failure modes, and the application of the quantification
formulas may not be correct.
1 Important failure modes can be overlooked. The scope of the risk assessment may preclude the analysis of all
the lEs, the required information may not be available to the analyst, or the quantification process may
truncate sequences with large consequences-low frequency that sum to a significant frequency.
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CCF(c) = Frequency (c ci) (3-6)
CCF(c ) = YProbability (c ci Is;). Frequency (s1)
all si
where Probability(c cils) = CCDF of consequences for scenario s;
and Frequency (se) = frequency distribution for scenarios
2
3
xi Releases, x,
Figure 3-8: CCDFs of Releases Corresponding to Three Initiating Events
The current version of the DPL does not offer the option of associating a PDF to the probability
of system failure, therefore uncertainty analysis can not be performed directly. The task of propagating
uncertainties through the model is not undertaken in the present study.
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3.6 Proposed Limit Line for Risk
The ITER project must set its working limits for release of hazardous substances in such a
way that the design does not have to be significantly modified after the site selection. The current ITER
design guideline of radioactivity releases sets acceptability criteria only for the risk due to individual
accident sequences, and does not provide a limit for the overall plant risk. This creates an important
limitation to the methodology, because a large concentration of accident sequences near the limit line
could lead to unacceptable overall risk, despite the adequately low risk posed by each individual
sequence. Another problem is the treatment of uncertainties. Since ITER is a first-of-a-kind machine,
uncertainties both in physics and engineering are unavoidable. As the ITER design develops further
and the system safety analysis step is reached, propagation of uncertainties will become more
important, but the current ITER design requirement does not allow for a convenient integration of
uncertainties. This section proposes a parametric form for the risk limit lines to be used as ITER
design assessment tool.
The safety analysis results presented in the risk curves form will have to be compared against
a safety criterion in the CCF form. We derive a parametric form for a CCF limit line, which accounts for
three criteria:
1. the overall plant risk;
2. the rate at which accident frequency decreases with increasing accident consequences (risk
aversion attitude);
3. impact of high frequency-low consequence accidents.
For ITER, five event categories have been defined (see Table 2-2). The classes of event
sequences are based on the expected annual occurrence frequency of the event sequence. A
dose/release limit per event sequence is established for each events category.
A CCF limit line with appropriately chosen parametric form for fission reactors was proposed
based on the three requirements delineated above.[3-17] In the present work, the current ITER design
guideline of releases was used to determine the slope and position of the limit line. First, a limit line in
the form of a frequency distribution of releases was obtained and then integrated to lead to the desired
CCF limit line.
Criterion 2 is concerned with risk aversion, which refers to the greater importance attached by
the public to single catastrophic accidents as opposed to a large number of small accidents with
similar total consequences. We can account for the risk averse attitude by requiring that accident
sequence frequencies to decrease faster than the accident consequences increase. In other words,
the following condition should hold:
c f (c) is a decreasing function of c for all c co (3-7)
78
where c are the consequences (low consequences c < co will be treated separately) and f(c) is the
frequency histogram of the consequences.
It can be proven that, in a normal (non-logarithmic scale), a function f(c) satisfying the
conditions:
f(c) < fo (c)
< , where- < 0, 0 < 0, and c -fo(c) = cons tan tdC d dc dc
(3-8)
(3-9)
for all c co , also satisfies condition (3-7). Figure 3-10 shows the f(c) function which gives a
decreasing risk in c as opposed to fo (c) corresponding to a constant risk.
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f(c)
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Figure 3-9: Frequency-consequence diagram in non-logarithmic scale
In a logarithmic scale, functions fo (c) and f(c) above are shown in Figure 3-11. In this case,
f(c) should comply with the following conditions:
log f(c) < log fo (c) , (3-10)
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dlog f(c) dlog f(c) - ,
dlogc dlogc
weedlogf(c)
where dlg < 0, cfO(c) = cons tan t,dlogc
(3-11)
for all c 2co. Conditions (3-10) and (3-11) are not sufficient to give us a function f(c) verifying
condition (3-7). However, by imposing that:
c2f(c) is a decreasing function of c for all c co, (3-12)
It can be shown that condition (3-7), as well as (3-10) and (3-11) are satisfied. Hence, (3-12 is a
stronger requirement than (3-7 on the function f(c). Thus, to ensure the risk averse attitude in a log-log
scale, we can now conclude that f(c) could have the form:
f(c) = k c-a, where a> 2, for all c 2 co,> (3-13)
and k is a positive constant. However, we will also include in this study the cases when a = 1 (no risk
aversion), a = 2, and 1 < a < 2. We analyze these situations because we do not know if the current
ITER limit line has included or not risk aversion in its definition. It is therefore interesting to provide a
family of frequency distribution of releases corresponding to different risk aversion attitudes, among
which the regulatory committee could chose the one reflecting its views.
1
fo(c)
f(c)
0.01
1
c 10
Figure 3-10: Frequency-consequence diagram in logarithmic scale
80
0.1
Let us next consider the impact of the high frequency - low consequence accident sequences.
Farmer [3-12] proposed a transition in the slope at a certain value of consequences (called the
nuisance value) to minimize the frequency of small consequences. In other words, even very small
consequences, close to zero, are desired to have a frequency not higher than a chosen k1. Its value
can be derived by imposing a maximum acceptable value for the risk RO due to high frequency - low
consequence accidents only.
The complete form of the frequency distribution function of consequences is:
f(c) = k1, for c < co (3-14)
fk2 .c-a, for c > co
An overall risk limit Rtot is used to determine the positive parameter k2, and the risk limit RO on low
consequence - high frequency accidents is used to determine k1. In a mathematical form, conditions
(3-15) and (3-16) are used to determine the parameters k1 and k2 , while considering three separate
cases for the.value of parameter a:
1. a=1;
2. a= 2;
3. 1<a<2ora>2.
C()
fcf(c)dc =RO, (3-15)
0
cf(c)dc = Rtot. (3-16)
0
k1 is derived from equation (3-15) and does not depend on the value of a:
k1 = 2R0  (3-17)
co2
k2 is derived from equation (3-16) and depends on the value of a:
Table 3-2: Values of k2 as a function of a
a=1 a=2 1 <a < 2 or a> 2
(Rtot -k 1  mRtt -k 1  I-(Cm -Co)J - Rtot -k1
The values for the risk limits RO and Rot, were calculated using the proposed ITER design
tritium releases guidelines (Table 2-2). The data in that table can be plotted in a frequency -
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consequence form in Figure 3-12. The overall risk limit is the overall expected value of consequences
per year:
(3-18)R tot = jc fITER lim (c)dc,
0
and the risk limit for the low consequence accidents can be calculated by changing the upper limit of
the integral in (3-18):
CO
RO= C fITERIim(c)dc,
0
where fITEPlim is the annual frequency function of HTO releases in grams given in Figure 3-12.
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Figure 3-11: ITER Design Guideline for HTO Releases
For the ITER case, we assigned to co the value of the tritium release limit for operational
events category (category I) (0.5 grams).
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The parametric form for the limit line as a frequency distribution of tritium releases as obtained
for ITER is presented in equation (3-20), and a selection of k2 parameters for five a values is also
given:
f(c) = 10, for c < 0.5 (3-20)
k2 -c-a, for c 0.5
where k2(a = 1) = 0.0036, k2 (a = 1.5) = 0.1175, k2 (a = 2) = 1.791,
k2(a = 3) = 7.4524, k2 (a = 4) = 7.4515.
In conclusion, a large set of pairs (a, k2) defining the proposed limit line given in equation (3-
20) is available for the respective regulatory commission to choose from, corresponding to the desired
conservatism. The set of parametric forms for the proposed frequency distribution function of
consequences can now be compared against the frequency - consequence graph for ITER as given by
the current design guidelines (Figure 3-12).
The CCF form is derived by using its definition" as following:
(3-21)F = ff(c)dc
C
Therefore, the parametric form of the proposed CCF for the three cases corresponding to
parameter a is as following:
1. F(c)- k1 (co - c)+k 2 In(cmax - co),
k2 In(cmax - c),
k1 (co - c)+k 2 i-- -- ,
2. F(c)= k CO cmax
C Cmax
for c < coforcco, for a1,for c c0
for c < c0
, for a = 2,
for c co
"The upper limit of the integral is actually cma, because Jf(c)dc =0.
Cmn
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(3-22)
(3-23)
k2  1 1 (3-24)(c - c)+ a -1 1 - forc< c
3. F(c)= max f
k2 1 1
a -1 ca-1 C a-1 , fI >c
for 1 < a < 2 or a > 2, and k2 given in Table 3-2.
This function is the proposed CCF of consequences limit line for ITER, and a family of CCF
lines for different risk aversion attitudes is represented in Figure 3-13.
In conclusion, we have proposed a CCF as a limit line for ITER. We believe that a CCF of
consequences is a suitable tool for constraining the risk from a fusion power plant. Quantitative risk
standards can be imposed, while being sufficiently flexible to allow the designers and regulators to take
into account several important aspects of risk: the overall risk limit, the risk averse attitude, the impact
of high frequency - low consequence accident sequences. The CCF limit is obtained by integrating a
proposed frequency distribution limit line shown in Figure 3-13. From to comparison of the frequency
distribution with no risk aversion against the current ITER limit line it can be concluded that the ITER
limit line has already some risk aversion attitude incorporated in its formulation. That is, the limit line
with a risk aversion corresponding to a = 1.5 fits the inclination of the ITER line more closely than the
line with a = 1. However, we propose the limit line with a = 3, due to the reasons explained in equations
(3-7) to (3-12).
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Figure 3-12: Proposed parametric frequency distribution of tritium releases
for ITER compared against the ITER design guideline releases12
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Figure 3-13: Proposed parametric CCF of tritium releases for ITER
12 The legend refers to f(c) as a function of (a, k2).
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4. Analysis of Accident Sequences that affect the
Integrity of the First Confinement Barrier'
The purpose of the Accident Analysis is to evaluate the effect of postulated events that
develop into accidents. The analysis determine potential initiating events that could lead to various
accidents involving the release of hazardous materials. Based on the materials and energy involved,
the physical parameters of the immediate environment can be determined. Between the hazardous
material and the affected target (i.e., environment, public), there usually are several barriers in the form
of safety-related systems. The challenges to the barriers are those physical conditions posed by the
accident. It should be determined whether or not the barriers will fail when challenged by the conditions
resulting from the accident.
The identification and delineation of combinations of events that might lead to release of
hazardous material or other undesired events is the first step of any Probabilistic Risk Assessment
(PRA) performed for nuclear fission power plants. In that field, the PRAs focus is on severe core
damage or core melt accidents, as they pose the greatest potential risk to the public. Therefore, the
qualitative result is a list of all conceivable core-melt sequences, which are developed down to the
point where the core has reached a damage state (PRA Level 1). The quantitative analysis at the PRA
Level 1 consists of evaluating the frequencies of occurrence and the particular damage state of each
accident sequence. The following step is to evaluate the response of the containment, and the
transport and release of the radionuclides from the core to the environment (PRA Level 2).
In a fusion power plant, the fuel is not confined in a reactor core as in a fission power plant, but
is recirculated through various systems, part of which are located outside the tokamak reactor building.
Thus, there is no such concept as "core damage". Between the process and the environment, several
confinement barriers should be provided, so that radioactive releases to the environment in any
conceivable accident situation are kept under prescribed design limits.
The safety requirements for the ITER design recommend at least two robust confinement
barriers such as the vacuum vessel and cryostat with extensions, when significant radiological hazards
exist. Although there are other systems connected to the vacuum vessel which might be contaminated
by tritium, we will only evaluate the performance of the vacuum vessel, the cryostat, and the tokamak
building as confinement barriers, for the purpose of developing a methodology.
The accident sequence analysis contains two parts:
1. the qualitative analysis, consisting of the development of the accident sequences using an
influence diagram/event tree model;
Only six initiating events will be analyzed in this chapter, the rest will be attached Appendix B. The reason is
that the construction of our probabilistic model is based only on these six events, eventually allowing for the
inclusion of the others. However, this last part is outside the scope of the present study.
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2. the quantitative analysis, referring to the estimation of probabilities of occurrence of various events,
data base design, and radioactive releases evaluation.
The first step of the qualitative analysis refers to accident sequences which stop when the first
confinement barrier is damaged. The second step consists in modeling the behavior of the second
confinement barrier, given that the first barrier failed, In case the releases out of the second barrier are
higher than the design limits, a third barrier will be required, and its performance will be evaluated.
Our main reference was ESECS [4-1] Chapter 6 "Analysis of Accident Sequences". ESECS
used Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) as a systematic method to identify the initiating
events. At the time the analysis was performed, not enough system design information was available to
develop a system based FMEA. Therefore, a functional FMEA was performed. Also, the document
presents the functional event trees for a set of initiating events. A functional event tree orders and
depicts the safety functional responses that mitigate the initiating event. The headings of the function
event tree are statements of safety functions required. The problem with function event trees is that
some functions are quite complex and may be provided by many combinations of systems. The
success of each function can then be expressed in terms of system engineered safety systems, and
support systems success.
As we developed the accident sequences after the ITER Design Description Documents
became available, our approach was to describe accident sequences in the form of influence
diagram/event tree (ID/ET) models, while using the function event trees of the ESECS [4-1] as a
starting point.
The previous chapter on method development describes the Master logic Diagram as the tool
used in the present work for developing a comprehensive list of initiating events for a fusion power
plant. For accident analysis, we selected a set of initiating events also considered in ESECS, for the
purpose of comparison.
Developing accident sequences for a system as complex as a nuclear power plant is a
considerable team effort, and the results depend on the expertise and the subjective judgment of a
particular team. Since the ITER project has a powerful safety team, our work considered their results to
the extent possible in analyzing the accident sequences. The main differences between our approach
and the ITER safety team approach are:
* we developed system accident sequences as opposed to function event trees;
" we used influence diagram/event trees instead of event trees;
" we developed separate modules for initiating events affecting different systems, then integrated
their effects on the systems with common interfaces. Thus, the accident is propagated from one
system to another.
These issues are more thoroughly explained in the "Method Development" chapter.
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In the following paragraphs, phenomena characteristic to fusion reactors will be mentioned
such as: disruptions, runaway electron damage, electromagnetic loads. Brief definitions are given here
to explain the effect of these phenomena on the plasma facing components.
* Disruptions: Disruptions of plasma in ITER will result in significant transient heat loads on the in-
vessel components and appreciable electrodynamical stresses on the first wall, divertor and
surrounding structures.
* Runaway electron damage: Disruptions of the ITER ignited plasma have capability to vaporize a
large amount of plasma-facing material, and result in the fast decay of a plasma current, which will
induce a strong electric field and produce significant runaways. In addition, the large plasma
current of 20-24 MA will enhance the possibility of runaway electrons produced by the avalanching
mechanism. The ITER plasma design will probably incorporate features to reduce the effect of
runaways, such as placement of sacrificial elements - poloidal and/or toroidal limiters (low Z) to
blunt the effects of runaways on the FW. Since the flux is largest at the magnetic axis, runaways
will be somewhat peaked and not produced in the scrape-off layer (SOL) or at plasma edge. It
should be noted that the energy in the runaways which carry the current is only a few percent of the
pre-collapse plasma thermal energy. It must be expected that the runaway electrons will be
deposited by flux penetration on the inboard first wall, unless for example the vertical control
pushed the plasma to the divertor. To the extent that they remain directed along the field line and
reasonably uniform spatially, this may not be a problem, since the energy is only a few percent of
thermal quench, and the expected energies are low 10-15 MeV. It is important to note that RAE is
a toroidally symmetric phenomenon, capable of producing simultaneous damage to all the cooling
loops of the FW or DIV.
" Electromagnetic loads: Plasma disruption causes electromagnetic loads whose effect on the
PFC and VV in ITER depends on design details such as geometry, electrical connections, wall
thickness, etc. Reference [4-6] presents results of plasma disruption simulations calculating 3-D
electrical response of VV and PFC.
The initiating events are grouped into six categories using the criterion of the system where the
event occurs. Some of these systems do not contain radioactive inventories, but they have interfaces
with systems which do have radioactive inventories. We tried to model the propagation of an accident
from a system to another in the present work. This chapter only analyzes the six initiating events
shown in bold face in Figure 3-4, since they are the ones included in the confinement barriers model
we developed. The model should eventually be completed with all the other conceivable accident
situations in order to give meaningful results for ITER design, but that is outside the scope of the
present study.
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4.1 LF02: Ex-vessel LOCA in a FW/SB coolant loop
The IE is the rupture of a medium size pipe (about 160 mm diameter) located inside the
FW/SB HTS vault or in the guard pipe leading from the VV to the vault. The accident sequences which
might develop are modeled in Figures 4-1 and 4-2.
Following the rupture, the cooling loop depressurizes rapidly, and most of the water coolant of
the damaged loop is depleted. Thus, the RI of that loop are out of the first confinement barrier (PHTS
loop) into the HTS vault.
Different loop parameters (e.g. pressure, flow) are suitable for detecting the accident
conditions and for triggering a safety plasma shutdown (an indicative time of 10 seconds can be
considered for detection and intervention of this safety system). Here the question arises if the plasma
shutdown will be done actively before the end of the pulse by the intervention of the safety shutdown
system, or passively due to the impurity or water ingress from the broken loop. The challenged
shutdown system is not necessarily the fast one, but it might be one of the interlock systems as well.
There is sufficient time available before any consequences occur, therefore the plasma shutdown is
not as critical here as it is for LDO1 2'3
The main difference between LFO2 and LDO1 comes from this time issue: even if the safety
shutdown fails, there is a probability that the FW tubes of the broken loop do not melt before the end of
the pulse. We again assume that success of the safety shutdown system assures that FW tubes of
damaged loop do not fail.4 Moreover, the total water holdup per loop is about 400 m3 for FW/SB, as
opposed to a DIV loop of about 70 in; the pressure being approximately the same (3.5 MPa), the HTS
vault will be much more challenged in the LFO2 then in the LDO1 case.
Nevertheless, the failure of active plasma shutdown systems, including detection and correct
communication of the IE, is an aggravating event. It can lead to overheating of in-vessel components.
There are ongoing studies to determine the temperature at which the plasma burn will be terminated
passively by:
* impurity ingress of evaporated beryllium atoms for hot parts of the first wall, or
" water ingress from the FW loop following failure of tubes from the damaged loop due to melting or
thermal stresses.
When the shutdown is caused by impurity ingress, the disruption may affect the PFCs integrity
by RAE or electromagnetic loads. The effect can be an extended in-vessel LOCA with or without
2 The heat-up of the first wall, assuming continued buming of the plasma, was calculated [4-5] and the results
showed that there would be 100-200 seconds before the first wall would reach melting temperatures.
3 LDO1 accident sequences analysis is included in Appendix B.
4 L. Cadwallader pointed out that the ITER plasma shutdown system will result in a disruption. Although not a
severe disruption, it may not be prudent to assume no first wall tube damage if the plasma shutdown system
successfully actuates. A damage spectrum for the tubes might be more appropriate.[4-13]
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bypass. It will be with bypass whenever the FW integrity is affected, because we make the following
assumption: whenever FW surface is damaged, the FW tubes of the damaged loop will fail with 100%
probability since their condition is more critical. In conclusion, impurity ingress may lead three types of
accident sequences:
1. no in-vessel LOCA: PFCs are not damaged (VV might only fail due to electromagnetic loads);
2. extended in-vessel LOCA, but no bypass: FW not damaged, but DIV damaged (VV might fail due
to: electromagnetic loads, or overpressure if RDs fail);
3. extended in-vessel LOCA, with bypass: FW damaged, DIV damaged or not (VV might be damaged
by any of the three causes enumerated in the previous section). In this case, the bypass sequence
is of concern since RI from the plasma chamber have a way to pass both VV and CV into the HTS
vault.
When the shutdown is caused by water ingress, that means that a small in-vessel LOCA with
bypass occurred. Coolant ingress - induced plasma disruptions are likely to be two or three times more
intense than typical disruptions, and perhaps even more severe than other density limit disruptions
caused by wall impurities. That disruption can cause more damage to PFCs leading to an extended in-
vessel LOCA, so the final result is similar to type 3 sequences above. The magnitude of releases
depend on the degree of damage to the PFCs.
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4.2 MPO1: TF coil overcurrent
Two causes could lead to this IE: power supply control failure, or TF shorted coil. We will look
here at the second case, because it is the most severe accident for a TF coil. The MPO1 ID/ET model
is presented in Figures 4-3 and 4-4. On two of the ET branches, plasma disruption could occur. The
disruption event leads to accident sequences described in Figures 4-5 and 4-6.
A TF shorted coil sees a rapid current increase due to inductive coupling from the other coils.
The whole coil can be considered to quench simultaneously as the critical conditions are approached.
Continued supply of power in the kV range will eventually overheat the coils. However, the coil
resistance is such that even at 2 kV, supply of power for several minutes does not cause excessive
temperatures.
In the event of a fast discharge, much of the helium is expelled from the coils: at higher
temperature, helium becomes gas and its pressure increases considerable resulting in a pressure
wave that could damage the conductor. A system of relief valves and a relief tank is designed to
capture the helium coolant.
The safety systems that should be activated by MOP are the following:
" TF quench detection system: this system should send signals to the other safety systems;
" Safety shutdown system of plasma: its prompt operation is very important before TF magnet
discharge; otherwise a disruption follows, possibly damaging PFCs and VV;
" TF fast discharge system: even if the TF discharge system does not work, TF coils will quench
by themselves, but in a longer time;
* CS discharge system and PFs discharge systems. The PF coils have separate power supply
systems. All of these coils need to be discharged in order to avoid mutual forces between magnet
systems that could cause coil displacement, missile generation, that could damage VV, and
PHTSs;
* helium expulsion system (relief valves and tank); if this system fails, TF coil integrity could be
lost due to overpressure. This event is not sufficient to damage structure, but local arcs could be
generated (if TF coil has not been yet discharged). Arcing can be an issue even if the TF coil did
not fail structurally.
By definition, arcing is a luminous discharge of current that is formed when a strong current
jumps a gap in a circuit or between two electrodes. Arcing can impair VV structure, and VV and PFCs
PHTSs. During arcing destructive process, some structural part (for instance, shear keys or objects
forgotten in the CV during maintenance) can become loosen and be accelerated by magnetic field
5 A newer design provides for keys constructed of non-magnetic stainless steel, so there is no longer any
concern about ferromagnetic induced motion of shear keys.[4-13]
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variations, if the magnet system have not yet been discharged. The missiles can damage VV structure,
as well as PHTSs pipes inside the CV.
For the accident sequence of success for all the safety systems enumerated above (except for
the helium relief system leading to loss of the TF coil integrity), we assume helium leakage is contained
in the TF coil case. Since all the coils were discharged, no danger of shorts or arcs exist.
If any of the CS and PFs coils is not discharged, coil displacement and acceleration of loose
objects are threats to the integrity of VV and PHTSs pipes inside CV. For simplification, we consider
that the same happens when TF's fast discharge system fails. We assume that the VV probability of
failure due to coil displacement and missile generation is dependent on the magnet systems might
have been discharged since the forces and magnetic fields are different. The same applies to PHTSs
inside the CV, but that would complicate the model too much. In fact, PHTSs pipes are smaller
components than VV, and they contain smaller RI quantities, thus we can afford to ignore them for the
time being.
Basically, when safety shutdown works, damage to VV and PHTSs can only come from
outside of VV, directly caused by the magnets. When safety shutdown fails, events very similar to the
LOFA accidents add up to the above ones. Some sequences also include in-vessel LOCA accident.
Care has to be used in evaluating the consequences so that they add up to at most maximum
conceivable value; for instance, when some of the RI mobilizable in the VV were escaped via bypass,
and a missile breaks through the VV thereafter, the remaining RI in the VV have to be considered.
When the fast safety shutdown system fails, a disruption is expected due to the loss of
magnetic confinement since TF quench is spreading automatically (even if TF fast discharge system
fails). This disruption can damage the PFCs via run-away electrons (RAE) or electromagnetic loads,
leading to an in-vessel LOCA. The sequences in that case are very similar to the LOFA sequences.
However, we will represent them here in a simplified way by excluding the dependencies between
damage to PFCs and the PFCs PHTSs. It is reasonable to do this since we have already described
these sequences in the LOFA case; and, if included here, sequences with lower probability would be
obtained since they are following from the magnets accidents.
When TF quench detection system fails, no signal will be sent to the other safety systems:
safety shutdown, and magnets discharge systems. Therefore, those will not operate. The frequency
of such a sequence is very small, clearly in the area of BDBA, so we will not develop the sequences
further.
The ID/ET model for the MOP1 is considerably large, and it might be difficult to estimate some
of the event probabilities in the way the events are now defined. However, the events can always be
changed as more data become available. The model developed here is the most comprehensive one
that exist at this time. It has put together all the information about possible accidents that could be
found in the ITER documents as well as the European study (SEAFP).[4-1, 4-3, 4-16]
A good way to solving the problem of large models is separating the ID/ET model into several
modules. Each module represents the accident sequences for an IE in a certain system (i.e., magnet
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system, plasma chamber), or an IE which might be the result of an accident in a different system (i.e.,
disruption caused by a magnet quench). What this means is solving independent parts of a large ID/ET
separately, and reducing them to a chance event with the same frequency distribution of
consequences. Then, introducing that chance event in the MPO1 model (converted into DPL code) on
the branches where it could occur. So, instead of having the initial large number of accident sequences
on that branch, only a representative number of sequences will be chosen.6 To exemplify the concept,
we calculated the frequency distribution and the corresponding cumulative distribution function (CCDF)
of releases for the disruption initiating event. Then, the disruption ID/ET model is reduced to a single
chance event with six possible states with a corresponding CCDF, represented by 'ccdf red' in Figure
4-7. That shows that ccdfred is an close envelope of the original CCDF,
DPL has a feature that makes the above concept possible by taking an independent 'module'
of the ET apart and using the 'Reduction' command. That way the module is transformed into a chance
event with a maximum of six states with the same expected value as the initial module. The
comparison of the frequencies histograms of the module with its associated chance event shows that
the latter is an envelope of the first, and therefore the same is valid for the associated complementary
cumulative distribution functions. Furthermore, in the initial ID/ET model, the module is removed from
the ET part, then the file is converted to DPL code, and, in the sequence part of the code, on the
branches were the module was previously, the lottery on the chance event representing the module is
introduced. Consequently, the number and the length of the accident sequences in this newly obtained
ID/ET model is much smaller, the program runs faster, and now information is lost.
We believe that the use of modules is valuable in building the event trees for a device like
ITER where systems like magnets, containing no RI, can produce defects that can damage other
systems containing RI. That way we can build modules of ET for separate systems, and then link them
at their interfaces.
6"'Representative' is defined as an envelope of the sequences in the initial module of the ET.
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4.3 TVP1: Vacuum pump process boundary failure
Failure of the cryogen lines inside the pump process boundary is accompanied by a large
release of tritium, deuterium and cryogen into the divertor section of the torus. This will cause a
disturbance and possibly a plasma disruption, but no direct tritium release. The disruption, in turn,
could lead to an in-vessel LOCA, which would pressurize the vacuum vessel and the process piping
connected to the vacuum pumps. If process piping isolation fails, then tritium handling equipment
outside of the vacuum vessel will become pressurized and could fail.
A typical configuration of vacuum pump regeneration at power involves two pumps
regenerating and' two pumps pumping. The vacuum pumps are passive components, and are fully
within the vacuum vessel boundary. However, during regeneration, the pumps are directly connected
to the DT return header and the gas puffing header, which are in turn connected to two lines that
penetrate the vacuum vessel boundary and the cryostat boundary. One is the line supplying DT from
fuel storage, and the other is the line delivering DT to the isotope separation system. Hence, failure of
the vacuum pump boundary, during regeneration, is similar to a failure in the headers to which it is
connected. And, failure of the headers is similar to failure of the lines that connect the headers to
equipment outside the vacuum vessel and cryostat. Thus, failures in the two lines are representative of
failures occurring anywhere in between them.
Two systems are challenged by this IE: the break isolation towards the tritium plant, and
the safety plasma shutdown. If the safety shutdown fails, a disruption will terminate the plasma due
to impurity or water ingress, so there is a probability that in-vessel LOCA will occur. We again used the
concept of modules by reducing the sequences following a disruption to a single chance event with a
corresponding probability distribution function, and attaching that event to the TVP1 sequences where
the safety shutdown fails.
Figures 4-8 and 4-9 describe the ID/ET model for TVP1 without disruption.
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Figure 4-8: Influence Diagram for the Initiating Event TVP2 without Disruption
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Figure 4-9: Event Tree for the Initiating Event TVP1 without Disruption
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4.4 OP: Overpower transient
The overpower event caused by thermal instability is referred to as an abnormal plasma
occurrence in nuclear fusion reactors. Thermal instability of the plasma causes the density and
temperature to deviate from the steady-state values, which results in deviations of the heat fluxes and
neutron wall loads to the core internal structures. Positive fluctuations in plasma parameters, e.g.
plasma temperature, will cause elevated fusion power within several seconds, which will result in a
beta-limit disruption. Such an abrupt positive thermal excursion may increase damage to plasma facing
components. On the other hand, negative fluctuations will reduce fusion power, which will eventually
shut down the plasma with a density-limit disruption.
According to studies of thermal instability of plasma, the instability increases when the plasma
temperature is low and the 0 value is high. By contrast, it has been reported that around beta limit,
thermal instability of plasma may be suppressed by a decrease in the performance of the plasma
confinement, which will not reach beta-limit disruption. However, the behavior of plasma around the
beta limit is not clear at present. Therefore, to evaluate ITER safety conservatively, it is necessary to
include an accident sequence in which thermal excursion due to thermal instability of the plasma will
result in a beta-limit disruption.[4-21]
Overpower events of plasma may be triggered by abnormal actions of fueling and external
heating. Overpower transients could lead to partial or general overheating of plasma facing
components which, if not terminated by shutdown, could lead to in-vessel LOCA. The difference from
the in-vessel LOCAs discussed previously is that the temperature of the plasma facing components
would become higher in case of OP, and therefore the consequences are more severe (higher
radioactive inventories releases).
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4.5 VCS: Small leakage of air in the cryostat vessel
Small leaks could lead to air freezing on the cold surfaces in the cryostat, so the coil cooling
systems could be able to maintain the vacuum in the cryostat by condensing the incoming air. This
frozen air would lead to two safety concerns:
" in case of an event like a magnet quench, the frozen air could be vaporized again and pressurize
the cryostat (loss of vacuum in CV) if present in sufficient quantities. This effect will be studied
when looking at the CV performance;
" formation of ozone in the frozen air could lead to an explosion hazard that can affect the VV and
PHTSs integrity.
Ozone is generated from oxygen according to the reactiorl:
302 =203 +Q (4-1)
with 0 = -144 kJ/mole of ozone
The energy required for the reaction is provided by neutron and gamma radiation. One of the
main sources of oxygen in the ITER cryostat is air in-leakage and condensation on cryogenic surfaces.
Air condensation and accumulation of solid air on cryogenic surfaces strongly depends on the amount
of air in-leakage into the cryostat, and the presence of inadequately shielded cryogenic surfaces inside
the cryostat area.
The mechanisms of the formation and decomposition of zone are not fully known, particularly
with regard to:
* the production rate of 03 from oxygen, as a function of the gamma or neutron deposited energy;
" the amount and concentration of 03 that constitute an explosion hazard;
* the energy threshold to initiate decomposition and the effects of impurities in reducing this energy.
Most of the reported ozone explosion accidents are related to LN 2 systems in the presence of
significant oxygen contamination. 03 explosions were reproduced experimentally in LN2 and oxygen
systems. In such experiments it was found that 03 explosions can occur when the 03 concentration in
liquid phase is 4% or higher. Conversely, in most of the recorded explosion accidents, the amount of
oxygen which was initially contained in the nitrogen as impurity was apparently incapable of producing
sufficient 03 to cause concern. Therefore, some mechanism of 03 concentration must be hypothesed
to have the risk of an explosion, e.g. by evaporation, perhaps on localized parts of the cryogenic
circuits where liquid gas equilibrium exists. Another cause of explosion can be the presence of
impurities that catalyze the decomposition of 03, thus reducing the minimum concentration required to
produce an explosion.[4-20]
Detonations of O in solid phase have not been recorded, but solid 03 can become liquid by
the effect of heating. The pressurization with consequent heating of the cryostat can e generated by:
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" an air injection prior to access for scheduled or unscheduled maintenance;
" an accidental air or water inlet to the cryostat due to the failure of a sealing component;
" the failure of leak tightness with a consequent loss of coolant from a fluid system (LN 2 or liquid
helium).
One way to detect leaks is to monitor the cryostat pressure. However, the pressure inside the
cryostat will rise only when the leak rate is larger than 20 g/s; because of smaller leak rates, the cold
surfaces of the magnets will act as cryopumps. Indeed, estimations in reference [4-20] have shown
that for a temperature of 80 K, a pressure inside the cryostat of 10 Pa, and a cold (cryogenic) surface
of 4000 M2 , the condensation capability is about 20 g/s. If the air in leakage is above 20 g/s, then the
pressure inside the cryostat will rise. With rising pressure, the condensation capability increases also
until a maximum condensation rate of 65 g/s is reached. At this rate, the condensation causes a heat
flux which is above the threshold at which the magnets quench. From the previous considerations, a
leak rate of 20 g/sec would be difficult to detect by pressure measurement and would a priori not lead
to quenching of the magnets.
VCS can lead to magnets quench, an event which is analyzed separately in a module, reduced
to a chance event, and incorporated on the branch showed in the Figure 4-13. The quench model itself
contains the disruption event on some branches, and again the module concept is used for
simplification. Figures 4-15 and 4-16 represent the quench model.
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4.6 LOSP: Loss of offsite power
On-site power supply will be provided in ITER to keep the plant in a safe state in case of offsite
power loss. Pony motors might serve to accomplish the decay heat removal function.
Loss of off-site power data for power plants indicate that the frequency of this initiating event is
between 10 /a to 10'6Ia, depending on the duration of the loss of power: the higher value is for short
duration events (typically under 2 h), and the lower value for events with a duration up to 10 h.
Should ITER suffer a complete station blackout, loss of plasma control will lead to plasma
shutdown due to the unstable plasma position. To keep the confinement function intact, all active
systems involved in confinement have to be designed as fail safe, i.e. in case of power loss they
should automatically get into a safe state. Decay heat will be either removed by natural circulation or
evaporation of the primary coolant. The vacuum vessel cooling loop should be designed for natural
circulation up to the ultimate heat sink. This will be sufficient to keep the first wall temperature below
5000C.
In order to develop a meaningful ID/ET model for this IE, we will consider the power supply
design described in SEAFP [4-24]. An emergency power supply (on-site generators and batteries) will
back up the external power supply for the following systems: cryogenics, decay heat removal, tritium
process, safety related instrumentation and control loads. However, the magnet related loads are
powered only from the external grid. Thus, LOSP will lead to a severe plasma disruption which
challenges the integrity of the PFCs structures and also of the superconductors (electromagnetic
forces, induced high voltage).
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5. Containment models for the Second Confinement
Barriers
By considering the success of failure of active plant systems, the influence diagrams/event
trees described in the previous section trace an accident sequence from an initiating event, through the
failure of the first confinement barrier which is the process system. In fission power plants, the system
event tree branches end with a stable condition with intact fuel or the onset of core damage. The
containment event tree is developed to describe the progression of an accident sequence from the
start of core melt to the release of radionuclides after containment failure, and it is attached to the final
branch points of system trees.
In a fusion power plant, the fuel (tritium) as well as other radioactive inventories are localized
or flowing among different systems, so they are not concentrated in the reactor core as in a fission
plant. Thus, the confinement strategy is more complicated as described in Chapter 2. As a result, the
system event trees end points include integrity or damage of many different parts of the first
confinement barrier. Those parts have different corresponding parts of the second confinement
barriers as given in Table 2-1. Therefore, several containment event trees have to be developed for
these parts of the second confinement barriers.
One initiating event can lead to accident sequences that affect different parts of the
confinement barriers, hence multiple containment event trees for the second confinement barrier
should be included in the same ID/ET model for any given IE.
The various containment failure mechanisms may be structured with a containment event tree.
In addition to considering the gross behavior of the structure (yield and ultimate-strength levels),
special consideration should be given to localized conditions, such as: electrical penetrations and
major openings, major discontinuities, interactions with surrounding structures. The containment may
fail as a result of overpressure, overtemperature, hydrogen explosion. In the fusion case, specific
events are: missile generation in the magnetic field, magnet coil displacement, ozone explosion, arcing
leading to melting.
The common practice in fission power plants PRA is grouping system event trees sequences
by release categories, a process called 'binning'. Two approaches have been used for binning:
probability screening and the development of plant-damage bins.[4-19] In the former approach, trial
sequences are selected using point estimates to identify those with the highest frequencies having
realistic accident processes. The physical process for these sequences are evaluated. If the results of
the analysis indicate that the spectrum of potential accident consequences is not well represented (e.
G., there are no sequences that fall into the large release categories), the level of discrimination is
reduced and more sequences are analyzed. One problem with this approach is that it requires iteration
and some judgment in deciding when the process is complete.
115
In the latter approach, the analyst develops groups of system sequences referred to as "plant-
damage bins", "plant-damage states", or "plant event sequence categories". The categories are
identified by the characteristics of the system sequence that affect the release of radionuclides to the
environment. All system sequences within a bin are assumed to have the same containment tree, in
that the branching probabilities are the same, and the end points are assigned to the same
radionuclide release categories. The second approach is suitable for use in our ID/ET models for the
ITER power plant with one difference: instead of assigning the same release categories to the end
points, we propagate the radionuclides releases corresponding to each branch by multiplying it with the
containment retention factor (RF). In order to do this, the containment models will be built into the
ID/ET models for the first confinement barrier as it is shown in Appendix C.
By considering the success or failure states of the active plant systems, the ID/ET models
described in Chapter 4 trace the accident sequence from the initiating event to the point were the first
confinement barrier is damaged. The containment models for the second confinement barrier (and
eventually for the third confinement barrier if one is required) are developed to describe the
progression of the accident sequences from the first confinement failure to the release of radionuclides
from the second confinement after its failure.
Figure 5-1 shows the containment event tree used on the Reactor Safety Study [4-18] from the
Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR). The headings were events postulated to lead to containment
failure. However, it might be appropriate to include in the containment event tree events that
significantly change accident sequences without failing the containment. The basic procedure is to
order the events from most severe to least, so that subsequent events are compounding. For example,
CRVSE is the worst thing. If it occurs, overpressure, hydrogen explosion, etc., do not matter. However,
if CRVSE does not occur and containment isolation is successful, a hydrogen explosion might occur or
it might not.
Although it is comparatively easy to draw these event trees, quantifying the probabilities is
something else. Since the events are basically physical processes which may or may not occur, the
probabilities of these events happening are basically judgmental. Because of the uncertainties in the
prediction of physical processes, it is sometimes not possible to state with complete confidence which
pathway an accident sequence will take. The branching probability in this sense represents a lack of
knowledge about the physical processes that are involved.
The approach used in the present work is similar to the 'plant-damage binning': we looked at
accident sequences which end with similar damage states of the first confinement barrier, we
developed containment event trees for the second confinement barrier, and attached them to the
corresponding branches.
One example is shown in Figures 5-2 and 5-3 representing the influence diagram and event
tree model for the cryostat vessel failure corresponding to branches where the vacuum vessel failed
and there is an in-vessel LOCA. The in-vessel LOCA may come from different cooling systems, and
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the vacuum vessel may fail due to different failure modes, which results in a family of branches to be
continued with the same cryostat vessel event tree. The probabilities of the events in the cryostat
vessel ID/ET do not change from branch to branch. However, the consequences in terms of
radioactive inventories released from the VV and scalled RI_VV do vary for different accident
sequences, because each is the sum of conditional values depending on the events of the accident
sequence:
RI_VV = RI_VP + RI_VV_PFC + RIVVDIVPHTS + RIVVFWPHTS (5-1)
where RI_VP is the tritium in the vacuum pumps mobilized in the VV if the vacuum pumps are not
isolated, RIVVPFC is the tritium in the plasma facing components mobilized in the VV depending on
the performance of the PFC cooling systems, RIVVDIVPHTS and RIVVFWPHTS are tritium in
the coolant released into the VV in case the respective PHTS caused in-vessel LOCA. In conclusion,
we need to include the second confinement barriers ID/ET models in the same DPL files containing the
first confinement barriers models.
CRvSE CL CR-B CR-OP CR-MT
a 13 I
CRVSE Containment failure from in-vessel steam explosion
CL Containment isolation failure
CR-B Containment failure from hydrogen combustion
CR-OP Containment failure from overpressurization
CR-MT Containment failure through basemat penetration
Figure 5-1: Example of Containment Event Tree [4-18]
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Figure 5-2: Cryostat Vessel Influence Diagram
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Figure 5-3: Cryostat Vessel Event Tree
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One of the most important types of cryostat vessel failure involves overpressurization caused
by a loss of water coolant inside the vacuum vessel combined with the VV failure, loss of water coolant
inside the cryostat from the PHTS pipes, or loss of cryogen coolant in the cryostat. The pressure level
at which the containment would fail can be calculated but only within some range of uncertainty, and
the same is true for the pressure history inside the cryostat. To determine failure probability for a
specific accident sequence, a curve that shows the probability of failure as a function of pressure can
be developed. For example, at the design pressure, the probability of failure is near zero; at the
ultimate strength of the structure, the probability of failure is equal to 1. In defining the rest of the curve,
the material properties should be considered, the uncertainties in analyzing failure level of the
structures, and the possibility of construction defects.
If hydrogen production is involved in a particular containment sequence, it is appropriate to
include a conditional probability of hydrogen combustion. The conditions resulting in combustion can
be described with uncertainties, and a probability of combustion can be estimated.
The analysis of the physical processes is outside the scope of the present work. We defined
several failure modes of the cryostat vessel as given in Table C-3, and we combined them in five
models depending on the accident sequences for the first confinement barrier they are attached to.
The accident sequences models for the six selected initiating events including the second confinement
barrier are included in Appendix C.
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6. Database Analysis: Initiating Event Frequencies,
Failures Rates, Radioactive Releases
6.1 General Concepts
The quantification of accident sequences requires a component-data base, which is developed
by compiling data, selecting reliability models, establishing the parameters for those models, and then
estimating the probabilities of component failures and the frequencies of initiating events. The data
available for a tokamak fusion reactor is very scarce, and moreover, ITER is different than the existent
experimental tokamak reactors in dimensions and new technologies involved. The most difficult task
involves estimating data for components characteristic to fusion tokamak reactors, while generic
nuclear industry data can be used for heat transport systems, electric equipment and other systems for
which operating experience data is available.
The development of a data base for accident sequence quantification is a multi-step process
involving collection and analysis of data, and the evaluation of appropriate reliability models. It
produces tables that specify the quantity to be used for each event in the fault and event trees. The
primary events can be analyzed with four types of models: component-failure models, test-contribution
models, maintenance-contribution models, and initiating-events models. The first three of these
models provide estimates of the probability that a plant element cannot accomplish its design function
because it has failed, is being tested, or is being maintained. The model for initiating events provides
the estimated frequency of the specific event of interest.
Component-failure models can be divided into two general types: time-related models and
demand models. Time-related models are used in situations such as:
" components in standby mode, which are not used until needed or tested, and they could fail while
in the standby mode;
" components in standby mode whose failure is detected immediately and they are returned to
service after a specific period of time;
" components which fail during operation before completing their mission;
* components are recovered in a certain period of time from their failure.
In most PRA studies, the exponential model is the most commonly used time-to-failure
distribution. It is not only because it is a simple model, but also many reliability studies have found
empirical grounds for the use of the exponential distribution. The probability that the event has
occurred by time t is given by the equation:
It should not be assumed that the failure rate during operation is the same as the failure rate in standby. Also,
failure to start and failure to continue running after starting are mutually exclusive events.
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p(t)=1-e-Xt
The parameter X is the failure rate, and is expressed in units of failures per unit time.
The demand model is appropriate for components that are in a dormant state until the moment
of need, when they are switched on. It is used to describe the failure of a component at the time of a
demand for its use.
For ITER, a cut-off frequency of 10~'/a is used to determine accident sequences, i.e.,
sequences with an estimated frequency lower than this cut-off are not included within design basis.
Test- and maintenance-contribution models are usually considered in the fault tree analysis
since they contribute to the component unavailability should a demand occur.
The probability that a component will be in testing when a demand occurs PT is the frequency
of the test fr multiplied by the average duration of the test LT, normalized by the time between the start
of tests ATT.
Tf (tests/month) -L- (hr/test) (6-2)
ATT (hr/month)
A maintenance act is considered to be any unscheduled activity that causes a component or a
system to be taken out of service for repair, but this repair may vary from very simple to very complex.
The evaluation of the maintenance contribution is similar to that of testing, except that maintenance
acts occur randomly in time, whereas for tests, the time is fixed. The probability that a component is in
maintenance when a demand occurs can be estimated as follows:
M (maintenance acts/month) -LM(hr/maint enance) (6-3)
M 1+fM LM
where fm is the average frequency of required maintenance, and Lm is the average length of the
maintenance.
Initiating events are the occurrences that initiate accident sequences. The desired measure
for such events is frequency. A plant may experience tens of these events per year or only one in
10,000 years.
The events in the accident sequences occur either randomly in time, or randomly at each
challenge. Thus, data will be either in number of events in time T, or number of events in n demands.
For events involving components in safety systems, the quantity of interest is the probability that the
component cannot perform its intended function when the initiating event occurs.
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(6-1)
The data-gathering task is to obtain the information needed for estimating the event-model
parameters described above:
1. the number of failures in time or the number of demands for reliability models;
2. the frequency and duration of tests for systems and components;
3. the frequency and duration of maintenance on components;
4. the frequency of initiating events.
At this time, there is not enough data to consider tests and maintenance for ITER, hence, we
will only consider the first and the last issues on this list. Moreover, unavailability due to tests or
maintenance are usually considered at the fault tree level that calculates the failure probability for
specific systems. In the present work, we gather failure probabilities for systems from existing
references for fusion experimental reactors, data reports, and previous risk assessments for nuclear
power plants. When more design information will be available for ITER, detailed fault tree analysis
should be performed.
The references that we used for data collection are as follows:
" L. C. Cadwallader, S. J. Piet, "1989 Failure Rate Screening Data for Fusion Reliability and Risk
Analvsis", EGG-FSP-8709, September 1989: This document contains failure rate screening data
for application to fusion components. The screening values are generally fission or aerospace
industry failure rates estimates that can be extrapolated for use by fusion systems designers,
reliability engineers and risk analysts. Failure rates estimates for tritium systems, liquid metal-
cooled systems, gas-cooled systems, water-cooled systems, vacuum systems, plasma heating
systems, and containment systems are given. Preliminary system availability, system level failure
rates estimates, and selected initiating event frequency estimates are presented.[5-1 1]
* R. Buende, "Reliability and Availability Assessment of the Next European Torus", Fusion
Technology, Vol. 14, Paae 197, 1988: This paper discusses reliability and availability targets
envisaged for the Next European Torus (NET) operation, describes and performs a failure modes,
effects, and criticality analysis (FMECA) of the overall plant and of major components (toroidal field
coil system, plasma heating system, protection, instrumentation, and control system, first wall and
blanket and the cooling system).[5-10] The conclusions section of the paper presents a table
(Table V) with system failure rates and corresponding mean downtime (MDT).
" G. Cambi. G. Cavallone, T. Palma, "Accident Scenarios for The In-Vessel Plant Area of NET-
II/ITER", NET Task SEA 4.1, ENEA-DISP, 1991: The paper presents the summary of the risk
evaluation for the main accident scenarios associated with failures originated in the In-Vessel Plant
Area of NET-II/ITER. The risk assessment performed represents the first part of a probabilistic risk
assessment dedicated to the accident scenario identification and to the corresponding risk
quantification for a tokamak experimental fusion machine like NET/ITER. The study is mainly
finalized to identify the most severe accident scenarios related to failures of the in-vessel systems,
with respect to the public hazards, and to quantify them in terms of risk to the public.[5-12]
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* Early Safety and Environmental Characterization Study (ESECS). ITER EDA, S 81 RE 95-06-01 W
1.1, June, 1995: Chapters 6 and 7 of ESECS present the results of accident analysis which
demonstrate that the consequences of the event sequences do not exceed the corresponding
limits established for the various sequences categories. Postulated sequences of events are
divided between those that are within the "design basis" (chapter 6) and those "beyond the design
basis" (chapter 7). Engineering judgment is used to categorize sequences, with 10/a as a guide
value for cut-off of "design basis".[5-1]
6.2 Database Development
The accident sequence models were developed using influence diagrams/event trees in
Decision Programming Language (DPL), as explained in Chapter 3. DPL models can be dynamically
linked to spreadsheets (EXCEL or Lotus 1-2-3): as DPL analyzes a model, it can send parameters to
the spreadsheet and ask for calculated or just stored values back. As the same system failure event
can occur in many accident sequences corresponding to different initiating events, it is important to
make sure that the data used in different initiating event models are consistent with each other. Linking
an event as it occurs in different DPL models to the same spreadsheet cell takes care of the
consistency issue. If the value of an event failure rate is changed in the spreadsheet, all the DPL
models will update it when running.
All the accident events involved in the sequences are defined in the influence diagram part of
the DPL model as chance events expressing the success/integrity of the system. Each chance event
has usually two states: yes (success) and no (failure). The failure has a probability of occurrence given
as a point estimate value between 0 and 1, and is shown in a value node. This value node is linked to
the spreadsheet model, which means that it is defined as a DPL-import variable: the spreadsheet cell
returns its output to the DPL analysis. The probability of system success is automatically calculated by
DPL as 1 minus the probability of system failure.
There are systems whose probability of failure depends on the output of other events in the
accident sequences (which can occur before or after the system itself is challenged). The dependency
is represented in the DPL influence diagram by arrows from the conditioning events towards the
conditioned event. Several probability nodes will be associated with the conditioned event, and they
represent conditional probabilities given specific states of conditioning events.
Our EXCEL 5.0 database is constructed in the form of a two-column table with the events
name and the corresponding frequencies for initiating events, and probability of failure for systems
failures. The failures are either failures on demand or failures to accomplish the mission for a specific
duration. The failure database and the explanation of the data is presented in Appendix D.
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The consequence data in terms of radioactive inventories released from the confinement
barriers are also defined as value nodes, and they may also be dependent on some system states.
They are attached in the event tree model to the appropriate branches. The present work concentrates
on tritium releases, but the same model could be applied for any other radioactive inventory. In chapter
2, an overview of tritium characteristics and locations of major inventories and flows was presented. In
this section, the concern is focused on the amount of tritium in the torus and in the cooling systems.
Chapter 2 of ESECS [4-1] gives a comprehensive description of tritium processes.
The tritium inventory in the torus is composed of tritium in the plasma and divertor gas, tritium
on the cryopanels of the vacuum pumps, and tritium in the plasma facing components.
The tritium in the plasma and divertor gas target does not contribute significantly to the
inventory that could be mobilized in case of an accident since it is only a few grams. (This low in-
plasma inventory is also one reason that there cannot be a runaway fusion reaction since there is
inadequate fuel present.)
The inventory on the cryogenic panels of the vacuum pumps can become mobile in any
accidental condition in which these panels would heat-up (for example, gas ingress or steam ingress in
the vacuum vessel). If the vacuum pumps are only regenerated after the end of burn, the total
inventory on the hydrogen panels of all vacuum pumps is the inventory that is injected in one burn-
cycle minus the amount that is burned, or approximately 130 g-T. If some of the pumps could be
regenerated during the burn, then the total inventory could be less than this. In the rest of this report.
we conservatively assume that the inventory is 130 g-T. Besides this inventory, the vacuum pumps
also collect tritiated impurities such as tritiated water and organics (if carbon is used in the machine).
The tritium content collected in a 1000 s burn from these is estimated to be 6-8 g, and the regeneration
could be less frequent than for the hydrogen panels. Assuming regeneration every fourth cycle, the
inventory would add up to 30 g-T. This leads to a total inventory on the vacuum pumps of 160 g-T, all
of which would be mobile in hot, oxidizing accident conditions.
Tritium in the plasma facing components is the most important inventory and the one that has
the largest uncertainty. Depending on the material, there are several dominant mechanisms for tritium
to be in (or on) plasma facing components:
* for metals the dominant mechanism is implantation with associated diffusion of tritium into the bulk
material;
* for carbon it is tritium co-depositing with carbon materials onto surfaces;
* tritium breeding in beryllium (or boron) in near-plasma materials.
The inventories in Table 6-1 are the values used in the present work: the total inventory base
case or only the mobilizable inventory depending on the temperature and the integrity of the respective
plasma facing component. The uncertainty in these values is large but will be reduced substantially as
the ITER R&D program progresses. For now, the best estimate is about 2 kg-T total with about 500 g-
T that could potentially be mobilized.
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Table 6-1: Tritium Inventory in Beryllium PFC Material
Component Total Mobilizable Reduction Reduction Inventory due
Inventory inventory due to due to to breeding
Base Case Base Case Surface Erosion (g-T)
(g-T) (g-T) Barrier
First Wall 900 40 100% none 130
Limiter and 400 100 none 50% 60
Baffle
Divertor 1900 600 50% 75% 180
Components
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7. Evaluation of Confinement Barriers Performance
The probabilistic model developed in the previous chapters is used to evaluate the safety
performance of the first and second confinement barriers. The Vacuum Vessel (VV) and the Cryostat
Vessel (CV) respectively are the most significant parts in the current ITER confinement strategy, and
therefore, a sensitivity analysis of their failure modes is performed in this chapter.
The failure probabilities corresponding to the failure modes of the first confinement barrier are
included in the first and second confinement barrier DPL models, while those corresponding to the
second barrier only affect the model of the second barrier.
A reference case is considered with the database parameters as given in Table D-3, Appendix
D. The failure modes and retention factors corresponding to the VV and the CV are enumerated from 1
to 23. The first step is to run the DPL accident sequence models for a low and a high value of each of
the 23 probabilities of failure, changing them one by one, while keeping all the other values at their
reference levels. The goal is to study the influence of that particular failure mode on the overall
complementary cumulative frequency (CCF) of tritium releases. The low (1) and high (h) values are
arbitrarily chosen equal to 106 and 0.1 respectively. This is a very large range, so if there is no
variation of the CCF between these values for a particular failure mode of a confinement barrier, it can
be concluded that this failure mode does not affect the overall safety of the plant.
It is important to realize that the development of the accident sequences is a subjective work,
so the list of failure modes considered might be different for different models. However, if we assume
that all the conceivable failure modes of the confinement barriers have been defined, the sensitivity
analysis presented here can be used to perform a ranking of the most important failure modes.
The overall frequency distribution of radioactive releases is analyzed with BestFit [8-13], which
gives statistical parameters such as: minimum and maximum consequence, mode', mean, standard
deviation, variance, skewness2 , and kurtosis.
The notations to differentiate among PDFs and CCFs of radioactive releases for various
parameter values are as follows: #1_b1, #1_b2, #h_bl, #h_b2, where "#" is the failure mode number
(from 1 to 23) as given in Table D-3, 'I' and 'h' are the low and high values of the probability of failure,
'bi' and 'b2' are barriers 1 and 2. The reference case for barriers 1 and 2 is represented by Ob1 and
Mode is the value with the highest probability of occurrence.
2 Skewness of a distribution gives an indication of the degree of asymmetry. A distribution which is symmetrical
about the mean leads to a value of skewnesss equal to zero (i.e., normal distribution). Negative values show a
distribution peak to the right of the mean, and positive values a peak to the left of the mean.
3 Kurtosis of a distribution describes the extent to which a distribution is peaked. Normal probability distribution
function has a kurtosis of 3, and is taken as a standard measure. A distribution with kurtosis smaller than 3 has
a flatter top than the normal distribution. A distribution with a kurtosis greater than 3 has a more peaked top
than a normal distribution.
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O_b2. When a failure mode has a corresponding probability close to the low or high values, that case is
not run any more. The results are grouped in three sections: VV failure modes, CV failure modes, and
retention factors. The statistical parameters of the PDFs of tritium releases determine those failure
modes to which the model is sensitive, and the corresponding CCF of tritium releases is plotted for
those cases along with the reference graphs and the ITER tritium release limit. When the reference
probabilities of failure are very close to the low or to the high values considered, it is not useful to run
the model, particularly if no sensitivity to that failure mode is observed for the other end of the range.
The statistics that differ from the reference one are highlighted in the figures below.
7.1 Sensitivity Analysis for First Confinement Barrier Failure Modes
There are ten vacuum vessel failure modes defined in the present accident sequences model.
Possible failure causes include: electromagnetic loads, overpressure following in-vessel LOCA,
hydrogen explosion inside the vacuum vessel, arcing, missile generation, displaced magnet coil, ozone
explosion inside the cryostat vessel. The probabilities of integrity loss of the vacuum vessel as we
defined them are conditional probabilities; for example, given an event such as arcing has occurred,
the probability that the vacuum vessel fails due to arcing is estimated.
The PDF and CCF of tritium releases was calculated when changing each of the ten
probabilities of failures to the low and then to the high values as defined above, while keeping all the
other probabilities constant. The statistics analysis shows that only two failure modes have an actual
impact on the PDF of tritium releases, while all the others do not have any significant effect. The two
failure causes are arcing (number 7) and displaced magnet coil (number 9), both magnet system
related events. Hence, it is important that the vacuum vessel design has provisions to avoid being
affected by events in the magnet systems. Moreover, if the magnet systems design allow for a
decrease in the probability of failure due to those causes, that would also decrease the frequency of
the accident sequences that include the vacuum vessel failure due to arcing or displaced coil.
For the arcing case, Figure 7-3 presents the complementary cumulative frequency of tritium
releases for the first and second confinement barriers for the vacuum vessel failure due to arcing. The
reference value of the failure probability is 0.01. It is interesting that changing the probability to 10~6
does not have a very significant effect on decreasing the accident frequencies; however, by increasing
the probability with only one order of magnitude to 0.1, the curves for both the first and second barriers
are shifted to upper frequencies quite significantly. Therefore, there is no benefit in trying to improve
the design in order to lower the probability of failure due to arcing, but care should be taken so that the
probability of failure does not increase above the current value.
The failure probability of the vacuum vessel due to a displaced coil has little effect on the
second barrier complementary cumulative frequency function, while the first confinement barrier
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function varies quite significantly. The low value of the probability is again 106, but the high value is 0.9
(because the reference value is 0.5).
What captures our attention in this case is that for the low case, the complementary
cumulative frequency for the first and second barriers intersect one another in the region of 500 - 800
grams of tritium (Figure 7-4). Intuitively, such a fact should not happen since the presence of a second
confinement barrier should lower the consequences in terms of both frequency and release. However,
due to the fact that CCF is a cumulative function, it might happen that, by introducing an additional
confinement barrier, more accident sequences leading to the same radioactive release are possible.
When adding all these frequencies corresponding to the same consequences, there might be points
where the CCF for the second confinement barrier is above the one for the first barrier, which happens
in our case.
A simplified example shown in Figure 7-1 and 7-2 demonstrates the statements above
mathematically. For the case when there is only one confinement barrier (i.e., the vacuum vessel), two
accident sequences are possible: one without any consequences, and the other with a probability of
pVV and release of Xgrams. When a second confinement barrier is introduced (i.e., the cryostat
vessel), which has two possible failure modes, there are four possible accident sequences: two of
them with no consequences, and the other two with the probabilities as given in Figure 7-2 and the
same consequence Xgrams. Thus, the release X -grams will have a cumulative probability of
occurrence equal to the sum of the probabilities of the two accident sequences:
Pr(Xgrams) = pVV(1 - pCV_1)pCV_2 + pVV(pCV_1) = (7-1)
= pVV[(1 - pCV_1)pCV_2 + pCV_1]
Equation (7-1) implies that Pr(X-grams) can be lower or higher than pVV, depending on the
probabilities of failure of the cryostat vessel: [pCV_1 + pCV_2 - pCV_l.pCV_2] < or> 1.
In conclusion, when an additional confinement barrier is included in the confinement
strategy, the failure probabilities corresponding to its possible failure modes should be
reasonably low, so that the situation encountered above does not occur.
The Primary Heat Transport Systems (PHTSs) of the Plasma Facing Components (PFCs) of
ITER are also part of the first confinement barrier. Because the accident sequences models developed
in the present study are symmetrical with regard to the divertor and first wall PHTSs, sensitivity
analysis is performed only on selected failure modes for the divertor PHTS. The failure causes of
interest are as follows: runaway electrons damage, electromagnetic loads, missile generation,
displaced coil, and ozone explosion in the cryostat vessel. The results, as presented in Tables 7-5 and
7-6 and plotted in Figures 7-5 and 7-6, show almost no sensitivity of the model to those failure modes.
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Figure 7-1: Probability versus Radioactive Releases from First Barrier
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y (1-.pVV)0 (1-pVV) 0
0
CV integrity
(failure mode 2)
CV integrity y (1-pCV 2)
(failure mode 1) pVV(1-pCV-1)(1-pCV_2) 0
y (1-pCV_1
n pVV Xgrs pVV(1 -pCV_1)pCV_2 X-grams
n pCV_1
Xgrams pVV(pCV_1) X-grams
Figure 7-2: Probability versus Radioactive Releases from Second Barrier
129
w1 i 6; 0 C Lo) Lo co
E E
(U 0L E)L (D 0CJ ' V
CL a)q in o) *C
-0 a = a)
C\0V >C(1N-
(In
(UC V)L CV)O0)-E EUC)1C)0~(( (U C )Ln~(L (
~~~0c 0~i-o 0 QW~-0C ca 02 5 ~ -
C~~C >,L Ci- y
UJI 0)J)iC'C 0UCO)Lfl-LODt)C (0 (U0 JC'J 7'
0 a) (0N c~ 0 0 co) (0- 6LO 0 -)
:- -l i-:) ' - I
CL CLC'~ CL Lo _
EUlf N E.9(1 aw ME.
(U ,0 Co (U 0a ci 0= 0 ~ 'r 0
130
ca
a)
a)
E
C0
02
LL 0
0 U-
(I>
E0)
(D
-
P- ( 0 I- -,q M- -N - tM C
0 -LO) It CD LO ~
CM C1~0 - 20 4 0 (0- * -
Em E 0mE
c (0o(0ca 0(c D c -00 0O)~N coCL (0(((
C 0)0 0) * qc r 4a 0) N
W I t )L 0 " CO qt IN (al M)
In m1- 0Nm 0j N m''
to (0-0 (00
co co~0N LO C~ o0 06 Lo _~ (D
C\JCm'- N-I'-CCLC0'-c) N-
E E E-~~
Iz- COa E_) c I
m o3 o3
131
U)(D
U)
0
rL
Ecuo
CES
760
-U)
e~j a),
IS
c
u
(
to
cm
If
E
SE
-- i=
. -
C,
-.
w
0 N
,0
0
E
.E
coN
(0
,r
E
E
Mu
Lo
r,In
co
-D0
0
oI
U)
cr)
N
(0
C
Cu
U)
*.
to
0
*t
cq
-v
0
*
C,
0)
to
C.)
C
LO
cu
>
-i
"o
Lo
a)
C
a')
0)
cv
II
Cu
Cu
0
e
M0 Lo N M N 0
W -r) It(0 N
o LON co (co- cos - > cm
o com F-
1~
.0
-I(0
if
E
E
E
cu
U)
o-V
0
Cuc(1)
cc
U)0
V
If
U)
cuCU
co
-e
Cu
U)
C
U)
11
o
mu0
t
CL
"t
C:
E
CO
a0)
0C
In,
iE
E
. E E..
x-.2
Cu
-
0.
C
to
cf)
0
N
1
0)
.
(0
N
CC)%
U) '-N
D
. -I
>0U
Soc 
0 U)t2e
to
-
-
I-N0 cr)o
c't
CI
6
S
cE
Cu0
-
co
C
H
to -
(0' t
C6(o L-)
-a
o c 
(Dm
mO00
- -
(D0)
,-0
Io(o
(0
.-
XV
E 0)
0 0
Cv)
-c) -
"1 I
E
F-
-E ..
. C- o
II
a
-0
toM
m CS
a)
*C Ucc
C>
> c
Lo
0)mC'
7-
TO 0
" C
conCu0 wu
Ci c >
toCN(o
-
cc
N
m
0)
N
(0o(0
cv,
Cu
II U
CdCu
a)
U)
0
+
0)
-
CD
N
0
Co
o
e
t
to LO cu cr ' co (D to It
LO U") N rl- w m wO r-
ji - 0 cm rF- - -
c o m ; Tog
( / ) -.-. n C
C:eE" c C 0
?: o .- E 0 cot
xa 2-mol
-,,I m 2 2 o o Ic00 25
to
-o
- N
Ifa)
C
>u
0)
to
(D
C6)
(0
Mu
0
0.
C
11
0 1
c e
0 .0
co y
O
II II
E
E
-;E
M>0)
Co
cM,
E
xu
toC
0
N
N
(0t
NQcq
I
C
Cu
U)
N
rN
toN
ca
U)
*
V
C,
to(0
co
t
1e
II
U)
0
CCu
>u
0)
N
0)
co
Nu
c CDU)
Cl>
N
N
0)
0)
Nu
CU
0
132
Encu
0) -- 7
C-.EN
C
-0
Cua
-a>
og
-C
-CC
Co
-Cu)
_.....N
Cu
H-
IMP wo Io O-o 1,Wm -- t I D so ER, r o o c c co co o o co o C!
o (D m It 0 co N o
U) V
EE
It C)
00) m) N mD N N N c
-' IDN NC) I 
CCZ (0D-~-dn
0~
CO > U)
0 a
0 00 Z>
LL
U)~ co NC CoU r ' 1-0mco0 f w 0 N ~0) >
In "j- a LO 'I 0~>
.E ~~~ Ex(r-c'
cc 0 a) "C
r-- -0 r-C- 0i C) CR f- (D -
CLo r- QU) m O C
ilt *.-
> CU )
1eCT oy e'ir ~In in r. c o elI I IaI)I)a)o 00 00 0 00
133
o o r-. iz F- t- .J 3.
I ~+o:i~4
C~J -l 0 g cv) Loa r-0 - cc
09 0 0 0 0+ + + Lba U j w LwU w w LI W W U. W W W0l 0 0 00> 0 0)
0 C, 03 0 0 0 0
-1 - ~~- w r ,
(ieaA ied) Aouenbejl aAijejnwnD AJLuewaGdwo3
0
0
00
0-
oC C
0o0
-C,
0)
E LLc
LLI
an
9
CU
0
06
0
00
0
134
I Ij E
io o 
0) 0) 0) 
) .
-
_--_ 
_
0
+
w
0
0
o cli Cm LO (D r-
o 0 0 0 0 0 0
wU aw J L W h W b W
o 0 0 0 0. 0 0
(jeeA ied) Auenbsaji GAIunwno Ajejuawaidwoo
co 0)0
I
0
0
0
00
00
CI)
o2
cco
CCo
o -Z
00
(I) C1o
> >
LL
0 E,
0 -
135
c~J0
+
w
00
0 ClJ ~L0 C C WN
-l I' - N~ qYr
-. T.U) )
C?0 ~c (0
9xCJC CfN
C4 -Y :3
C' -: U) w ),
( ~~ 0 to r" 0i
CIL q 00lI) 0l to m
s W2E > (D
EE .1 11 i
q~ a~ . ca 0
qr_____ c- It fl-- - - - 9______ 0 _
o) lq tc - n a wLf
C~ jCl co
0 ~ ~ ~ I IIII 6 r Cl ttoc
CL 0 U- CL LOC~~
E1 E it OI. C ~o
136
0
H0
LLL
CL M
" U-
0C)
0D r
OC0)a
a.-
C
-0CI
N 'o a) 6D
co to C\JNt
E 0
'a .co
0 ~C 0 ~
C')
N
N
LC)
N
c'i
c D
N
6
U)
co
C')
Nm
I0
U)
(D
U)
CO
a,
C')
0
- f- -+ - + - - + - - -~ -4 -~ 4
Co
Co
0
C
00)
*U) N
e'j co
CD L/)
N C')
N-
C') C')
,- N
to
U.o
11 I22 ~r-ouwi
cm ) > ('D 24
COo 00) U tO to mD a, aD
C\ o1
c c-:I or
0C NC\DL)- CMN
II
E
(D C: o 3 0
'a cc "D = 'a
-- O C R C D -o 15r- C CD (
Co c  '- C'OCO CD x c C6 to Ca, cc
=$ M C CDC:* CD0~(
CD T C J(
C~Je~-C CJ N M ~ -'
,.N c DC OC N ~ ~m cm cm NOC
137
U-
Lu
0Co C')
Nm
x
U)
C')
I'
Co
0
U)lN-(0
0
II
C
Co
Co
it
EN
N
CD
E 9
a)
0 )
(DCI
CL
CZ C
0
0 i i i -1.- 11
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Clq
C>
001pL ..- e -
on 0 0 0 0D 0 0 0D 0 0D 0+ + + b L di 6 h d dwi w ui L W W W LU L U Lo C 0 C0 0 0 0 0 0 0 C0 0C> 0 0 0 0 CD 9
(Je jad ) AoDuenbajji eA!genn Ajeluewaldwoo
138
1 X
(D
- o
U)
EZ02
U)
*0
o d
> c
a-
o
0>
0
0D
o o m 0 o 0 I 0 n 0 o 0 0
U di Lbi L Lbi Li di Lii Wo) l 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(.aA xad) Aouenbeji OAImeLnwno A.ujiueedwuo3
139
E
LU
- - -CO
0 o ~ x ^
0)
0D
0)
0
-0
eo~~~o 
o o
0DQ
0
CC
E
C>
C>
C> (a
0
.00
a)
I-0 C
0
IL
>0
cna
~c,
a) 0
LL
cv~ -
0 0D
C! q
0
0
0
>a
c
Li
c
c
7.2 Sensitivity Analysis for Second Confinement Barrier Failure
Modes
The most important component of the second confinement barrier for ITER strategy is the
cryostat vessel. Eleven failure modes are considered for the cryostat vessel (numbers 11 to 21 in
Table D-3, Appendix D); some of the accident events as defined are conditional and some are
independent. Naturally, these failure modes are only included in the accident sequence DPL models for
the second confinement barrier, which considerably decreases the DPL and EXCEL run time to obtain
the complementary cumulative frequency (CCF) of tritium releases. Four failure modes affect the CCF
of releases from the second confinement barrier in this case: arcing (number 12), missile generation
(number 15), displaced magnet coil (number 16), and failure of the cryostat vessel without off-normal
challenge (number 18). Tables 7-7 to 7-9 present the statistical parameters of the PDFs of tritium
releases when sensitivity analysis is performed on the failure probabilities. Figures 7-7 to 7-10 include
the CCF of releases for the four failure modes mentioned above.
The conditional failure probability of the cryostat vessel due to arcing (event number 12) given
that arc was produced has a reference value of 0.1. The low and the high values for which the model
was run are 10~6 and 0.9 respectively. As Figure 7-7 shows, decreasing the conditional probability by a
factor of 10- lowers the CCF curve for the second barrier by less than a factor of 101 in the range of
20 to 900 grams of tritium releases where most of the accident sequences belong. However, the CCF
is still above the prescribed ITER limit. When the failure probability of CV due to arcing is increased to
0.9, the CCF for second confinement barrier overlaps with the CCF for the first barrier, implying no
advantage from a safety point of view for the presence of a second barrier. Therefore, the CV and
magnet systems design should be such that the probability of failure should not be more than 0.1, but
the gain in CCF curve is not considerable if the probability of this failure mode is decreased below the
reference value.
For missile generation and displaced magnet coil (numbers 15 and 16, respectively), the
reference value for the CV conditional failure probabilities is the same and equal to 0.01. The model
was run for three other values: 106, 0.1, and 1. For the low value, there is practically no change in the
CCF of tritium releases, meaning that no effort should be made to decrease the probability for those
failure modes. When the probability is increased by one factor of magnitude to 0.1, an increase of CCF
by a factor of 3 in the range of 20 to 3000 grams of tritium is observed. When increasing the probability
from 0.1 to 1, the CCF for second barrier jumps considerably, in some points above the CCF for the
first barrier. Care should be taken that the conditional probability of failure of CV for these two failure
modes does not go above 0.1.
The failure of the CV without being challenged by any off-normal causes is an independent
event (number 18), having a reference probability of 103. By decreasing this probability to 10-, no gain
140
in CCF of tritium releases is observed at all. The CCF curve is more sensitive to an increase of the
probability to 0.1, although not significantly (Figure 7-10).
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7.3 Sensitivity Analysis for Confinement Barriers Retention Factors
The judgmental reference values used in this study for the retention factors of the vacuum
vessel and the cryostat vessel are 0.1 and 0.25 respectively. Sensitivity analysis is performed for the
low and high values of 0 and 0.9 for each of the retention factors.
Let us first analyze the vacuum vessel retention factor. For accident sequences with
frequencies higher than 10~6/year, a reduction of the retention factor to zero (meaning that all
radioactive releases escape the first confinement barrier if its integrity is lost) will lead to an increase of
tritium releases by hundreds of grams; for instance, the maximum release increases from 3700 to
4110 grams. This is a significant amount of tritium, although the change of CCF curve in Figure 7-11
does not look impressive. If both the first and the second confinement barriers failed, a retention factor
of zero for the vacuum vessel causes the maximum tritium release from the second barrier to increase
from 2670 to 2970 grams.
When the VV retention factor is equal to 0.9, the maximum release from the first confinement
barrier is decreased to 411 grams, and from the second confinement barrier if both barriers fail to only
297 grams (Figure 7-12). The CCF curve for the second confinement barrier is still not entirely under
the ITER limit, but it is much closer to satisfying the design requirements. However, a retention factor
of 0.9 might not be a realistic value, or might increase the cost of designing and constructing such a
vessel by an unreasonable amount of money.
The cryostat vessel retention factor only affects the second barrier model. Decreasing it from
0.25 to 0 leads to an increase of tritium releases from the second barrier of about 900 grams (from
2673 to 3564 grams). A value of 0.9 for the CV retention factor leads to a maximum release of 356
grams, a very important reduction in radioactive releases. However, the maximum release is higher
than in the case of a VV retention factor increase to 0.9 (356 versus 297 grams). Also, there are more
points corresponding to possible consequences above the ITER limit line in Figure 7-13 than in Figure
7-12. The conclusion might be that the design effort of increasing the retention factor for the VV rather
than for the CV is more justified. Another argument to sustain that conclusion is that the vacuum vessel
is smaller than the cryostat vessel and contains a higher vacuum during normal operation, so the
vacuum vessel is already designed for more severe conditions that the cryostat vessel.
We also looked at the effect of increasing both retention factors to 0.9 simultaneously, to
observe if the second confinement barrier CCF curve is below the ITER limit in that limit case. Figure
7-14 shows that this is not the case, although the number of points above the ITER limit is significantly
decreased. However, the maximum possible release is 222 grams, only 70 grams lower (25%) than
the case when only the VV retention factor is 0.9, and the CV retention factor is 0.25.
In conclusion, the vacuum vessel and the cryostat vessel retention factors highly influence the
complementary cumulative frequency of tritium releases. More analysis should be performed to
observe if their increase combined with the decrease of the failure probability of various confinement
149
failure modes can bring the second barrier CCF curve under the ITER recommended limit. In that
case, a third strong confinement barrier would not be required.
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7.4 Analysis of the Complementary Cumulative Distribution
Function of the First Confinement Barrier
As previous sections of this chapter show, the CCF for the first confinement barrier practically
depends on three parameters only: the failure probabilities of the vacuum vessel due to arcing (number
7) and displaced magnet coil (number 9), and the vacuum vessel retention factor (number 22). The
CCF of tritium releases is actually derived from the frequency distribution of tritium releases calculated
by using the probabilistic model developed in the previous chapters. Therefore, the frequency
distribution is a function of the above mentioned parameters: p7, p9, and rf22. So far we studied the
sensitivity of the CCF of releases when changing each of these parameters to a low and a high value.
It might be interesting to study the sensitivity to some intermediary values. However, running the DPL
accident sequences models and the EXCEL model that integrates the results from all the accident
sequences into a CCF curve is very time expensive. Thus, we thought about using response surface
techniques [7-1, 7-2] to represent the consequences as a function of the input parameters p7, p9, and
rf22.
A probability density function can be fitted to the overall frequency distribution function of
releases for ITER. This can be done using the BestFit package, and the data is the frequency
distribution of radioactive releases as obtained in EXCEL after combining all the initiating event models
together. In BestFit, this type of data given in the form of (x, f) pairs is called density data. The
frequency weight f specifies the relative height of the frequency curve at each x value of tritium
releases. When running a BestFit calculation on density data, the program sorts the data, gathers
statistics and normalizes the data to create a continuos probability density function (PDF) (i.e., the area
under the curve is equal to 1). Therefore, the fitted density function corresponds to the normalized
continuos PDF rather than to the discrete frequency distribution, and is characterized by a number of
parameters (usually between one and three parameters) that define the form of the function. The
parameters of the fitted distribution depend in turn on the uncertain parameters p7, p9, and rf22.
Sensitivity analysis can then be performed on the parameters of the fitted distribution for the whole
range of values of p7, p9, and rf22.
After previewing with RiskView the form of the distributions available in BestFit, we concluded
that gamma distribution fits the input data most closely although not perfectly, as shown in Figures 7-
15 and 7-16. However, that is not relevant when performing sensitivity analysis on the parameters.
The gamma density function has the following form:
x (7-2)
f(x) ba.xa-l.e b
F(a)
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where r(a) is the gamma function. The parameters are a>O and b>O, and the domain is x O, where x
are the tritium releases in the present case. Each parameter a and b are functions on p7, p9, and rf22,
and we use response surface method to define a and b as second order polynomial functions of those
three parameters.
The DPL model that calculates the frequency distribution of tritium releases using the gamma
distribution with parameters a and b given by response surface functions of p7, p9, and rf22 is given in
Figures 7-17 and 7-18. The values for p7, p9 and rf22 are input in DPL and exported to an EXCEL file
that contains the response surface functions for a(p7,p9,rf22) and b(p7,p9,rf22); thus, a and b are
import variables from EXCEL, and the frequency distribution function is then calculated in DPL as
gamma(a,b). Sensitivity analysis can then be performed in DPL on any of the parameters p7, p9, and
rf22.
The second-order response surface for the approximation of a given consequence, f(Z) , as a
function of parameters z1, ..., zn, has the following functional form [7-11:
n [ , ,( _ j, n -(7-3)
f(i) A + + C(z + - ZkO) (zj - zjo)
j=1 k=j+1
To determine the unknown coefficients, a set of 1+2n+[n(n-1)/2] points, I, is selected at which the
approximation, f(z), is made equal to the actual values of f(z) calculated by the DPL-EXCEL model.
The coefficients are basically calculated using the following'set of equations:
A = fo, (7-4)
B= R11(zjO - zj2)+ R12(z o Zp),
Cj =Rj + Rj2,
where
(zji - zjO)(Zy - zj2)
= f2(j) - 0
(zi2 - zjo)(z! 2 - Zp)
D = fo + f11(j,k) - f1(j) - f1(k)
(zil - Zio)(Zkl - zko)
for all j = 1,...,n and selected pairs j, k.
where io = (z10,...,znO) is the reference point, zil and Zj 2 are two other selected values
of zj for all j = 1,...,n, and fo = f(zo), f1(j) = f(zj = zj 1), f2(j) = f(zj = zj 2), f1I(j,k) = f(zj = Z1,Zk = Zk1)-
The MATHCAD file that calculates the response surface coefficients for a(p7,p9,rf22) and
b(p7,p9,rf22) is in Appendix G. Parameters a and b have to be positive, and they also should make
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physical sense. The mean of the gamma distribution is equal to (ab), and the variance is (ab 2). As the
failure probabilities p7 or p9 increase, the mean value of the consequences should decrease; also, as
the VV retention factor increases, the mean value of the consequences should decrease. The resulting
a and b functions of those three parameters should be checked against all these conditions, so that the
DPL model in Figure 7-17 does not return error messages when sensitivity analysis on p7, p9, and rf22
is performed. Our analysis shows the following results:
" a>0 for any p7, and a is approximately constant (at 0.0055) for p7<0.01 (the reference value);
" a is approximately constant (at 0.012) for p9<0.02, but is negative for 0.1 02<p9<0.424; moreover,
a increases fast with p9 for p9>0.424, which is the region of interest to us;
* a decreases with rf22 for 0<rf22<0.2; for the rest of the rf22 value (rf22>0.2), the a function as
derived here cannot be used because a is negative for 0.2<rf22<0.8, and is an increasing function
of rf22 for rf22>0.8, which is not physically correct;
" b is positive for any p7, p9, or rf22 when varied individually; also, b is an increasing function of p7
for p7<0.27, an increasing function of p9 for ant p9, and a decreasing function of rf22 for any rf22.
While considering these restrictions, sensitivity analysis was performed with DPL and the
results are presented in Figures 7-19 to 7-21. For p7 in the range 0 to 0.7, the expected value (EV) of
tritium releases does not vary much, while from 0.7 to 0.9 the EV increases by a factor of 3. The EV is
more sensitive to p9, since in the range 0.43 to 1, the EV increases by a factor of magnitude. For the
retention factor between 0 and 0.2, the EV decreases by an order of magnitude.
Performing this type of sensitivity analysis might be of help in finding inconsistencies in the
accident sequences models. More insight could be gained if a more conservative distribution fit can be
found. Also, the response surface method has various ways of calculating the coefficients. The design
we used has two weaknesses: a single response surface is used over the entire space, and the
interaction term is determined in one quadrant only. A second scheme provides additional points, so
that separate response surfaces are generated for different ranges of the uncertain variables.[7-1]
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Figure 7-17: DPL Model for Frequency Distribution of Tritium Releases using Gamma Distribution
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Figure 7-18: DPL Data Definition of the Frequency Distribution of
Tritium Releases Chance Node of DPL Model in Figure 7-17
161
I I I I
a') f) ai) af)CD 0~ CD C
Cl N c i
cli C\
0 0
0 0
6 d)
CO C14
CJ
C"l
D CD CD CDo 0 0 0
o o 0 0
LO LO I
a) a) a) a
9nlIeA peoodX3
162
0
(D (0o) 0o 0
(b 4
LO LO
r-
0o
N-
C-
a-
0
0 -
CV)
0.
0
LL
00
0)
E
0
0>
x
00
3
.LM
C',
76
o) 10 0r 10l 0 0) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LO Cf- LO ' 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 Co C'O to 0f rO Lb LO Lf 0 U
0) 0 0 0~ 0) CN N 'J
0 0 0 0 ) CO ( C6) 5-0~6666 C
enjBA pelcoedx3
163
NsCN
0
C;
10 M (
6 0
l-
0 M
C CM
onluA pjoad10
164
8. Decision Model for the Type of Tokamak Building
of ITER
The methodology developed in the previous chapters provides the means for deciding if a third
confinement barrier is required to comply with the regulatory requirements. The results show that a
third confinement barrier should be used to lower the releases of radioactive inventories to the
environment under the desired limit. The tokamak building should play that role, but different designs
could be used. The present chapter contains a decision model to help decide what type of tokamak
building is the most appropriate from the designer's point of view. The model considers not only safety
considerations, but also other important attributes such as construction cost, project completion time,
technical feasibility and public attitude.
The ITER Joint Central Team is currently considering design changes for the tokamak
building, but due to the time frame of our project, we will not include them in the present work. The
design as described in the DDD 6.2 [8-161 is the first possible choice considered; it includes a filter/vent
system that releases radioactive inventories through the stack to the atmosphere, and it does not
withstand overpressures. The other option is to basically keep the same design for the tokamak pit, but
to include a CANDU-type vacuum building that accommodates overpressure and radioactive
inventories containment in case of accident. Other options, as they become of interest to the designer,
can be easily included into the model.
The decision problem is inherently difficult because complex and developing technologies, as
well as domestic and international economics and safety cultures are involved and highly intertwined.
More specifically, the following characteristics of the problem complicate its analysis:
* large uncertainties: technological, economical, and political, partially due to the very long time into
the future for which the decisions are relevant;
" multiple objectives: construction cost, technical performance (during sever accidents and external
events), constructibility, construction schedule, design codes and regulatory concerns, safety and
environmental impact, public fear and anxiety towards a new nuclear technology;
" multiple decision makers: fusion scientific community, utilities, general public, and governments.
The approach taken here is to construct a probabilistic model for the decision problem,
construct a multi-attribute utility function to describe the stakeholder's preferences and conduct
extensive sensitivity analysis with respect to the data that is most uncertain or subjective. The main
goal of the analysis is to identify parameters, such as those related to costs, conditional probability
distributions of the uncertain events, and preference structures of the decision makers that significantly
affect the optimal strategies. The results will allow us to identify some key parameters that require a
better assessment, or parameters to which the optimal strategy is insensitive.
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Due to the complexity of the problem, we restricted the analysis to only one stakeholder group:
the designers group. The main objective of the designer is to maximize the chance that the project is
accepted by the other stakeholders and realized in practice. We assume here, for simplicity of the
model, that the designer has to decide between two main options: the first is the current ITER
tokamak building design as described in the Design Description Document [8-16]; the second is a
CANDU type containment, as it was first proposed by Steven Piet in reference [1-1]. Because of the
Canadian experience with tritium, the CANDU containment deserves some special attention among all
the other types of fission reactor containments. The possibility of using a CANDU-style "vacuum
building" for ITER has been discussed to accommodate accident overpressures, in lieu of a filter/vent
system. The vacuum building for the existing CANDU power plants has a normal pressure of about 7
kPa, and it provides additional volume at low pressure for blowdown of pressurized water during
LOCAs while keeping the pressure sub-atmospheric.
Chapter 2 described the current design for the ITER tokamak building, as well as the tritium
confinement strategy. Table 2-9 presents the TB compartments parameters. The tokamak pit is a right
circular cylinder, and the cryostat and tokamak are located in the center of the pit. The pit also contains
all the components which must be in close proximity to the cryostat, such as diagnostics, plasma
heating, plasma fueling, remote maintenance equipment, and a large number of penetrations in the
cryostat. The upper part of the Tokamak Hall consists of a crane hall. The pit and the crane hall are
separated by a floor made of movable sections. We will consider that only the tokamak pit is to be built
as a CANDU containment in case that decision policy is preferred.
Table 8-1 presents the characteristics of the reactor buildings and vacuum buildings of the
CANDU reactors in operation in Canada. The largest CANDU vacuum building is Darlington A as
shown in Table 8-1. The ITER tokamak pit alone has a volume of 521,800 M3 , which is much bigger
than the reactor building and vacuum building of Darlington taken together. The size of a vacuum
building for ITER depends on details of LOCAs and subsequent pressurization within the ITER
confinement.
The tokamak pit contains tritium bearing equipment, and therefore, it is provided with a
separate ventilation system at negative pressure to the rest of the building. The HVAC system vents
through the stack directly to the atmosphere. Reference [8-16] specifies the following pressure values:
" during operation, in the tokamak pit, outside the bioshield: -2 cm H20 1 (equal to 101.1 kPa);
" during operation, in the tokamak pit, inside the bioshield: -3 cm H20 (equal to 101 kPa);
* during major maintenance, in the tokamak pit: atmospheric pressure.
A comparison of the characteristics of the ITER tokamak pit as given in [8-16], and the
tokamak pit of a CANDU type is synthesized in Table 8-2, along with the characteristics of the
Darlington CANDU containment. We assume that the volume of the tokamak pit is already minimized
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1 1 atm = 101.3 kPa = 1033.2 cm H20
to provide enough room for all the equipment, so it would stay the same for any type of containment
building being chosen. Although not clearly stated in DDD 6.2 [8-16], the current design pressure is the
atmospheric pressure, since the pit is not designed to resist overpressures from LOCA accidents.
Knief [8-17] gives a design pressure for a CANDU PHWR 600 MWe of 130 kPa. The ITER cryostat
vessel includes a free volume of 18,600 m3 with vacuum during normal operation which can
accommodate some of the overpressure in case of LOCA. Thus, it is probably desirable to keep the
design pressure of the tokamak pit of CANDU type at the atmospheric level, so that the cost does not
increase considerably. The normal operation pressure for the current tokamak pit is 101 kPa, while for
the Darlington CANDU building is 96 kPa.
Table 8-1: CANDU Containment Parameters [8-8]
Station Net Output Containment Volumes (m') Reactor Building
(MWe) Reactor Vacuum Design Pressure
Building Building (kPa)
Pickering A 4 x 520 51,000 each 82,000 serves all 41
Pickering B 4 x 520 51,000 each 8 units 41
Bruce A 4 x 750 92,500 shared 62,000 69
(4 vaults + ducts)
Bruce B 4 x 850 95,000 shared 62,000 83
Darlington A 4 x 880 140,000 shared 95,000 96
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Table 8-2: Comparison of Tokamak Pit DDD versus Tokamak Pit CANDU Type Containment
Tokamak Pit Tokamak Pit Darlington
DDD CANDU CANDU
FilterNent System yes none none
Vent to Stack to Vacuum Building Vacuum Building
atmosphere
Vacuum Building none yes yes
Tokamak Pit Total Volume (m) 521,800 521,800 140,000
Tokamak Pit Free Volume (m) 85,000 85,000 NA
Cryostat Vessel Volume (m) 31,400 31,400 none
Cryostat Vessel Free Volume (M) 18,600 18,600 none
Vacuum Building Volume (m) 0 (*1) 95,000
Primary Coolant Volume (m3) 2593 2593 1408
Tokamak Pit Design Pressure (kPa) 101.3 101.3 (*2) 130
Tokamak Pit Normal Operation 101 101 (*3) 96
Pressure (kPa)
Vacuum Building Normal Operation none > 7 kPa (*4) 7 kPa
Pressure (kPa)
Primary Coolant Pressure (MPa) 2 - 4 (*5) 2 - 4 10
(*1) The required volume of the vacuum building should be calculated considering the possible
LOCA events and the fact that the cryostat vessel already has a 18,600 m3 of vacuum to suppress
the overpressure.
(*2) The tokamak design pit pressure could be kept at the atmospheric level, and the overpressure
released to the vacuum building. The Joint Central Team currently considers changing the design
of the tokamak building to a strong barrier designed for overpressures of 3.5 to 5 psi (design
pressure of 125.5 to 135.8 kPa). The new idea under exploration is to contain and condense
steam releases, not to filter and vent them.[4-1 3]
(*3) The pit normal operation should be left at the current level so that no additional pumping
power is required.
(*4) The required vacuum pressure in the vacuum building should be calculated along with its
volume according to the possible LOCA accidents for ITER.
(*5) The primary heat transfer systems are under different pressures in the range given as follows:
the first wall/shield blanket - 3 MPa, the divertor - 4 MPa, the vacuum vessel - 2 MPa.
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8.1 Method of Solution for the Decision Problem
The interested parties in this decision are identified. They include all individuals and groups
which may have an impact on deciding the TB safety role or which may be affected by it in some way.
The ITER is a joint project of the United States of America, the Russian Federation, Japan,
and the European Community (which includes Canada) developed under the auspices of the
International Agency for Atomic Energy (IAEA). In deciding upon the design of the TB, the interested
parties would be as follows:
" the regulatory commission of the country of site,
* the owner of the site,
" environmental and public interest groups,
* electric utilities and tax payers,
" IAEA,
* designer groups from the participating countries.
As mentioned before, for simplicity, we restricted the analysis to only one stakeholder group:
the designers. When choosing the proper design strategy, the designer should consider several issues
called "attributes". These attributes should be both comprehensive and measurable. An attribute is
comprehensive if, by knowing the level of an attribute in a particular situation, the decision maker has a
clear understanding of the extent that the associated objective is achieved. An objective generally
indicates the direction in which we strive to do better (i.e., the objective is to minimize the cost, and the
attribute is the cost of the building). An attribute is measurable if it is reasonable both (a) to obtain a
probability distribution for each alternative over the possible levels of the attribute (or to assign a point
value), and (b) to assess the decision maker's preferences for different levels of the attribute. In
addition, the set of attributes chosen for a particular problem should be complete, so that it covers all
the important aspects of the problem; operational, so that it can be meaningfully used in the analysis;
decomposable, so that aspects of the evaluation process can be simplified by breaking it down into
parts; nonredundant, so that double counting of impacts should be avoided; and minimal, so that the
problem dimension is kept as small as possible.[8-10, 8-12]
We developed two separate models to describe the same decision problem: an influence
diagram in DPL linked with EXCEL by Data Dynamic Exchange (DDE), and an EXCEL - @Risk model.
The latter model is less time-expensive to run, since it uses a deterministic sensitivity analysis on each
parameter by keeping the others (which are independent from that particular parameter) constant.
Thus, it offers a preliminary understanding on the important parameters on which more time-expensive
probabilistic sensitivity should be performed with the DPL - EXCEL model.
The analysis followed several steps:
0 Specification of the attributes,
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* Verification of assumptions,
" Elicitation of one-dimensional utilities U(Xi),
" Measurement of scaling factors, k.,
* Calculation of normalizing parameter, K,
" Determination of multi-attribute utility function, U(X),
* Sensitivity analysis.
Specification of the Attributes
Let us choose a set of attributes, and then define the range of interest for each of them. The
levels of each attribute which are most and least preferred should be identified for each one-
dimensional utility. The following five attributes were included in the model:
X1 = Tokamak Pit Construction Cost,
X2 = Constructibility,
X3 = Project Completion Time,
X4 = Public Attitude,
X5 = Radiological Confinement.
Three of these attributes are objective (as opposed to subjective) in nature. That means that
there already exists a commonly understood scale for that attribute and its levels are objectively
measurable. However, there are objectives for which no objective index exists, and in such cases a
subjective index must be constructed. The two subjectively assessed scales in the present work are
those of the attributes 'Public Attitude' and 'Constructibility'.
Tokamak Pit Construction Cost (XI): For the current ITER option, we use estimates
available in reference [8-3]. The evaluated Joint Central Team (JCT) estimate is given as a 1989 klIUA
2value within the uncertainty range. Whether the estimated value will grow toward the high side of the
range or reduce toward the lower cost depends on many factors, such as: commercial competition
reducing cost, actual conditions of procurement increasing cost, control of vendor cost adopted by the
project management organization, a "design-to-cost" approach whereby design changes are made to
maintain costs within the budgeted amount, to ensure that the range is not exceeded. The JCT
estimate for the ITER buildings structures (including cranes) as given in Table 3.3.1 [8-3] is 891 klUA
with an uncertainty of +45 / -90 kIUA. We assume that the construction cost of the tokamak pit is
directly proportional to the volume of the building, and the volume of the tokamak pit represents about
2 1 IUA = 1,000 US $ (January 1989 buying power). The cost in currency in 1995 is converted to January 1989
using a de-escalation factor of 1.2415.[8-3]
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20% of the total volume of the tokamak building. Thus, the best estimate for the tokamak pit cost is
about $220 million, with minimum and maximum values of $207 and $240 million respectively. Having
three estimated values only, we assume the cost to be distributed according to a triangular
distributions: Triangular(207, 240, 220), where $220 million is the peak (mode) of the distribution.
Similarly, the CANDU option has an associated distribution for the construction cost as follows:
Triangular(300, 480, 350). The peaks of these triangular distributions are controlled by nodes Al_1
and A1_2 in the DPL influence diagram presented in Figure 8-1.
Constructibility (Xd): Constructibility refers to the technical feasibility of the proposed
confinement design. We defined a "feasibility scale" from 0 to 5. Zero on this scale would be for a type
of technical solution which is used and works well on a 'regular' basis. Five would be assigned to a
technical solution not yet demonstrated and generally considered to have very small chances of being
successful in practice. A 'technical feasibility factor' was associated to each type of containment. This
factor is allowed to vary according to a triangular distribution. The peaks of these triangular
distributions are controlled by nodes A2_1 and A2_2 in Figure 8-1. (Example: the technical feasibility
factor associated with the CANDU option is generated from the distribution Triangular(0, 5, A2_1) with
a minimum value of 1, a maximum value of 4 and mode of A2_1).
Project completion time (X3): We felt that the project total completion time might be an
important attribute for the designer. In general, the shorter the duration of the project, the better. In
addition, shorter duration of the project would reduce the chances of being interrupted by external
factors (e.g. court actions by public groups). We considered 'time until completion' to be distributed
according to an exponential distribution4 . The reason for choosing this type of distribution is its
3 This distribution has three parameters: a, b, and c. The distribution extends from a to b and peaks at c (which
must lie between a and b). The only restriction on the parameters is that a<c<b. The distribution is as follows:
2(x - a) for a:5 x < c,(b - c)(c - a)
ft(xa,b,c)= - 2(b - x) for c9 x:5 b,(b - a)(b - c)
0 otherwise.
where a<c<b. DPL refers to this distribution as triangular(a, b, c). The equations for the mean and var are:
a+b+c
mean = +
3
a2 + b2 + c2 - ab - ac - bc
var = 18
4 Exponential Distribution is defined for all positive values of x and declines exponentially. Its only parameter is X,
which must be positive. The distribution is as follows:
fe(dX)= Xe-X
where x>0 and X>0. DPL refers to this distribution as Exponential(y). The equations for mean and variance are:
171
'memory-less' property. The mean time of the project completion (equal to the inverse of the 'lambda'
parameter) for the two options is controlled by nodes T1 and T2 in Figure 8-1.
Public attitude (X4): This attribute refers to the public fear and anxiety due to the new
technology, which is the risk as perceived by the public, be it scientifically based or not. We assigned a
scale from 1 to 10 to this attribute. Ten would be the measure associated with a technology which
generates a lot fear, anxiety and implicit hostility of the public; one would be the kind of technical
solution which would even generate a mild support from the public side. Triangular distributions where
also used in this case. The peak values of these distributions are controlled by nodes A4_1 and A4_2
in Figure 8-1.
Radiological Confinement (Xs): We used the radioactive releases of tritium to the
environment as a measure of the radiological confinement performance. The frequency distribution of
the tritium releases to the environment was obtained from the probabilistic methodology developed as
the main goal of this project. Chapters 4 and 5 described the method for obtaining frequencies
distributions of releases out of the first and second confinement barriers respectively. As for the third
confinement barrier represented by the tokamak building, we attached a chance event 'Tokamak Pit
integrity' to the sequences where the second confinement failed. A more sophisticated method that
divides this event into several failure modes of the building is recommended, but it is outside the scope
of the present work. The DPL model was run for both of the options, CANDU and the current one, by
considering different probabilities of failure and retention factors as shown in the EXCEL database in
Appendix D.
Named probability distribution functions were then fit to the frequency histograms obtained
above, to be used in the DPL decision problem for the attribute 'Radiological confinement'. The
software package used for fitting the distributions is BestFit.[8-13] This software package includes
RiskView, which allows a preview of all types of distributions and gives a sense of which of them might
fit our data. That is how we decided to try the following distributions: negative binomial, Poisson,
Rayleigh, triangular, Weibull and lognormal. The best fit is the triangular distribution with the following
parameters: Triangular(0, 1910, 0.21)5 for the CANDU option, and Triangular(0, 3230, 0.42) for the
current option. The original distributions, the best fit and the lognormal distribution fitted to the data are
presented in Figures 8-3 and 8-4 at the end of this chapter.
1
mean =
var =
The mean must be positive.
5 The values represent grams of tritium released to the environment.
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Verification of Assumptions
The theory of multi-attribute utility is based on two assumptions about the structure of
preferences which refer to the way a person values the interaction between attributes. The two
assumptions are:
" preferential independence (PI)
" utility independence (UI)
If both of them hold, then we have a practical means to obtain the multi-attribute utility with a
reasonable computational effort.
Preferential independence means that the ranking of preferences over any pair of attributes is
independent of the other attributes. This implies that the order of ranking between two attributes does
not change because of changes in the level of the other attributes, which does not mean that one does
not care about the other attribute. Formally, the assumption of preferential independence is as follows:
if for any pair of attributes, say X1 and X2, one combination is preferred to another (X1', X2 ') > (X1", X2 ")
for some level of the other attributes, say X3 to XN, then the order of this preference will be maintained
for all other levels of the other attributes.
Returning to our problem, the five attributes specified above seem to satisfy the preferential
independence assumption from the point of view of the designer. His goal is to perform a design with
low cost, high constructibility, short project completion time, high public acceptance, and good
radiological confinement. After testing for the requirements specified in the definition of the Preferential
Independence, we concluded that it is reasonable to assume that X1, X2 , X3, X4 , X5 are indeed
preferentially independent of each other.
Utility independence concerns the intensity of preferences, not just their relative order as does
Pl. The UI assumption is that the indifference between a lottery and a certain equivalent for any
attribute does not depend on the levels of the other attributes. Formally, the assumption of utility
independence is as follows: if for any given level of attributes X; other than Xi, there is an indifferent
statement between several levels of X: Xi' - (Xi", P; Xi.') for one set of X, j # i, then this indifference
holds for all levels of Xj, j # i.
Because the verification of the utility independence requires at least portions of the one-
dimensional utility functions, we found more convenient to check this assumption as part of the
assessment of these utility functions.
For our problem, we first assessed the single-attribute utility functions by the certainty
equivalent (CE) method. The scale for the utility functions was set between 0 and 1 as follows: U(X-)
0 and U(X) = 1, where X- is the least desirable value of the attribute, and X' is the most desirable
value in the range considered. Once we obtained the single-attribute utility functions, we checked the
UI assumption for each attribute as follows: assume that, for the attribute X1, the interviewed person
makes the statement: $300M - ($250M, 0.8; $450M). Specifically,
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U($300M) = 0.8 U($250M) + 0.2 U($450M) (8-1)
The person is utility independent for the construction cost (X1 ) if the same statement is valid for any
other value of radiological and public attitude, etc.
Elicitation of One-dimensional Utilities U(Xi)
It is very probable that the majority of the allegedly interviewed designers are "risk averse" for
the attributes we have considered. We define the independent utility functions for all five attributes as
being monotonically decreasing functions of the respective attributes for construction cost, radiological
confinement defined in terms of releases to the environment, and project completion time. That is a
intuitively understandable assumption since the designer prefers those attributes to be as small as
possible (utility should be equal to one for the minimum value, and equal to zero for the maximum
value of the attribute). As for constructibility and public attitude, we define the scales so that the
minimum value of the scale corresponds to maximum utility, and the maximum value to minimum
utility. That way we will only deal with decreasing utility functions.
For monotonically decreasing preferences, a person is risk averse if he prefers the expected
consequences of any nondegenerate lottery' to that lottery. Then, if the utility function represents such
preferences, the utility of the expected consequences must be grater than the expected utility of the
lottery. If one prefers (is indifferent to) every nondegenerate lottery to its expected consequence, then
he is said to be risk prone (risk neutral). It can be demonstrated that a decision maker is risk averse
(risk prone, risk neutral) if and only if his monotonically decreasing utility function is concave (convex,
linear).
There are many techniques for evaluating utility functions depending on the particular decision
maker and on the context of the problem. The basic steps, however, that one uses to assess a utility
function are essentially the same: preparing for assessment, identifying the relevant quantitative
characteristics, specifying quantitative restrictions, choosing a utility function, checking for consistency.
Instead of going through the elicitation work with the designer to evaluate his/her individual utility
functions for each attribute, we chose to define risk averse functions for all five attributes, and then
perform sensitivity analysis on the functions' parameters to explore the possible policy change when
the designer becomes risk neutral or prone towards any of the attributes. Each individual utility function
is defined as a sum of a line and a triangle with parameters a, b, r, and c, where a and b are the
minimum and maximum value of the attribute, r indicates the position of the triangle peak between a
and b, and c gives the height of the triangle. The parameter c determines the concavity of the utility
6 A nondegenerate lottery is one where no single consequence has a probability one of occurring.
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function as follows: -1 < c < 0 for the risk prone attitude, c = 0 for risk neutral, and 0 < c < 1 for risk
averse one. The analytical function is defined in Visual Basic as shown in Appendix E and can be used
with EXCEL to generate values depending on the attributes' values.
Measurement of scaling factors (ki)
The method used for finding each scaling factor was to obtain an indifference statement of the
form: (Xi*, X1-) - (X*, P; X.), j # i. These indifference statements were developed by varying the
probabilities Pi. The probability Pi is actually the scaling factor ki. References [8-12] and [8-14] explain
and exemplify the method for obtaining the scaling factors. The basic idea is to obtain a set of
independent equations in a number equal to the number of the scaling factors representing the
unknown values and to solve for them. These equations can be generated from certainty
considerations, probabilistic considerations or both. It is not easy to interpret the scaling factors since
they depend on the minimum and maximum desirable values of the attributes and those depend on the
possible consequences of the problem. The values of the ki's are stored in the nodes k1 through k5 in
the DPL diagram in Figure 8-1, and sensitivity analysis was performed on each of them.
Calculation of Normalizing Parameter (K)
The normalizing factor, K, is determined from the formula:
n (8-2)K +1= f(Kki +1)
In general, this expression, an (n-i)-dimensions polynomial, must be solved by trial and error.
The determination of K is facilitated by the fact that its value is bounded by Xki as follows: K > 0 for Yki
< 1; -1 < K < 0 for Yki > 1; K degenerates for Xki = 1, and in that case the multi-attribute function is the
simple additive model: U(X) = 7 ki U(Xi).
Returning to our problem, we have five attributes, so the equation to be solved is:
K + 1 = (K k1 + 1) (K k2 + 1) ... (K k5 + 1) (8-3)
A Visual Basic function [8-14] can be used in EXCEL applications to solve the equation (8-3)
for the non-negative value of K. The function is presented in Appendix F.
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Determination of multi-attribute utility, U(X)
The multi-attribute utility (MAU) for a stakeholder group U(X) is obtained from the formula:
n (8-4)KU(X)+ 1=H(Kki U(Xi) +1)
i=1
where U(Xj) are the one-dimensional utilities for each X. The Visual Basic function used for the
calculation of MAU is presented in Appendix F. The cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) and the
expected values of MAU for both tokamak pit options are presented in Figure 8-5, which shows that
the CANDU option is clearly dominated by the current design with an expected value of 0.846.
Sensitivity Analysis
A thorough value sensitivity analysis was performed with respect to most of the parameters
influencing the expected multi-attribute utility function. The EXCEL - @Risk model is less time-
expensive because it changes only the parameter on which the sensitivity analysis is performed and
the dependent parameters, and does not perform Monte Carlo simulations on the attributes' values as
DPL - EXCEL model does. Therefore, we first used the first model to check which parameters lead to a
change in policy, and then used the latter model to perform 'Rainbow Sensitivity Diagrams' that give a
more precise value of the parameter where the policy changes.
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8.2 Summary of Results
We found that the alternative with the highest expected multi-attribute utility value is the current
ITER design as shown in Figure 8-5, but, as the results of the sensitivity analysis show, the ranking of
the options might change for relatively small variations in the input parameters.
Sensitivity analysis was performed on the following three types of parameters:
* ki factors: The scaling factors considered for the reference case are as follows:
(k1, k2, k3, k4, k5) = (0.3, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.4). (8-5)
Figures 8-6 to 8-10 represent the sensitivity analysis on these five factors. The vertical bar marks
the place where a change in the optimal decision choice occurs. In Figure 8-6, the reference value
for k1 is equal to 0.3, value situated on the right of the vertical bar at 0.22; thus, all the values of k1
higher than 0.22 lead to recommending the current ITER DDD choice as the optimal solution. As
the construction cost becomes more important to the designer's decision making process, ki
increases, and the ITER DDD design gets more credit, which is reflected in an increased MAU
expected value of this choice. Also, Figure 8-6 shows that the CANDU option becomes the
preferred one if k1 decreases bellow 0.22 (meaning that the importance that the designer gives to
the construction cost decreases). For k1 < 0.2, the expected MAU remains approximately constant
implying that, if the importance of the attribute decreases even more, the overall satisfaction level
remains the same.
Figures 8-7 and 8-8 indicate that the expected value of MAU is an increasing function of k2 and k3,
so if the importance of constructibility or project completion time increases, the current ITER DDD
option becomes even more preferred over the CANDU option, and the recommended decision
choice does not change over the entire range of these two attributes.
The sensitivity of the MAU expected value to the public attitude attribute, as shown in Figure 8-9,
expresses the following behavior: while k4 decreases from 0.28 to 0, representing a decreasing
concern of the designer towards the public attitude, the expected value of MAU increases for the
currently preferred choice (i.e., current ITER DDD); however, at k4 = 0.28, the preferred decision
policy changes to the CANDU option, and, as the public attitude weights more and more in the
designer's decision making process, his expected MAU for the CANDU option increases with k4
almost linearly.
For radiological confinement attribute, the sensitivity analysis is represented in Figure 8-10. The
designer's satisfaction level is increased by the increased value of the k5 factor for any of the
tokamak pit design choice. A k5 higher than 0.68 will change the optimal policy from the current
ITER DDD to CANDU.
182
the parameters7 of the probability distribution functions associated to each of the five
attributes: The sensitivity of the MAU expected value on the construction cost PDF parameters is
represented in Figures 8-11 and 8-12. It should be reminded that the PDF for the cost attribute is a
triangular distribution, and sensitivity analysis of the MAU expected value on the mode of the
distribution is performed for each of the two decision policies. With the information currently
available, the MAU expected value corresponding to the ITER DDD optimal policy remains
constant if the most probable cost of the CANDU-type building (Al1) varies between the
minimum and maximum limit, and decreases with the increase of the most probable cost of the
current ITER IDDD building (Al_2) (in other words, the designer's satisfaction decreases as the
most probable cost of the ITER DDD building increases). None of these two parameters variation
within the considered ranges lead to a change of the decision policy.
The constructibility attribute is also given by triangular distributions for each of the decision policies.
As a remainder, a zero value represents perfect constructibility, and a five value represents a not
yet demonstrated feasibility, so that the lower the value the better. The mode of the CANDU
constructibility PDF (A2_1) does not affect the MAU expected value for the ITER DDD choice
(Figure 8-13). As for A2_2 (Figure 8-14), corresponding to the ITER DDD constructibility mode, its
reference value is equal to 1, and the MAU expected value of the ITER DDD policy decreases with
an increased value of A2_2, as expected. Moreover, for A2_2 3.8, CANDU option becomes the
choice with the higher MAU expected value. In other words, if some kind of unforeseen problem
occurs in the current design, then the CANDU choice might become dominant.
Varying the project completion time PDF parameter of any of the two options (Figures 8-15 and 8-
16) does not change the expected value of MAU, and no change of policy is recommended.
Finally, the sensitivity of the MAU expected value on the mode of the PDF associated with the
public attitude towards the two policies is represented in Figures 8-17 and 8-18. In both cases, this
parameter does not seem to cause a change in the preferred design, which is an interesting result
because it gives the designer more freedom in the decision making process.
* parameter 'c' of the single attribute utility functions, determining the designer attitude
towards each attribute (risk averse, neutral, or prone): The sensitivity was only performed with
the EXCEL - @Risk model. Each of the Figures 8-19 to 8-23 represents the MAU expected value
for both design options as a function of c corresponding to each attribute. The two MAU functions
do not intersect in any of the cases, meaning that the change of the designer attitude towards the
attribute does not lead to a change of his preferred option.
7 The parameters for the chosen probability distribution functions of the five attributes are explained in the
subsection 'Specification of the Attributes' of the present chapter.
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Intuitively, CANDU type containment has the major advantage of being perceived as more
reliable by the public, and provides a better radiological confinement. The major disadvantage is the
cost. A better estimation of the construction costs is required.
A more advanced analysis should definitely take into account the location of the facility. (For
example building construction costs as well as feasibility factors might depend strongly on the
seismicity of the zone.)
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9. Conclusions and Recommendations
9.1 Concluding Remarks
The overall objective of this work was to develop a methodology that evaluates the
performance of the radiological confinement barriers for a tokamak reactor, recommending the number
of barriers required to comply with the design requirements, and the type of the last confinement
barrier to the environment. We decided to call this methodology as a whole the Enhanced
Probabilistic Decision Analysis (EPDA).
In the first part of the present study, a probabilistic methodology was developed to assess the
performance of the first and second confinement barriers. The models include only the accident
sequences derived from six initiating events, each occurring in a different system of ITER: primary
coolant systems, magnet systems, fuel systems, plasma vacuum chamber, cryostat vessel, and
electric power supply system.
The accident sequences were developed using influence diagrams/event tree models in DPL
[3-11], by defining all the system failures in an influence diagram, and constructing the time sequence
in a system event tree. This method is suitable for large accident sequence models, because it
separates the data definition including conditional events in the influence diagram and the time
sequence in the event tree. The result of running a DPL accident sequences model is a frequency
distribution of consequences, which is what was needed for our work. A drawback of using DPL for
accident sequence modeling is that the accident sequences are not given explicitly with their
corresponding frequency and consequence, which is desirable for a Probabilistic Risk Assessment
study.
A database with failure probabilities of various systems failure modes as defined in this study
was developed in EXCEL 5.0. Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) was used between the DPL accident
sequence models and the EXCEL database, to assure consistency: the same event might occur in
several DPL models, but its probability is only changed once in the database, and all the models will
get that new value when run. Some of the probabilities used were taken from the available references
as indicated, but others are purely judgmental since no data is available. As more data becomes
available, the database should be improved.
The safety design requirements currently recommended for ITER are setting limits on
individual accident sequences in terms of both frequency and consequence. In our opinion, a
complementary cumulative frequency (CCF) of radioactive releases form is more appropriate since it
can take into consideration overall risk aspects and uncertainties can also be integrated. An analytical
form of such a line was derived for ITER in the present study, based on criteria such as risk aversion,
limit the risk from the low consequence - high frequency accidents, and limit the overall risk of the
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fusion plant. The case of no risk aversion (a=1) was also analyzed and compared against the current
ITER limit line, because we were not certain if that line already incorporates a risk aversion attitude or
not. Our observation is that it might incorporate a risk aversion corresponding to a slope of -1.5.
Figures 3-12 and 3-13 in Chapter 3 show families of curves for different values of parameter
'a' for a proposed limit line in the form of a frequency distribution and a complementary cumulative
frequency of tritium releases respectively. Nuclear fission power industry usually employs limit lines
with a risk aversion corresponding to a slope of -1.2 to -1.5. However, ITER is a fusion machine still at
the design stage, whose safety goal is to demonstrate no evacuation requirements. For that reason,
and also because society tends to be more risk averse towards new technologies, we choose a limit
line with a higher risk aversion than for fission reactors. That line corresponds to a parameter a=3, and
is included in all of the figures representing results in graphs CCF versus tritium releases in Chapter 7.
The results for the reference case, as well as for the sensitivity analyses on the confinement barriers
failure modes are presented along with the proposed limit line. Only one probability of failure was
changed at a time to a low or high value while keeping the others at the reference level. One exception
is Figure 7-3 which also includes a limit line corresponding to a=1.5, for exemplification purposes. In
case the regulation committee chooses such a line with lower risk aversion, it might be that no strong
third confinement barrier is required, as Figure 7-3 implies.
Once the decision is made from a safety point of view that a strong third confinement barrier is
required to comply with the design requirements, the type of the building has to be chosen. A decision
model was developed to chose the appropriate ITER tokamak building while considering several
attributes such as: safety, cost, project completion time, public attitude, and technical feasibility. A
designer utility function was defined for each of the attributes, and multi-attribute utility function theory
was used to combine the single attribute functions in a single one. The decision option which
maximizes the multi-attribute utility is chosen. Our model currently considers two options for the ITER
tokamak pit: the current design as given in the design Description Documents [8-16], and a CANDU
design. More options can be easily implemented into the model as they become of interest.
9.2 Limitations
The completion of the present work required the adoption of a multitude of assumptions. They
were usually specified along the thesis as they occurred, but we give some examples below:
" in the decision model for the type of tokamak building, the two assumptions about the structure of
preferences which refer to the way a person values the interaction between attributes (preferential
independence and utility independence) were both considered to hold; however, an extensive
interviewing process with the stakeholders should be undertaken;
" the form of the singe-utility functions and the corresponding scaling factors were assigned forms
and values without discussions with the designer groups, as it should be done;
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" the accident sequence models were not exposed to peer reviews, which could have resulted in
modifications performed during an iterative process;
" the database for the probabilities of failures by experts.
It is important to recognize that the value of this study is in providing a methodology that can
be useful in making decisions during the design of the radiological confinement barriers of a tokamak
reactor. At the present stage of development, our model cannot give definite answers about the safety
of the ITER reactor. Considerable work should be added to complete the model with all the necessary
details, but that is outside the scope of our project.
9.3 Recommendations for Further Work
A Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) study for a nuclear power plant is a project undertaken
by a large group of analysts, each specialized in a particular area. The present work involves using
several PRA tools, yet it is essentially the product of one person. Thus, building a complete model that
gives meaningful results for ITER confinement design was not possible. It should be noted that the
development of the framework of a methodology was the main focus of this work. More work has to be
added in several areas so that design recommendations can be made for ITER confinement strategy.
Some of these areas are as follows:
" all the conceivable accident sequences should be included in the overall complementary frequency
for the first and second confinement barriers;
" human errors should be included in the accident sequences;
* external events should be analyzed once a site is selected;
" the EXCEL database for probabilities of failure should be improved by performing a
comprehensive fault-tree analysis for the systems involved;
" common cause failures should be more carefully analyzed, and the influence diagram can be a
useful tool to explicitly represent events that can lead to the simultaneous failure of several
systems;
" releases of other radioactive inventories should be analyzed with the same model;
* the definition of the systems failure modes should be checked against the latest designs;
* sensitivity should be performed on failure probabilities when changing more than one value at a
time;
* the decision model for the type of tokamak building should be updated with the ITER choices
under consideration;
* similar decision models for the type of tokamak building should be developed for other
stakeholders interested in the ITER project, then their choices should be considered together for
making a final decision (e.g., using game theory).
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Appendix A: EXCEL Macro for First Confinement
Barrier CCDF
Sub MacroFirstBarrierO
Sheets("LF02").Select
Workbooks.Open Filename:="LFO2.CSV"
With ActiveWorkbook
.Title =
.Subject =
.Author = "Ruxandra Golinescu"
.Keywords
.Comments =
End With
ActiveWorkbook.SaveAs Filename:="LF02.XLS", FileFormat:=xlNormal,
Password:="", WriteResPassword:="", ReadOnlyRecommended:=False 
_
CreateBackup:=False
ActiveWorkbook.Close
Range("A1:B92").AdvancedFilter Action:=xlFilterCopy, CriteriaRange _
:=Range("D1:D2"), CopyToRange:=Columns("F:G"), Unique:=False
Sheets("MPO1 ").Select
Workbooks.Open Filename:="MPO1.CSV"
With ActiveWorkbook
.Title = ""
.Subject =
.Author = "Ruxandra Golinescu"
.Keywords =
.Comments =
End With
ActiveWorkbook.SaveAs Filename:="MPO1.XLS", FileFormat:=xlNormal, _
Password:="", WriteResPassword:="", ReadOnlyRecommended:=False
, CreateBackup:=False
ActiveWorkbook.Close
Range("A1:B92").AdvancedFilter Action:=xlFilterCopy, CriteriaRange -
:=Range("D1:D2"), CopyToRange:=Columns("F:G"), Unique:=False
Sheets("TVP1 ").Select
Workbooks.Open Filename:="TVP1.CSV"
193
With ActiveWorkbook
.Title = ""
.Subject = ""
.Author = "Ruxandra Golinescu"
.Keywords =
.Comments =
End With
ActiveWorkbook.SaveAs Filename:="TVP1.XLS", FileFormat:=xlNormal,
Password:="", WriteResPassword:="", ReadOnlyRecommended:=False
, CreateBackup:=False
ActiveWorkbook.Close
Range("A1 :B1 5").AdvancedFilter Action:=xlFilterCopy, CriteriaRange
:=Range("D1:D2"), CopyToRange:=Columns("F:G"), Unique:=False
Sheets("OP").Select
Workbooks.Open Filename:="OP.CSV"
With ActiveWorkbook
.Title = ""
.Subject = ""
.Author = "Ruxandra Golinescu"
.Keywords = ""
.Comments =
End With
ActiveWorkbook.SaveAs Filename:="OP.XLS", FileFormat:=xlNormal,
Password:=", WriteResPassword:="", ReadOnlyRecommended:=False
CreateBackup:=False
ActiveWorkbook.Close
Range("A1:B92").AdvancedFilter Action:=xlFilterCopy, CriteriaRange _
:=Range("D1:D2"), CopyToRange:=Columns("F:G"), Unique:=False
Sheets ("VCS").Select
Workbooks.Open Filename:="VCS.CSV"
With ActiveWorkbook
.Title = ""
.Subject =
.Author = "Ruxandra Golinescu"
.Keywords =
.Comments =
End With
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ActiveWorkbook.SaveAs Filename:="VCS.XLS", FileFormat:=xlNormal, 
_
Password:="", WriteResPassword:="", ReadOnlyRecommended:=False
, CreateBackup:=False
ActiveWorkbook.Close
Range("A1:B1 9").AdvancedFilter Action:=xlFilterCopy, CriteriaRange _
:=Range("D1:D2"), CopyToRange:=Columns("F:G"), Unique:=False
Sheets("LOSP"). Select
Workbooks.Open Filename:="LOSP.CSV"
With ActiveWorkbook
.Title = ""
.Subject = ""
.Author = "Ruxandra Golinescu"
.Keywords = ""
.Comments
End With
ActiveWorkbook.SaveAs Filename:="LOSP.XLS", FileFormat:=xlNormal,
Password:="", WriteResPassword:="", ReadOnlyRecommended:=False
, CreateBackup:=False
ActiveWorkbook.Close
Range("A1:B22").AdvancedFilter Action:=xlFilterCopy, CriteriaRange _
:=Range("D1:D2"), CopyToRange:=Columns("F:G"), Unique:=False
Sheets("ALL1 ").Select
ActiveSheet.PivotTables("PivotTable2").RefreshTable
Sheets("ALL2").Select
ActiveSheet.PivotTables("PivotTable1 ").RefreshTable
Sheets("ALL3"). Select
ActiveCell.Select
Selection.Sort Keyl:=ActiveCell, Order1:=xlAscending, Header:= _
xlGuess, OrderCustom:=1, MatchCase:=False, Orientation:=
xlTopToBottom
Sheets("CCDF").Select
End Sub
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Appendix B: Analysis of Accident Sequences that
affect the Integrity of the First Confinement Barrier'
This appendix will discuss the accident sequences that affect the integrity of the first
confinement barrier grouped in six categories as describes in Chapter 3. Six of the initiating events
from the list presented in Table 2-2 (those in bold face) were analyzed in Chapter 4, because they were
the ones we used to develop our methodology for evaluating the performance of the confinement
barriers. The accident sequences in this appendix should be eventually included in the model for
completeness, but that is outside the scope of the present study. However, we hope that this appendix
can be a useful reference for further work in the ITER safety analysis.
B. 1 Coolant Accidents
This section contains eight representative accidents in the primary coolant systems of the
plasma facing components and the vacuum vessel. These systems are in operation both during the
pulse and the dwell time. We will mention our assumptions as we go along in describing the accident
sequences.
B.1.1 LBV1: Small in-vessel LOCA from FW/SB PHTS
This IE is representative for a family of IE's: small in-vessel LOCA through an opening of 1-2
cm 2 in one of the cooling systems: first wall, blanket, divertor, vacuum vessel. We develop the accident
sequences deriving from a small leakage in the blanket cooling system. The frequency of this IE is
estimated at 0.2/yr.[4-1] The relatively large frequency is what makes this event and the corresponding
aggravating failures important to study. Figure B-2 and Figure B-3 represent the influence
diagram/event tree model for accident sequences deriving from LBV1.
As described in Chapter 1, ITER is a pulsed machine with pulse duration of 1000 seconds, and
nominal repetition time of 2200 seconds. We assume that the IE occurs during a plasma pulse, while
the plasma is producing nominal fusion power.
A very small breach may be choked up by the freezing of the liquid water due to absorption of
the latent heat of evaporation from itself, and ingress stops. We assume that the breach is not that
Only six initiating events will be analyzed in this chapter, the rest will be attached Appendix A. The reason is
that the construction of our probabilistic model is based only on these six events, eventually allowing for the
inclusion of the others. However, this last part is outside the scope of the present study.
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small. Due to the water ingress, the plasma disrupts almost immediately, and fusion reaction is
shutdown.
The expected sequence developing from LBV1 is as follows:
" the water ingress into the VV causes a plasma shutdown by disruption;
" disruption causes runaway electrons and electromagnetic loads that challenge the integrity of the
plasma facing components and corresponding PHTS loops, as well as the integrity of diagnostics
windows; the electromagnetic loads might also cause the failure of the VV;
" the pressure rises in the VV;
" chemical reactions of water/steam with PFC metal produce hydrogen.
The safety functions which are challenged by the events following LBV1 are:
1. decay heat removal: The global decay heat at the time of shutdown is 20 MW (1.33% of the
nominal fusion power of 1.5 GW), and it decreases to 1.2 MW after one week.[4-2, 4-3] There is
no dedicated decay heat removal system, instead ITER uses its many normal operation cooling
systems to remove heat. LBV1 means damage to one of those systems, which degrades the
decay removal function. However, most of the safety burden is on the vacuum vessel cooling
system, which has natural circulation capability and is divided into two fully independent loops with
100% capacity. Furthermore, we assume that the amount of radioactive inventories mobilized from
the plasma facing components depends on the success of the coolant systems operation.
2. overpressure relief: Following the water ingress inside the VV, evaporation is caused by two
effects: the PHTS water temperature is greater than the water saturation temperature at the
pressure inside the VV (initially vacuum); water impinging on the PFC walls evaporates because
the wall is hot. Pressure in the VV increases with evaporation up to the saturation value of the
water temperature. Experimental results (4-4] show that the VV pressurization rate increases
proportionally with the water injection pressure. The vacuum vessel has rupture disks set to open
when the vacuum vessel pressure exceeds 0.2 MPa. The rupture disks will burst and vent steam
to the relief tank where it is condensed. The vacuum vessel is designed for 0.5 MPa and
calculations show that, although 0.2 MPa could be exceeded because of finite blowdown capacity,
0.5 MPa is sufficient even for an in-vessel LOCA with a total break size > 0.5 m2 involving all first
wall coolant systems.[4-3]
3. bypass isolation: There are hundreds of windows for plasma diagnostics between the vacuum
vessel and the diagnostic lines. We consider three possible causes for windows break: run-away
electron damage or electromagnetic loads following the disruption, overpressure caused by water
ingress in the plasma chamber. A window integrity loss may lead to two undesired consequences:
bypass of both the VV and CV directly into the diagnostics room, and air ingress into the VV.
However, we give credit for the closure of active isolation valves providing the secondary
confinement by assuming that there is a probability that the leak is detected and isolated before RI
bypasses the confinement barriers.
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4. first barrier of radioactivity confinement: The first confinement barrier consists of VV and all the
PHTSs boundary (piping and systems). Since the leakage from PFC PHTSs is inside the VV,
although the first confinement barrier has been broken (FW/SB PHTS), the radioactive inventories
(RI) are still inside the first barrier. Therefore, the first confinement barriers whose performance is
of interest is the VV, the plasma facing components and diagnostic windows.2 The plasma
disruption caused by the water ingress can damage the PFCs (first wall and divertor) as well as the
diagnostics windows via two mechanisms: runaway electron damage and induced currents and
loads.3 Structural failure of the VV is possible due to: induced currents and loads in conducting
structures [4-6], failure of the overpressure suppression system, or hydrogen explosion/detonation.
We defined conditional probabilities that, given a disruption induced by LBV1, FW, DIV, and
diagnostics windows are damaged by RAE and/or by electromagnetic loads. The integrity of the
plasma facing components directly affects the operation of the cooling systems, which should fulfill
their decay heat removal function. Moreover, a PHTS loop has an independent probability of failure
since it has active components that might happen to fail due to other causes which are not included in
these accident sequences. The independent probabilities as well as the conditional probabilities of
failure for the FW PHTS and DIV PHTS were calculated using a fault tree approach. Common cause
failures were included. The success criterion of a PHTS refers to the successful removal of the decay
heat, since the fusion power has been terminated by disruption. The fault tree for the calculation of the
probability of failure of DIV PHTS is given in Figure B-1. We assume that the FW/SB PHTS damaged
loop fails its heat removal function, therefore we question only the operation of the other three loops.
The success of VV PHTS is given by the operation of at least one of the two loops, and we assume
that the VV PHTS is not affected directly by LBV1 (only independent probability considered).
The vacuum pumps should have an isolation systems which should be activated when the
plasma disrupts. If the isolation is not successful, the tritium in the cryogenic panels will become
mobilized in the VV and will add to the rest of RI available inside the VV.
Another safety concern following from LBV1 is the hydrogen explosion hazard in the vacuum
vessel. Three ingredients are necessary for a detonation4 to occur: hydrogen and oxygen in the
appropriate mixtures, and an ignition source. Generally, direct initiation of hydrogen-air mixtures is
possible with about 1 gram of high explosive, equivalent to about 4 kJ of energy.[4-23] Since the
plasma typically contains much higher levels of stored energy, it should be assumed that a point
2 We separate windows from VV because a windows failure has the potential to lead to bypass of both VV and
CV.
3 The LBV1 sequences developed in ESECS do not consider the disruption effects on plasma facing components
and windows integrity. Their argument is that those effects are covered in the ex-vessel LOCA analysis, but
that initiating event has much lower frequency, and therefore the corresponding accident sequences will have
lower frequencies.
4 A detonation is defined as a flame front that is supersonic relative to the bumed gas flowing toward the
unburned gas. There is a significant increase in pressure as the front passes a stationary observer.[5-22
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ignition source is always present during normal operation and wall conditioning. The factors
determining the likelihood of the detonation are then the availability of hydrogen isotopes and oxygen.
There are several sources of hydrogen in the ITER torus, including leakage of hydrogen
isotopes from plasma fueling systems or discharge cleaning systems; dissociation of water leaking
onto hot reactive metals (e.g., beryllium), and reaction of water leaking into hot graphite. Hydrogen
isotopes are present in the solid matrix of the plasma facing components at substantial levels. This is
not ordinarily available for combustion or detonation although a portion (including tritium) may be
released if a detonation occurs. Since hot plasma facing components and the vacuum vessel are
cooled with water, a leak could result in the generation of hydrogen from chemical reactions of
water/steam with beryllium, graphite or tungsten.
Be-steam reactions and the subsequent H2 production is a major concern for ITER safety. Be-
water (and Be-air) reactions are exothermic:
Be+ H20 = BeO+ H2 + 0 (B-1)
with Q = 377 kJ / g - mole of Be reacted with water
To develop into self sustained reactions the energy release by the chemical reaction needs to
be larger than the energy removed from the plasma facing beryllium. This border line between both
regimes presents a typical cliff edge effect: if self-sustained reactions develop, the amount of hydrogen
produced will become very large (> 100 kg); if thermal relaxation is fast enough the amount of
hydrogen produced will be negligible.
The reaction rates are strong functions of the temperature (thus, the PHTSs operation,
especially the VV PHTS, is very important) and pressure (thus, the rupture disk successful opening is
important), as well as the physical condition of the beryllium. The exothermic character of the Be-
steam reactions leads to the possibility of self-sustained Be-steam reactions (beryllium fire).
Although endothermic and therefore not prone to self-sustained reactions, steam-graphite
reactions would also lead to potential hazardous H2 production. An air ingress might lead to potential
self-sustained graphite air reactions but several studies have shown that for the temperature ranges
expected for ITER such a scenario is not credible.
The tungsten-steam reaction for first wall/divertor coating of tungsten is not of concern.
Oxygen in the ITER torus would probably come from one of two sources: air entering through a
broke component (e.g., pipe, window or bellows) or dissociation of water by hot metal or graphite.
Dissociation of water is not a significant source of oxygen because reactive materials are also strong
reduction agents, and will getter (react with) all the oxygen.
The flammability limit for H2-02 reactions is about 10 kg inside the vacuum vessel, and 100 kg
inside the cryostat. Detonation limits are about a factor 2.5 larger.[4-22]
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An example of a sequence of events leading to detonation in the ITER vacuum vessel is as
follows:
1. with the torus at its operating pressure of 10r torr, water leaks into the torus impinging on the hot
plasma facing components;
2. a steam-beryllium (or graphite) reaction occurs;
3. either the resulting overpressure in the torus causes the torus to vent to atmosphere, or water on a
hot component (e.g., window or pipe) causes structural failure and admits air into the torus;
4. the vacuum port gate valves close;
5. mixing of reactants and air occurs on the cooled side, away from the hot initiating source;
6. reactants contact the initiating source and detonation occurs.
From this sequence, it is evident that two events are necessary before a detonation can occur:
a water leak followed by a vent to atmosphere. Note that these are not necessarily independent
failures, since an initial water leak could lead to a vent to atmosphere. A time delay in ignition of the
fuel-air mixture is required for a full-blown detonation; without such a delay, there could be multiple
point ignition resulting in less violent events such as deflagration or graphite fires.[4-22]
We assume that the failure probabilities of the plasma diagnostic system and the plasma
mitigation systems (fueling: gas puffing and pellet injector, heating/current drive, magnets) are low
enough so that these events are not considered. Their introduction in the event sequences would lead
to very low probability sequences which are BDBA (< 10-).
Relative to the consequences in term of radioactive releases out of the first confinement
barrier, if a PFC is damaged, all the RI in that PFC PHTS loop will enter VV. The RIs in the PFCs may
become mobilized depending on the temperature of that PFC; in turn, the temperature depends on the
success of the PHTSs operation. All these Ris, which may become mobilized inside the VV, could get
outside the first confinement barrier through different ways: leak through the VV walls cracks when the
VV structural integrity is lost (electromagnetic loads or overpressure), bypass of both VV and CV via a
diagnostics line when a window integrity is lost, and, the most undesirable of all: a hydrogen
explosion/deflagration causing extensive damage to the VV.
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B.1.2 LDO1: Ex-vessel LOCA in the divertor coolant loop
The IE is a rupture of a divertor primary coolant pipe inside the pipe guard or HTS vault.
Figures B-4 and 4-5 represent the ID/ET model for the accident sequences following LDO1.
The pressure in the vault rises until the setpoint for venting is reached (0.17 MPa). In the
current design, the initial pressure is released via a filter-vent system directly to the stack. ESECS
notes that this initial relief path will be closed, and subsequent venting will occur into a pressure
suppression tank and filter system. However, at the beginning of the sequence, releases of RI from the
broken loop go directly to the environment. A pressure relief tank designed to suppress the initial and
subsequent bursts is a better solution from a safety point of view, even if its price is higher. A decision
regarding this matter is still pending.
For the purpose of this section, which estimates the frequency histogram of releases out of the
first barrier, the RI in the DIV coolant of the broken loop will be considered first. The in-vessel part of
the divertor in that loop becomes then the first confinement barrier.
Since the divertor is exposed to high heat load, the plasma must be rapidly shut down to avoid
overheating and burn through the divertor coolant channels. Different loop parameters (e.g. pressure,
flow) are suitable for detecting the accident conditions and to ask for a safety plasma shutdown.
Without shutdown, the cooling channels of the divertor plate will reach a temperature value of 10000C
in about 3 seconds (and 20000C in about 10 seconds). It should be noted that the conditions for the
divertor are different than for FW due to the large heat loads. That leads to much shorter time scales to
reach melting temperature. Therefore, we assume that, if safety shutdown fails, divertor surface melts
with 100% probability, causing a plasma disruption by water ingress. On the other hand, also due to the
short time, by the time in-vessel LOCA from the damaged loop occurs, there will still be a large amount
of water in the loop.
The most challenged function in the case of LDO1 is the fast plasma shutdown. The fusion
power termination systems are described in [4-5]. The safety shutdown system is one of several
defense layers for active plasma shutdown. An interlock system is included for machine protection in
cases where the normal plasma control function fails. The safety shutdown system backs up the
normal plasma control and interlock systems. This shutdown system has a target unavailability of 10~
2/demand. The required time to shutdown in order to prevent the in-vessel component melting vary in
the range 10-100 seconds, but for high heat flux components (divertor, baffle, limiters) the time could
be of the order of a few seconds. Since the divertor temperature rises so fast after a LDO1, the safety
shutdown system will be challenged.
We make the assumption that the divertor surface does not fail (melting or structural failure
due to thermal stresses) when the safety shutdown is successful. This is based on thermohydraulic
transient analysis that has shown that fast thermal relaxation occurs after melting of copper.[4-7] That
is the result of the residual cooling capacity of the broken loop, which is sufficient to cool down the hot
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structures. The VV PHTS operation is also desirable but its probability of failure is so low -that the
sequence is beyond the design basis accident (BDBA).
What makes LDO1 interesting is that the ex-vessel LOCA might be followed by an in-vessel
LOCA from the same DIV loop. This sequence creates a bypass of both VV and CV, and all the RI
available inside the VV can go directly to the HTS vault. This situation can be aggravated by the
ingress of air into the VV once the broken loop is depleted. The conditions for hydrogen
explosion/deflagration are then in place: hydrogen from Be-steam reaction and air.
The water ingress into the VV challenges the pressure relief function. If the rupture disks
(RD) fail to open at their setting point, VV might fail structurally leading to leaks into the CV or
diagnostics room (if windows break). Note that here we do not separate between leakage coming from
the VV walls or windows.
The initial in-vessel LOCA from the damaged DIV loop is a small one, but it causes a
disruption which may lead to an extended in-vessel LOCA (caused by RAE or electromagnetic loads to
the PFCs). In terms of probability, these damages condition the operation of the PFCs PHTSs. In
terms of consequences, they condition the values of RI from the water coolant into the plasma
chamber. In turn, the operation of the PFCs PHTSs, as well as VV PHTS, determine the amount of RI
mobilized from the PFCs into the VV.
We assume that the independent failure of VV has a very small probability, so it leads to a
BDBA sequence. Thus, we will consider only the failure modes of the VV which can be caused by this
particular IE:
1. VV might fail due to electromagnetic loads following a disruption;
2. VV might fail due to overpressure following in-vessel LOCA in the case RD fails;
3. VV might fail due to hydrogen deflagration/explosion following in-vessel LOCA and air ingress.
5 ESECS considers that, even if fast plasma shutdown is triggered, there is a real possibility that the in-vessel
divertor channels will undergo damage. It is not clear if the term 'triggered' means 'successful operation', or it
might be the case that the signal went through, but without the desired response.
6 In the LBV1 case, we differentiated between them because the windows failure leads to air ingress into the VV
via a bypass sequence.
205
>)> >
-> m) >>. >
> EE >ua
> -. 2 -
> >1
w
U0)
>C
>I I).
ra.0
EE.
CI) L
(I)(D
o o
~ -i
206
c C
CLU
0.0
207
B.1.3 LFO3: Heat exchanger tube rupture in a FW/SB coolant loop
The IE represents the rupture of a tube in a primary heat exchanger. The ID/ET model is
shown in Figures B-6 and 4-7. It is anticipated that the first wall (baffle and limiters) and divertor will
either have intermediate coolant loops so that no release to the environment would occur, or
alternatively, isolation valves must be provided. In the latter case, the affected primary loop must be
cooled down so that the rupture can be isolated from the environment by using isolation valves on the
secondary loop.7 The time needed to achieve that is estimated to be around 20 minutes. The
cooldown of the primary loop and the subsequent isolation represent therefore an important
safety function called by LFO3.8 It is assumed that the tritium and activation products that are blown
into the secondary loops before isolation are released to the environment. We will here analyze the
case assuming no intermediate loops would be present. The radioactive inventories that leak from the
steam generator (SG) of the primary loop are out of the primary confinement barrier.
The plasma shutdown is challenged since we need to start cool down of the primary loop as
soon as possible in order to be able to isolate the secondary loop. We assume that as long as the
plasma is not shutdown, the isolation system does not work. Plasma shutdown makes the cooling of
the PHTS loop with the broken SG possible. Hence, the pressure in that PHTS decreases and allows
the isolation system to operate. However, the isolation system might fail; causes for this include stuck
isolation valves or late detection of leakage. There are many signals that could help detect leakage
(monitoring of secondary loop water, pressure indication in the primary loop, level indication in the
pressurizer), so that eventually the leak would be detected. The event of SHTS isolation
success/failure is in any case conditioned by the cooldown of the primary loop due to the pressure
difference of the two loops. After plasma shutdown, decay heat removal (DHR) in the broken loop
should be performed by VV PHTS, so the success of SHTS isolation depends on the success of DHR
by VV PHTS. In turn, the SHTS isolation conditions determine the amount of coolant which is lost
through the SG tube break: SHTS isolation success means only 0.3 g-T is released, while failure
means 100 g-T released.
This IE implies lower temperature transients, since only one SG tube is involved as opposed to
a large ex-vessel LOCA in the LFO2 case. Thus, it is assumed that when the plasma shutdown system
fails, the plasma will be terminated by one of the following causes:
1. FW tubes of the damaged loop will melt, leading to a in-vessel LOCA, disruption, and bypass
sequence;
7 The secondary loop is not designed to withstand the primary pressure.
In the ID/ET model of LFO3, we represent this safety function by a single event: 'Secondary HTS (SHTS)
Isolation System'. The cooldown of PHTS should therefore be included in the fault tree calculating the
probability of failure for SHTS isolation valve.
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2. end of the normal fusion pulse - this was not possible in the cases of LDO1 and LFO2 due to faster
temperature transients of the PFCs.
We make the following assumptions:
* if plasma shutdown system succeeds immediately after the IE happens, FW surface melting is not
an issue (ESECS considers that, even if the plasma shutdown system is successful, there is a risk
that the disturbed loop is overheating with resulting damage to the in-vessel part, and consequently
a bypass from the vacuum vessel to the environment can result);
" in the case 2 above, FW surface does not melt after the end of the pulse if VV PHTS continues to
remove the decay heat.
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B.1.4 LFV99: Large in-vessel LOCA from a FW/SB loop
The initiating event is a plasma wall interaction inducing generalized damage to the first wall.
The corresponding accident sequences are developed in Figures B-8 and B-9. The underlying causes
of such an event could be phenomena like disruptions with a fast decay of plasma current and
significant production of runaway electrons, or a vertical displacement episode (VDE). The first wall
segments will then leak into the vacuum vessel and the equivalent leak size is of the order of 0.5 m2
area. The vacuum vessel will rapidly pressurize up to the pressure at which the rupture disks will open
and coolant will blow off to the pressure suppression tank.
In the sequences following LFV99, there may be some dependencies between the IE and
failure of the coolant systems of DIV and VV. Independent failures are also possible, although of low
probability. Examples of dependencies are:
0 a leak of the DIV or VV inside the plasma chamber could lead to the described disruption followed
by runaway electrons, and thus be the underlying cause (the accident sequences describing this
situation are encompassed in the analysis of the IE small in-vessel LOCA followed by an extended
in-vessel LOCA);
0 the transient following the global damage to the FW is sufficiently violent that subsequent damage
to the DIV (RAE or electromagnetic loads) or VV (electromagnetic loads, overpressure, hydrogen
deflagration/explosion) cannot be excluded.
From the point of view of the consequences, an immediate effect of the IE is that the RI of all
the FW PHTS loops will go into the VV, so that the performance of the VV as confinement barrier will
become even more important. The performance of the DIV and VV PHTSs has an effect on the
temperature of the PFCs and hence on the amount of RI mobilized into the VV.
The overpressure shock in the VV could damage the VV walls as well as the windows. If the
rupture disks to the suppression pool do not work as designed, VV and/or windows might fail due to
overpressure. The result of VV walls failure would be that (part of) the steam would be blown into the
cryostat rather than to the pressure suppression pool. Loss of integrity of a window can lead to a
bypass of both the VV and the CV directly into a diagnostics room, if the isolation system fails; this also
creates an air ingress path, and thus an increased chance of hydrogen deflagration/explosion.
However, credit is taken for the case when the bypass is isolated.
In the case that the rupture disk does work, the steam will blow into the suppression tank. Due
to the abrupt pressure rise, there is a probability that the suppression tank itself will leak. The pressure
suppression tank is actually a sub-component of the VV system, making it part of the first confinement
barrier.[4-8]
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B.1.5 LGC: Generalized rupture of coolant lines in cryostat
The initiating event is a displacement of the vacuum vessel or of the magnets rupturing
multiple coolant lines and their guard pipes inside the cryostat vessel. All active cooling is interrupted
and decay heat removal must rely on radiation, conduction and natural convection. The water lost in
the cryostat will first freeze on the cold surfaces and the pressure transient will be relatively mild. The
loss of the water coolant can happen with or without simultaneous release of cryogenic helium. Figures
B-1 0 and B-1I contain the ID/ET model for this IE.
In this IE, the PFC tubes facing the plasma chamber become the first confinement barrier.
That is why the PFC integrity is important. The rapid plasma shutdown is important for the temperature
transients, given that all the PHTSs including those of VV are lost.
Even when safety shutdown is successful, there is a probability of melting of the PFCs. PFCs
damage creates a bypass path for the RI outside the VV into the CV. We assume that the amount of
water ingress into the VV following PFC melting is quite small, so there is no overpressure challenge
for the VV. However, there is still a potential for Be-steam reaction that might cause a hydrogen
deflagration and affect the VV integrity.
In the case safety shutdown fails, DIV surface will melt with probability 1, due to the high heat
load and lack of any active heat transfer.
This IE seems to be the most severe of the coolant accidents from the point of view of
consequences, due to the complete loss of active cooling to remove the decay heat.
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B.1.6 FF2: Loss of flow in a FW/SB coolant loop
FF2 refers to a loss of flow in a FW/SB coolant loop because of pump seizure. A loss of flow in
one of the DIV PHTSs loops would have similar consequences. It leads to the increase of the FW and
water temperature in the affected loop and possibility of in-vessel LOCA with initial temperature >
2000C. Plasma shutdown is a very important safety function to stop the heat flux to the PFCs. One
specific problem is the LOFA detection. In conclusion, there are two systems whose operation is
challenged by LOFA occurrence: LOFA detection system and the plasma shutdown system.
If plasma shutdown is not achieved actively, then the water temperature and pressure rise up
to the setpoint of the safety valves on the loop. On the plasma side, the FW surface temperature will
increase up to the point where disruption occurs due to either impurity or water ingress.
It is important to separate window performance from VV walls performance, because, if
isolation fails, the former can lead to a bypass sequence of both the VV and the CV directly into a
diagnostics room with air atmosphere.
When disruption is caused by impurity ingress, and no damage is caused to the PFCs by RAE
or electromagnetic loads, VV can only be damaged by the electromagnetic loads. If a window's integrity
is lost in that situation, the RI composed from PFC and vacuum pump (VP) inventories (each
conditioned by events like PHTSs operation, VP isolation) can get out of the VV via the bypass
sequence to a diagnostics room. Failure of PFCs will add the overpressure challenge of VV. Moreover,
if air ingress through a damaged window is an issue, there is also a possibility of hydrogen
deflagration/explosion in the VV.
The accident sequences are represented in Figures B-1 2 and B-1 3.
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B.1.7 HB99: Loss of heat sink to divertor, blanket, and first wall
It is assumed that the first wall, blanket/shield and divertor will have a common heat sink, and
that the vacuum vessel coolant loops will have two independent heat sinks by virtue of their decay heat
removal function. A credible event is the ultimate loss of the heat sink system causing loss of heat sink
to the first wall, blanket/shield and divertor loops. Figures B-14 and B-15 present the ID/ET model for
this IE.
The immediate consequence will be the generalized heat-up of FW/SB and DIV coolants.
Thus, pressure will rise, and safety valves on the pressurizers should open. Failure of the safety valves
is a possible event, but is probably a beyond design basis accident (BDBA). Combination with no
plasma shutdown needs to be investigated.
Loss of heat sink in the divertor is expected to lead to similar sequences as a large ex-vessel
LOCA due to the small margin against departure from critical heat flux. Given the large thermal
capacity of the cooling water, the time scales involved are rather long. Depending on the acceptable
temperature increase inside the primary cooling loops, the time available is in tens of seconds before
fusion power shutdown is needed. Without plasma shutdown, 1000 seconds of plasma burn would
evaporate about 1100 m3 of coolant.
Two safety systems are challenged by this IE: the safety plasma shutdown and the safety
valves to the PHTS loops pressurizers. If the safety plasma shutdown works, only the decay heat
remains to be removed and the VV PHTS should do that successfully, no matter what happens with
the safety valves. If the safety plasma shutdown fails, the plasma power is higher than the VV PHTS
heat removal capacity, thus the heat and pressure in PHTSs will raise. If all the safety valves open, the
accident sequences are identical to those in ex-vessel LOCA case (PHTSs overpressurization is not an
issue). If any of the safety valves fails, that PHTS loop is overpressurized and in- and/or ex-vessel
LOCA can occur. Therefore, the probability of water ingress inside the VV is higher in this case. The
sequence including ex-vessel LOCA event has a probability of the order of 10'8, which means BDBA,
and therefore we do not extend the analysis further.
Remind that the design option studied here is the one with integrated FW/BS PHTSs. The
FW/BS and DIV PHTSs each have four loops, and each loop has its own pressurizer. Thus, there is a
total of eight safety valves. When calculating the probability that any of the safety valves fails, common
cause failures (design, manufacture, maintenance, valves in the same HTS) should be considered. For
the present work, we assumed that the valves failures are independent.
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B.2 Magnet Accidents
The magnet systems do not contain any radioactivity by themselves, but they store high
amount of energy that has the potential to damage the structures or components that are used for
confinement of radioactive inventories. Thus, it is important to understand not only the design and
operation of the magnet systems but also the possible interactions of the magnets with all the other
tokamak systems.
The literature available so far contain accidents that might happen in magnet systems, but not
accident sequences developed to determine the effect on confinement barriers, and that is what we try
to do in the present section. Reference [4-9] contains the results of a survey conducted among the
majors centers of large magnet development and operation in USA to obtain information on magnet
system failure and accident events. It is useful to check the credibility of the sequences developed here
against events that happened in reality.
Data about probability of events in the magnet systems is very scarce due to the fact that ITER
magnets will be the first superconducting magnets of such large dimensions. Reference [4-10]
contains data on probabilities of failure of the magnet systems for NET. Sensitivity analysis on the
probability of events can offer more insight into the importance of magnet related events.
The type of damage due to an initiating event occurring in the magnet systems can be
categorized as follows:
* Structural damage:
0 overcurrents in coils cause large in-place forces;
0 off-normal currents in PF coils result in large vertical forces;
0 of-normal out-of-plane forces on TF due to exceptional PF currents;
0 faulted TF coil or faulted TF coil busbars/power supply causes exceptional loads on out-of-
plane support structure;
0 large scale crack failure of TF coil case;
* Thermal damage:
0 shorts or open circuits causes overheating and arcing on busbars external to cryostat;
0 distributed heating of winding pack material (jacket and/or plates) from an overcurrent
level;
0 local heating of winding pack material from discharge failure;
0 local melting or vaporization from short/arc inside a coil;
* Fluid damage:
0 coil quench after a cryostat loss of vacuum;
0 cryostat pressure increase after coil helium leak.
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The damage from several potential accidents is analyzed to determine if radiological
confinement barriers could be affected.
B.2.1 MPO2: CS/PF coil overcurrent
Overcurrent in individual central solenoid (CS) or PF coils, or exceptional combinations of
currents in sets of coils can cause off-normal patterns in the out of plane forces on the TF coils. That
can overload the support structure or the coil cases themselves. Full assessment of all possible
combinations requires extensive calculations with a finite element model to determine the worst PF coil
current combinations. ESECS cites preliminary assessment results using the out of plane forces and
moments compared to the values in normal operation.[4-1] The PF coil faults have been limited to an
increase in current to critical conditions for one coil while the remainder stay at the normal (start of flat
top) operating condition. Consistently with the coil overcurrent, the forces increase by up to 80%. In the
critical inner leg region, as expected, the CS and PF 2 and 7 faults have the most impact, whereas the
outer coils dominate the outer region.
Combinations of current in different CS/PF coils may also create vertical forces on other PF
coils. The PF coils are supported onto the TF coils by a link at each coil. These links are sized on the
basis of the vertical loads in normal operation: towards the machine (compressive static limit) or away
(tensile fatigue limit). An abrupt increase in load by up to a factor of two could cause one of the twenty
supports to fail (probably by yielding if an initial crack already extends to a substantial fraction of the
area), but simultaneous failure of several supports is seen as a very low probability event.
Reference [4-9] mentions that shorted PF coils were analyzed. The variable current
combinations and different mutual inductances mean that a shorted coil, with all other coils discharged
at any point in the scenario, only exceeds its maximum operating current by 1 or 2 kA (i.e. up to 45 kA).
This does not represent a safety issue and is not considered further.
When the fast discharge systems fail to respond on demand, damage to the magnet systems
may occur and can lead to undesired consequences to the confinement barriers.
The development of the accident sequences in terms of effects on confinement barriers for
CS/PF coil overcurrent is very similar to the TF coil overcurrent case described in the previous section.
The differences between TF and PF systems will cause some components to be more challenged, for
instance the torsion cylinder, crown rings' keyways, and PF supports on the TF case. Thus, the
probability of damage due to missile generation and coils displacement should be higher.
Figures B-16 and B-17 represent the ID/ET model for MPQ2, which includes the accident
sequences inside the plasma vacuum chamber.
225
E 0 10 1 0 >.
> > > > > > LM +
> > >. > > > >
C- -W N - C4 v r-]-
0. 0. CL 0L 0. 0.
S > > LC
> 2,
>> > >
CLL
E1
> IL > 0. 5
0
E > I--
00
CL LL
00OL 0 CL L
0.E
226
0L6
CL I-
> > 0
h U)
0.0
>
J
f. = E E
o~zi~ U I.
a,-gi -
227
C~J
0
a-
CD
LI
a)
.)
LL
B.2.2 MS: TF coil case failure from initial defect
A similar accident is described in [4-9]: an initially localized structural failure leads to sequential
overloading and fracture of other structural components. The primary cause appears to have been
design flaws relative to structural details and the load distribution in localized areas. The conversion of
the stored magnetic energy to kinetic energy of the fractured components is a source of missile
generation and coils displacement.
The structural material areas in one of the TF coils at the equatorial cross-section are: case
0.37 m2, jacket and radial plates 0.42 m2.
Deterministic calculations referred to in ESECS concluded that complete structural failure of
the coil cross-section (plates and case) is not possible.[4-1] However, insulation damage, particularly of
the ground insulation at the break point, is probable. Current flows at the short are generally restricted
by the use of ground resistors, and development of an arc is not likely. The break would probably
generate sufficient mechanical heat to quench the coil (thus causing a fast discharge to be initiated)
even if the movement due to the break is not detected.
The ID/ET model for MS is shown in Figures B-18 and B-19, and includes the accident
sequences inside the plasma vacuum chamber.
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B.2.3 MAC: Short between busbars outside the cryostat vessel
Since there is no direct link back to the cryostat (even after several minutes) to cause a coil
quench through loss of vacuum, there is the possibility to dissipate almost the whole TF coil energy
(100 GJ) at the short. The coils cannot be discharged without driving a substantial fraction of the
energy into the shorted coil, probably resulting in the permanent damage of this coil and increasing (at
least temporarily) the arc current.
If the fast discharge system fails, off-normal currents and forces create the potential for coil
melting, helium release, and arcing. The most significant difference from the previous magnet
accidents is the possibility of shorted coil melting which can damage the VV vessel.
Although from the safety viewpoint the coil could withstand these forces, it seems desirable to
eliminate the possibility of this fault by ensuring that the two terminals of each coil are widely separated
in the busbar runs, preferably in different containments. It is acceptable to pair the terminals of
adjacent coils.
The ID/ET model for MAC is shown in Figures B-20 and B-21, and includes the accident
sequences inside the plasma vacuum chamber.
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B.2.4 MI: Insulation failure (turn and pancake arcs)
A major source of internal heating is an internal arc. Besides acting as an initiator of a quench,
the arc itself can dissipate significant heat in the winding. Internal shorts in coils develop at a rate
determined by the external voltage applied to the coil (i.e. from a resistive discharge) and by the
propagation of the coil quench initiated by the heat from the short which greatly modifies the coil
resistance.
Simultaneously with the initiation of the coil discharge and the development of a coil voltage,
current begins to flow in the short. After the shorting piece of metal evaporates, an arc is formed with a
voltage drop related to the length, power, and area. The arc voltage has little impact on the initial
current build up in the short. The current buildup is determined primarily by the short resistance and the
mutual inductance of the shorted loop with the rest of the coil and the self inductance of the shorted
loop. The induced current can rise significantly above the critical current leading in the high field zone
to an immediate quench. Additionally, the energy of the arc heats the conductor and reduces the
critical current. The quench develops as a time dependent resistance in the shorted loop and
propagates very rapidly. In less than a second, the resistance forces the short current to decay.
Eventually the short current reaches zero and then, assuming the destruction of the conductor
is limited, the short is either evaporated and a gap is formed, or the shorting piece is still there
providing a parallel path around the shorted turn. Alternatively, if the arc energy in the area has melted
through the conductors, an in-line or bypass arc could develop.
It appears that for all except a narrow range of values for the initial short resistance, the
associated conductor quench is sufficiently rapid to give only a limited energy release in the coil, not
sufficient to cause significant structural damage. The case of the short resistance that can generate in-
line and bypass arcs requires further calculation; the worst case energy release requires many
assumptions about the ability of arcs to reignite after the current passes zero. However, even in this
worst case, the energy deposition in the coil is less than 50 MJ, still insufficient to cause structural
damage.
In the case of the TF coils, the conductor case could contain any helium release from damage
to the surface conductors. For the CS and PF, a helium release to the cryostat could occur.
The ID/ET model for MI is shown in Figures B-22 and B-23, and includes the accident
sequences inside the plasma vacuum chamber.
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B.2.5 MCC1: Cryogen leaks in cryostat
A cryogen release into the cryostat will lead to coil quench and fast discharge, and to cryostat
pressurization. The worst case for the cryostat overpressure is the complete break of the helium
lines to all TF coils simultaneously, with the loss of 96 m3 of liquid helium. The coils undergo a fast
discharge and eddy current heating of the steel in the coils occurs, to about 50 K in 20 s.
The first step of our analysis is concerned with the performance of the first confinement barrier
(VV + PHTSs). We will look at the potential of this IE to damage the magnets and furthermore the VV
and/or PHTSs. The cryostat pressurization will be studied during the second step concerned with the
performance of the second confinement barrier. An emergency atmosphere detritiation system with a
capacity of about 5000 m3/h is foreseen to cope with the pressure transient. Using this system, the
cryostat pressure can be brought to atmospheric pressure in about 7 hours.[4-1] In case the detritiation
system would not be available for accidents involving cryostat pressurization, a relief line with rupture
disks venting directly to the stack is foreseen. The helium is not causing any significant concern from
the radiological releases point of view.
The ID/ET model for MCC1 is shown in Figures B-24 and B-25, and includes the effects on the
PHTSs, but it does not include the disruption model on the three branches indicated.
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B.3 Fuel Systems Accidents
Accidents in the fueling and fuel processing systems can occur in the torus pumping system,
the impurities processing system, the isotope separation system, the on-line storage system and the
fueling systems (gas puffing and pellet injection). There are many process lines that connect the
various components, and these lines are also potential accident initiators.
The scope of the present study refers to the confinement barriers inside the tokamak building
only, therefore we will not analyze the lEs affecting confinement barriers in the tritium building.
B.3.1 TGP3: Failure of gas puffing valves in open position
There are three major components inside the gas puffer room: a) the buffer tank, b) the
process piping, and c) the gas puffing valves. A process boundary failure in a) or b) will lead to a
release of DT inside the gas puffer room; and failure of the gas puffing valves (e.g., valve sticks in the
open position) could lead to the injection of a large quantity of DT gas in the vacuum vessel.
It is assumed that 1 kg of tritium gas is mobilized from the plasma facing components, by the
in-vessel LOCA, but because the diameter of the gas puffing line is small (a few millimeters),
compared to the diameter of the rupture disks in the vacuum vessel pressure relief system, only
minute quantities of tritium would be transported, by steam flow, into the gas puffing room. Hence, the
environmental releases are negligible.
The immediate consequence of a stuck-open gas puffing valve is a continuos injection of DT
gas into plasma. This may cause plasma quench or overpower. If the plasma instability is detected, a
safety shutdown could be successful with no further consequences. Otherwise, a disruption due to
impurity or water ingress can lead to in-vessel LOCA. Also, the pressure in the VV can become high
enough to get radioactive inventories out into the gas puffing room via the stuck-open valve.
Figures B-26 and B-27 describe the IT/ET model for TGP3 without disruption.
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Figure B-26: Influence Diagram for the Initiating Event TGP3 without Disruption
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Figure B-27: Event Tree for the Initiating Event TGP3 without Disruption
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B.5 Loss of Secondary Vacuum Accidents
ESECS estimates that the loss of primary vacuum (vacuum vessel) is not of concern from a
safety point of view. Hence, we only analyzed the secondary vacuum loss accidents (cryostat vessel) in
Chapter 4.
B.5.1 VCL: Large leakage of air in the cryostat vessel
A large air ingress in the cryostat will lead to generalized quench of coils due to generalized
overheating of the coils. If the quench protection system does not work, there is a potential for arcing
and consequential damage of the vacuum vessel. However, conditions for fractional air condensation
would not exist for a long time, so that ozone explosion does not seem likely. This is covered by the
magnet accident analysis chapter, thus we will not analyze this IE here.
B.6 Loss of Auxiliary Systems
This category of initiating events includes the different loss of electrical power events, as well
as events related to the loss of other service systems (cryogenics, ventilation, compressed air, etc.).
The loss-of site power was analyzed in Chapter 4.
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B.4 Plasma Accidents
There are several events related to plasma anomalies, but their effects are more severe when
coupled with the occurrence with other IE's in the coolant, magnet, or fueling systems, context in which
we have already analyzed plasma disruptions, run-away electron damage. The following is a
description of these events:
1. Plasma disruptions: they are part of the normal operation events. The systems in ITER are
designed to withstand a large number of disruptions: for the BPP, the requirements stipulate 3000
disruptions of which 500 at full current and full energy. The most important safety parameter is the
bulk temperature of the FW. Thus, the most dangerous situation is when the bulk first wall and
blanket temperatures are high for another reason (e.g. LOCAs or LOFAs) and therefore the
reaction front temperature cannot be rapidly relaxed. These cases have been analyzed in the
coolant accidents section.
2. Run-away electron damage: Disruption of the ignited plasma has the potential to vaporize a large
amount of plasma facing material and result in a fast decay of the plasma current. This leads to a
strong electric field in which electrons could be accelerated and escape in the form of run-away
electrons that could damage the plasma facing components as they strike in a toroidally symmetric
way.
3. Vertical Displacement Events: they are part of the normal operation events for ITER. During a
VDE, the plasma becomes vertically unstable and comes into contact with the first wall and/or the
divertor while moving rapidly upwards or downwards along with the major axis of the machine. This
induces a localized heat load and poloidal currents (halo currents) which produce significant
structural loading on the components in contact with the plasma. The machine will be designed to
withstand the effects of the worst VDE, but, for machine protection reasons, a mitigation strategy
based on initiating a fast disruption may be included in the design.
4. Overpower transient: This is the only IE among the plasma anomalies that we will analyzed in
more detail in Chapter 4.
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Appendix C: Accident Sequences including the
Second Confinement Barriers Models
This appendix presents the accident sequences including the second confinement barriers for
the six initiating events analyzed in Chapter 4. The figures were explained in Chapter 5.
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Appendix D: EXCEL Database
The data is grouped by categories of systems: values extracted from references are written in
italics and values for events that have not been found as such in references are given in bold. Some
that the definitions for systems failure events, especially conditional events, do not correspond to any
of the events found in the references. However, we believe that the definitions are reasonable and their
probabilities could be more precisely estimated upon further deterministic analysis and operational
experience. Sensitivity analysis particularly for these type of events will be undertaken to study their
influence on the results of the systems model.
In DPL, the definition of events is given in terms of the success of a system to fulfill its
intended mission. Each event has to states: yes - meaning successful operation; no - meaning system
failure. The sum of the probabilities of the two states is equal to 1 (complementary states)'. Thus,
estimating the probability of systems failure is sufficient, and these failure probabilities are centralized
in the EXCEL database. In conclusion, the events defined in EXCEL are in fact the complementary
events of those defined in DPL.
The attempt of the present work was not to develop a comprehensive failure rates data base,
but only to centralize data for the events defined in the six initiating events models for accident
sequences that are included in the probabilistic model for studying the confinement barriers.
Initiating Events
Six initiating events were picked from the comprehensive list studied in Chapter 4, each
starting in a different part of the plant. It is simpler to develop a model by using a minimal number of
initiating events, and then implement the rest of the initiating events.
LFO2 (ex-vessel LOCA in a FWISB coolant loop) frequency can be estimated using pipe
failure data, and depends on the size of the pipe: for medium size piping (typically 160 mm diameter),
the break frequency is between 10 3 and 102/a; for large pipes (800 mm diameter), the frequency is 10
4/a.[4-1 1]
MPO1 (TF coil overcurrent) frequency was estimated from [4-10], where the TF coil system
is broken down into assemblies and aggregates as follows: superconducting coil, cryogenic cooling,
energy supply, protection devices including instrumentation. We assume that TF coil overcurrent is the
result of a failure of one of the electrical components: electrical connection between double pancakes
with helium passage and one helium pipe connection (GA1), electrical connections without helium
passage and with two helium pipe connections (GA2), current leads (GD), pancakes (GM). The failure
No partial fulfillment of mission is considered in the present study. See [4-17] for three-state model: normal,
degraded and failed states.
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rates of these components are given in [4-10] Table Ill. The MPO1 frequency is calculated as the sum
of these failure rates per year, assuming that the TF coil system is kept energized at all times. The
estimated frequency for MPO1 initiating event is 1 0"/a.
fMPO1 = (XGA1 + XGA2 + 2 GD + XGM)[/hr] 8760[hr / yrj (D-1)
where XGA1 = 1.26E - 07 / hr, ? GA2 = 3.4E - 08 / hr,
XGD = 1.OE - 05 / hr, XGM =1.0E - 06 / hr
TVP1 (Vacuum pump process boundary failure) frequency is taken from ESECS [4-1], and
it is assumed to be 1 0-'/a, given the large number of process lines inside the vacuum vessel boundary.
OP (Overpower transient) occurs due to failure of the fuel injection systems (fuel pellet
injection or fuel gas injection). The two systems are independent, so the possibility of common cause
failures is quite small. The result is about 9.6 events/year. The frequency value is introduced in DPL as
the branch probability that the initiating event occurs, and DPL can only work with values between 0
and 1 for the probability. Therefore, we use a value of 1 for the frequency of OP as DPL insert variable,
and we multiply the resulting accident sequences frequencies by the real OP frequency value of 9.6/a.
This trick does not affect the results.
fop = (XPI + XGI)[/hr] 8760[hr / yr] (D-2)
where kpi = 1.OE - 03 / hr, XGI = 1.OE - 04 / hr
VCS (Small leakage of air in the cryostat vessel) frequency value is extracted from [4-11],
where the initiating event 'vacuum leak at bellows' has a frequency of 0.2/a.
LOSP (Loss of offsite power) data for power plants indicate that the frequency of this event
is between 10-3/a and 10-6/a, depending on the duration of the loss of power: the higher value is for
short duration events (typically under 2 hours), and the lower value for events with a duration up to 10
hours.[4-1J Reference [4-11] gives data from various US utilities, of the order of 0.1/a. To be on the
conservative side, we will use a frequency of 0.1/a for LOSP initiating event.
Plasma Facing Components Primary Cooling Systems
The PFC PHTSs are not designed as safety systems, but they are assumed to play a role in
removing the decay heat from the plasma facing components. The ITER decay heat is about 20 MW
right after plasma shutdown, and it decreases to about 1 MW after the first week. So, we assume a
mission time for the decay heat removal of one week after the plasma shutdown.
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Table D-1: ITER Decay Heat
Time after shutdown (days)
1 .16E-05
0.007
0.042
0.417
1
7
31
Global decay heat (MW)
20
14
9.5
1.9
1.6
1.2
1
The failure causes for the PFC PHTSs loss of integrity are:
" independent failure, meaning that PFC PHTS fails to causes unrelated to the accident sequence
events;
* runaway electron damage to PFC penetrates the PHTS tubes;
* electromagnetic loads damage PFC and penetrates the tubes;
" magnet coils displacement cause break of PFC PHTS;
" missile generation cause break of PFC PHTS;
* ozone explosion in cryostat vessel cause break of PFC PHTS.
DIVPHTS Y
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Figure D-1: DPL Probability Data for DIV PHTS Success/Failure Event
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The following four situations can be distinguished for the capability of DIV PHTS to remove the
fusion decay heat for one week after plasma shutdown:
1. The divertor plates are not damaged by disruption effects. Then, DIV PHTS can still fail due
some independent causes such as sub-component failures or common causes. We developed a fault
tree with the top event "DIV PHTS fails to remove decay heat during one week after shutdown due to
causes unrelated to plasma instabilities" to calculate the failure probability p0DVc in Figure D-1. The
DIV PHTS has four loops situated in two HTS vaults; the two loops in the same HTS vault can be
interconnected in case one of them fails. Hence, the success criterion for the fault tree top event refers
to the operation of at least one loop in each HTS vault. The corresponding failure criterion is failure of
at least two loops in the same vault, and the three situations when that happens are described in the
fault tree. The failure rates for the basic events (identified by circles) and for events which are not
developed further (identified by rhombus) are taken from [4-10, 4-111.
Table D-2: Failure rates for basic events in DIV PHTS failure fault tree
Event name Event symbol Failure Rate [4-111 page no.
Pipe break in one HTS loop PIHTS 10 4 /yr 50
Pipe break to cassettes PICAS 10 3/yr 50
Pump failure PUMP 10 5/hr 53
Heat exchanger failure HX 10 6/hr 50
Fire in one HTS vault FIRE 3x10 2 /yr 60
Bad maintenance, high humidity, bad MAIN 1.1x10 6/hr 50
coolant chemistry
Electric power failure ELPO 9x10l2/yr 60
Control system failure CONSY 10 6/hr 55
For the event 'Bad maintenance, high humidity, bad coolant chemistry', we used the beta
factor method to calculate the common cause failure rate:
Xc XC (D-3)
where X is the failure rate of both loops due to the common cause, ?, is the independent failure rate of
one loop due to the same cause, P is the beta factor, usually estimated from previous experiences. A
reasonable value for P is 0.1. Hence, X, can be evaluated as follows:
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P L. (D-4)
For Xj =10- 5 /hr, Xc =1.1.10- 6 /hr.
Boolean algebra is then used to calculate the top event probability of occurrence:
G01= G02+GA1+GO3 (D-5)
G02= G04+GO4
G04= GA3+G07
GA3= G05-GO5
G07= FIRE+ MAIN
GA1= G02-GO5
G05= PIHTS+ PICAS+ PUMP + HX
G03= GA2+GO6
GA2= GO5-GO5-GO5-GO5
G05= ELPO + CONSY
where GO is an 'OR' gate, and GA is an 'AND' gate. With a mission time for DIV PHTS of one week,
the probability pODVc is 0.0034.
2. DIV plates are damaged by runaway electrons (RAE), but are not damaged by electromagnetic
loads. Hence, the DIV PHTS will either fail independently or due to RAE penetration of DIV plate
cooling tubes. The failure probability of DIV PHTS is pl DVc in this case, and it is in fact a conditional
probability:
p1 DVc = Pr(DIV PHTS fails independently OR due to RAE damage to DIV tubes (D-6)
I RAE damage to DIV plates)
p1 DVc = Pr(DIV PHTS fails independently I RAE damage to DIV plates) +
Pr(DIV PHTS fails due to RAE damage to DIV tubes I RAE damage to DIV
plates)
p1DVc = Pr(DIV PHTS fails independently) + Pr(DIV PHTS fails due to RAE
damage to DIV tubes I RAE damage to DIV plates)
p1DVc = pODVc + Pr(DIV PHTS fails due to RAE damage to DIV tubes I RAE
damage to DIV plates)
Two probability theory concepts were used in (D-4):
" p(A or BIC)=p(AIC)+p(BIC), if A and B are mutually exclusive events;
" =p(A), if A and C are independent events.
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Runaway electron damage is a toroidally symmetric event, so it has the capability of damaging
all four DIV PHTS loops simultaneously. To estimate a value for Pr(DIV PHTS fails due to RAE
damage to DIV tubes I RAE damage to DIV plates) more detailed analysis should be performed, which
is outside the scope of the present work. For now, we assume that in 2 out of 100 disruptions (0.02
probability) causing RAE damage to the divertor plates, DIV PHTS fails due to RAE damage to DIV
tubes. Thus, p1 DVc = 0.0034+0.02.
3. DIV plates are not damaged by runaway electrons (RAE), but are damaged by electromagnetic
loads. The failure probability of DIV PHTS is p2DVc in this case, and it is again a conditional
probability. Everything we said in part 2 applies here, except that the failure cause is electromagnetic
loads to DIV plates instead of RAE. We assume that in 1 out of 100 disruptions (0.01 probability)
causing electromagnetic loads damage to the divertor plates, DIV PHTS fails due to electromagnetic
loads damage to DIV tubes. Thus, p2DVc = 0.0034+0.01.
4. DIV plates are damaged by both runaway electrons (RAE), and electromagnetic loads. The
failure probability of DIV PHTS is p3DVc in this case, and it is a conditional probability. We believe that
the effect is more than cumulative, and assume a probability of 0.06 (6 out of 100) that DIV PHTS fails
due to the damage to DIV plates by RAE and Electromagnetic loads.
For the similar events referring to the FW/SB PHTS, the same types of calculations should be
performed. Some basic events failure probabilities might be different, since the design of the FW/SB
PHTS is not identical with DIV PHTS in terms of thermohydraulic parameters, piping dimensions and
configuration. However, the number of loops is also four, and we will assume the same values for the
events probabilities as for DIV PHTS failure, at least for the time being.
The LFO2 initiating event represents a break in one loop of the FW/SB PHTS. Therefore, only
three loops are left to remove the decay heat from the FW. We called the event "Rest of FW PHTS
failure" to refer to the three loops unaffected by LFO2, and we considered the independent failure to
have a probability equal to the probability at gate GA1 in Figure D-3.
Missile generation, magnet coil displacement, and ozone explosion in the cryostat vessel are
three other causes for PFC PHTS failure that we considered in this study. We calculated the
conditional probabilities of DIV and FW PHTS failures given any of these events based on the same
considerations as in Equations (D-4). We again estimated some rough values for the probabilities of
PHTS damaged by these events, and the values are shown explicitly in the EXCEL database. As an
example, we assumed that, given a missile was generated, the probability that a PFC PHTS is
damaged is of the order of 0.1 (in 1 out of 10 events with missile generation, the PFC PHTS is
damaged by that missile). Further research should be performed for a more reliable estimation.
264
ITER Safety Systems
The safety systems for ITER include:
" off-normal fusion power shutdown;
* pressure suppression systems to protect confinement barriers;
* vacuum vessel cooling system used for decay heat removal, and having the capability for natural
circulation;
* magnet quench detection and discharge systems;
* isolation valves;
" emergency power supply.
Reference [4-10] gives a generic failure rate for the Engineered Safety Features of 10 4 /hr with
a Mean Downtime (MDT) of 1.1 hours.
Similarly to the possible damage causes for the PFC PHTS, we defined the event that the VV
PHTS fails independently with a probability of 2 x 104 , and the conditional events that the VV PHTS
fails given missile generation, coil displacement, or ozone explosion in the cryostat vessel.
For failure to respond on demand of fusion shutdown system, a probability of 10- was
considered , as in [4-12).
The connection between the vacuum vessel and its pressure suppression tank is made by four
ducts, each of diameter 1 m2, fitted with rupture disks which isolate them during normal operation. The
success criterion for pressure release is when at least one disk breaks on demand, so the failure of
pressure releases occurs when all four disks fail simultaneously. The probability of failure on demand
for one disk, as given in ESECS [4-1] is 10'. Hence, the simultaneous independent failure is quite
small, but common cause failure is a possibility; we assume a beta factor of 0.1, leading to a probability
of failure of 10 4 for the rupture disks system.
The plasma vacuum pumping in ITER is part of the exhaust system, and it contains radioactive
inventories. The vacuum pumps should be therefore isolated form the plasma chamber following
plasma shutdown, to avoid the transport of the radioactive inventories between the two systems. Fast
acting valves are located upstream the cryopumps to isolate the vacuum lines from the plasma
chamber, if needed. Reference [4-12] estimates the probability of failure on demand of the vacuum
pumps isolation system at 4.8 x 103.
The initiating event TVP1 consists in boundary failure of the vacuum pump. Credit is taken for
the break isolation, and ESECS [4-1] assumes a probability of 10 for the failure of vacuum pump
boundary break isolation to respond on demand.
The superconducting magnets should not damage safety functions leading to a release of
radioactivity in excess of specified limits. Emphasis is placed on magnet design concepts that preclude
catastrophic structural failure or thermal conditions that could damage confinement barriers, and
include safety features of the structure, conductor, insulation, cryogenics, power supplies.
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The cryogenic plant supplies helium to the coils, busbars, and current leads. In the event of a
fast discharge, much of the helium is expelled from the coils, because the heating of the coolant
causes a fast pressure rise. A system of relief valves and a relief tank will capture the helium. We do
not have more information about the system at this time, and [4-15] gives a probability of failure of 10-1
for Cryogenic helium relief.
The magnet conductor is designed to tolerate a range of disturbances without initiating a
quench2 (in particular disruptions and limited mechanical motion). The copper in the cable provides a
limited degree of thermal protection, but, to prevent local overheating and possible coil damage, the
coil affected must be discharged with a time constant of about 20 seconds. The primary quench
detection system relies on voltage balance between similar conductors to exclude inductive voltages
and reliably detect the small resistive voltage that characterizes the start of a quench. There is a
backup system that acts on a larger time scale and uses the pressure wave from a quench for
detection. An estimate for the TF coil quench detection system failure rate is taken form [4-
10]:8 _ 10 7 /hr. The probability of failure (0.003) is calculated for a mission time equal to the Basic
Performance Phase (BPP) time: 13000 pulses, each pulse of 1000 seconds. Reference [4-15] gives a
probability of failure per demand of 0.01 for the coil quench detection system.
If quench is detected, the magnet coil discharge system should be activated not only in the coil
system where a defect occurred, but also in the other coil system due to mutual forces among magnet
coils. The failure rate of discharge system equal to 10,7/hr is taken from [4-11], and a mission time
equal to BPP is assumed. The seven PF coils have separate power supplies, and the failure criterion is
that at least one PF coil is not discharged; hence, the PF coils discharge system has a probability of
failure of about seven times the probability of failure of TF or CS coil system (simultaneous failure of
two or more PF coils and common cause failures are not considered, they are assumed to have a
relatively low probability).
Reference [4-12] contains data on air leak detection and isolation in the cryostat vessel as
follows: for leak detection, a failure rate of 10. /hr (mission time equal to BPP), and for leak isolation, a
failure on demand of 103.
A disruption has the potential to damage diagnostics windows which are numerous in the
plasma chamber. Such an event would lead to bypass of both of the confinement barrier: vacuum
vessel and cryostat vessel, to the diagnostics room. However, credit is taken for the isolation of the
bypass. We found a probability of failure of isolation valves of 6 x 10 6/hr in [4-10], and using a mission
time equal to BPP, a probability of failure of 0.021 was obtained.
2 When a conductor loses its superconducting properties locally, its resistance increases rapidly and the resistive
spot becomes an intemal heat source. This heating could lead to propagation of the resistive zone along the
conductor, which is called a quench. This can be avoided in some cases when the conductor is cryogenically
stable: a stabilizer (copper or aluminum, or another material whose resistivity is lower than that of the
superconducting material when it is resistive) is needed to carry the coil current for the time the
superconductor need to cool down and recover, so that the superconductor can carry the current again.
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An emergency power supply system could consists of two redundant Diesel generators. The
probability of failure on demand for one Diesel generator is 0.03 as given in [4-11], so the probability
that both fail at the same time is (0.03)2.
Plasma Facing Components
The plasma facing components are: divertor, first wall, and diagnostics windows. They could
be damaged by disruption effects such as runaway electron damage and electromagnetic loads. We
assume that the effect of runaway electrons on the plasma facing components is different for a
disruption caused by impurity ingress or water ingress in the plasma chamber. So, we estimate
different values for conditional probabilities of PFC failure in these two situations. We also estimate a
probability that diagnostics window fail due to overpressure, since that can lead to an aggravating
sequence such as bypass of two confinement barriers.
In the case of a fusion tokamak reactor, the occurrence of an accident will lead directly or
indirectly to the plasma shutdown: directly - the initiating event causes plasma disruption, e.g. in-vessel
LOCA from plasma facing components; indirectly - the detection of the accident should activate the
safety plasma shutdown system. However, even if the plasma safety shutdown system fails to respond
quickly, the accident sequence eventually leads to an increase of the temperature of the plasma facing
components. The effect will be impurities ingress into plasma, and even water ingress if the heat load
on the component is very high and the melting is so rapid that a disruption due to impurity ingress
does not have enough time to happen. In conclusion, if the shutdown system fails, the events 'Impurity
ingress' and 'Water ingress' are complementary, which means that their probability sum to 1.
The event 'DIV damaged by electromagnetic loads given disruption' is a conditional event
which could be further decomposed as follows:
Pr(DIV damaged by electromagnetic loads I disruption) = Pr(DIV damaged by (D-7)
electromagnetic loads I electromagnetic loads) Pr(electromagnetic loads I
disruption)
For the present time, 50% of disruptions are assumed to produce severe electromagnetic
loads, and in 1 in 100 cases when electromagnetic loads are produced, they actually damage the PFC
(DIV, FW or windows).
Runaway electrons are generated during plasma disruptions that produce conditions of low
density and low plasma temperature. Experience from JET is used to estimate the number of impurity
caused disruptions generating significant quantities of runaway electrons as being 15%; in other words,
Pr(RAE I disruption by impurity ingress) = 0.15. The coolant ingress-induced plasma disruptions are
likely to be two or three times more intense than typical disruptions or disruptions caused by impurity
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ingress; 90% of these disruptions are assumed to be able to produce energetic runaway electrons:
Pr(RAE I disruption by water ingress) = 0.9. We assume that, given runaway electrons are produced,
there is a probability of 0.5 that DIV or FW is damaged by RAE, and a probability of 0.01 that
diagnostics windows are damaged by RAE.
Pr(DIV/FW damaged by RAE I disruption by impurity ingress) = Pr(DIV/FW (D-8)
damaged by RAE I RAE) Pr(RAE I disruption by impurity ingress) =
0.5 x 0.15 = 0.075
Pr(DIV/FW damaged by RAE I disruption by water ingress) = Pr(DIV/FW
damaged by RAE I RAE) Pr(RAE I disruption by water ingress) =
0.5 x 0.9 = 0.45
Pr(Windows damaged by RAE I disruption by impurity ingress) = Pr(Windows
damaged by RAE I RAE) Pr(RAE I disruption by impurity ingress) =
0.01 x 0.15 = 0.0015
Pr(Windows damaged by RAE I disruption by water ingress) = Pr(Windows
damaged by RAE I RAE) Pr(RAE I disruption by water ingress) =
0.01 x 0.9 = 0.009
By tradition, designers of building windows use a probability of window failure of 0.0083 over
the life of the building (20 to 25 years), when the windows are designed to accommodate ambient
conditions as well as pressure loads from high velocity winds. That is a failure rate of 4 -10-4 /yr. For
overpressure demand (usually less than one atmosphere differential pressure), the building windows
have to meet the 50 year storm wind loading demand, which gives a probability of failure of
0.02/demand 4 of window.
The view port windows for ITER are generally smaller, and use higher grade materials, but the
overpressure loading is 0.5 to 0.8 MPa, or even 2 MPa differential pressure possible in some ITER
scenarios. Therefore, we assume a failure rate for diagnostics windows in ITER equal to the one for
building windows at 0.02/demand for 5 to 8 atmospheres overpressure. [4-13]
8 out of 1000 windows failed during the 20 - 25 years period.
4 (4 . 10~4 / yr) (50 years / demand) = 0.02 / demand
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Vacuum Vessel Confinement Barrier
The behavior of the vacuum vessel as the first confinement barrier for radioactive inventories
is the main interest of the present work. The following events can cause the loss of VV integrity:
electromagnetic loads following disruptions, overpressure when the rupture disks fail to open towards
the pressure suppression tank, hydrogen explosion5, arcing, missile generation, magnet coil
displacement, ozone explosion in the cryostat vessel.
For the electromagnetic loads effect, we assume the same values as in (D-5):
Pr(VV damaged by electromagnetic loads I disruption) = Pr(VV damaged by (D-9)
electromagnetic loads I electromagnetic loads) Pr(electromagnetic loads I
disruption) = 0.01 x 0.5 = 0.005
For the VV failure due to overpressure given rupture disks fail to open, a probability of 0.5 was
estimated in [4-14], where this conditional event is called CRYOBOUND: Primary boundary failure
towards the cryostat. That value probably refers to an overpressure higher than the VV design
pressure of 0.5 MPa. The rupture disks should open at about 0.2 MPa. For a steam overpressure of
0.5 MPa, Lee Cadwallader suggested a probability of failure of 10-4 per demand.
For the hydrogen detonation/explosion event, the probability of VV failure can be written as
follows:
Pr(VV damaged by H detonation/explosion I state[VV PHTS] and state[RDs]) = (D-1 0)
Pr(VV damaged by H detonation/explosion I H detonation/explosion) x
Pr(H detonation/explosion I state[VV PHTS] and state[RDs])
where 'state[event name]' can be either success or failure.
Among all the events defined for the VV confinement barrier, the failure due to overpressure
was the only one that we found in the literature. All the other events' probabilities are guessed values,
and sensitivity analysis should give a sense of which failure causes have relatively higher effect on the
confinement function of the vacuum vessel.
5 Hydrogen is produced by the reaction of water/steam with plasma facing materials, and depends on the
quantity of steam and the plasma facing materials temperature. Thus, we assume that the probability of
hydrogen explosion depends on the VV PHTS successful operation for heat removal, and on the rupture disks
response on demand.
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Magnet Systems
The major concern about magnet transients is the potential for propagating faults to other
components of the fusion machine. The magnet faults of concerns from an off-normal event
propagation viewpoint are off-normal forces that would produce large coil displacements, break off
magnet pieces, pull ferrous missiles from other areas, or arcs that could produce melting and
volatilization in other components. In ITER, these events could have the potential to damage the
vacuum vessel, ducts and piping from the vacuum vessel, and the cryostat and potentially result in
radioactivity releases. Off-normal forces could arise from shorts in coils, faults in the discharge system,
or power supply faults. Arcs between coils, arcs to ground, and arcs at open leads could lead to
melting and/or volatilization. Arcs could arise from insulation faults, gas ingress, over-voltage, or other
causes.
At this point in time, there is no reliable data available for ITER magnets, as they are much
bigger than the other experimental tokamak machines. The Japanese team is currently building a
model coil for tests that could produce more reliable data. Reference [4-9] presents the results of a
survey conducted among the major centers of large magnet development and operation in the USA to
obtain information on magnet system failure and accident events, and it contains a brief summary of 31
such events. Reference [4-15] contains accident scenarios for three initiating events: puncture of coil
insulation, local loss of superconductivity, and loss of cryostat vacuum. The event trees contain
probabilities of failure on demand for the systems involved.
The probabilities we need to estimate for the events occurring in the magnet systems or
caused by magnet systems are all conditional probabilities. For instance, we assume that the
probability of missile generation depends on the discharge of the all the magnet coils and of arcing, as
shown in Figure D-2. Reference [4-15] gives an estimate for the probability of arcing of 0.1.
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Figure D-2: DPL Probability Data for the 'Missile Generation' Event
Cryostat Vessel Confinement Barrier
The cryostat vessel is a containment building, and hence it is subject to leaks. ITER has no
reliability data for this vessel yet, and ESECS uses generic data such as 10-1 - 10-2 failure probability
per demand. Sensitivity analysis will be performed to study the effects of using probabilities of failure
for the cryostat of different orders of magnitude. Similarly to the vacuum vessel case, we defined
events for the cryostat integrity loss due to several failure causes: arcing, overpressure from in-vessel
LOCA, water LOCA in the cryostat, or loss of cryogen in the cryostat, missile generation, coil
displacement, ozone explosion, hydrogen explosion propagating from the vacuum vessel.
For the event 'Cryostat vessel fails without being challenged by off-normal events', we
assumed a failure rate of 10 3/yr (Lee Cadwallader proposed a value of 10~5/yr for the vacuum vessel),
resulting in a probability of failure during BPP of 4 x 104.
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Table D-3: Failure Rates Database
IEs Frequency [/a]
Ex-vessel LOCA of the FW/SB coolant loop 0.01
TF coil overcurrent 0.1
Vacuum pump process boundary failure during regeneration at power 0.1
Overpower transient 1 9.6
Small leakage of air in the cryostat 0.2
Loss of offsite power 0.1
PFC PHTSs Probab. of
failure
DIV PHTS fails independently 0.0034 *
DIV PHTS fails given DIV damaged by RAE 0.0234 25
DIV PHTS fails given DIV damaged by electromagnetic loads 0.0134 26
DIV PHTS fails given DIV damaged by RAE + electromagnetic loads 0.0634
DIV PHTS fails given missile generation 0.1034
DIV PHTS damaged by missile given missile generation 0.1 27
DIV PHTS fails given displaced coil 0.3034
DIV PHTS damaged by displaced coil given displaced coil 0.3 28
DIV PHTS fails given ozone explosion in CV 0.2034
DIV PHTS damaged by ozone explosion in CV given ozone explosion 0.229
Rest FW PHTS fails independently 0.0026
Rest FW PHTS fails given FW damaged by RAE 0.0326
Rest FW PHTS fails given FW damaged by electromagnetic loads 0.0226
Rest FW PHTS fails given FW damaged by RAE + electromagnetic 0.0826
loads
FW PHTS fails independently 0.0034
FW PHTS fails given FW damaged by RAE 0.0234
FW PHTS fails given FW damaged by electromagnetic loads 0.0134
FW PHTS fails given FW damaged by RAE + electromagnetic loads 0.0634
FW PHTS fails given missile generation 0.1034
FW PHTS damaged by missile given missile generation 0.1
FW PHTS fails given displaced coil 0.3034
FW PHTS damaged by displaced coil given displaced coil 0.3
FW PHTS fails given ozone explosion in CV 0.2034
FW PHTS damaged by ozone explosion in CV given ozone explosion 0.2
SAFETY SYSTEMS
Plasma safety shutdown system fails to respond on demand
Rupture disks from VV to suppression tank fail to open on demand
Vacuum pumps isolation system to VV fails to respond on demand
Vacuum pumps process boundary break fails to be isolated from Tritium
plant
VV PHTS fails independently
VV PHTS fails given missile generation
VV PHTS damaged by missile given missile generation
VV PHTS fails given displaced coil
VV PHTS damaged by displaced coil given displaced coil
VV PHTS fails given ozone explosion in CV
VV PHTS damaged by ozone explosion in CV given ozone explosion
Cryogenic He relief system fails
0.001
0.0001
0.0048
0.01
0.0002
0.0102
0.01
0.0502
0.05
0.0202
0.02
0.1
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TF coil quench detection system fails 0.003 [5-15] 0.01
TF discharge system fails 0.0004
PF coils discharge systems fail 0.0025
CS discharge system fails 0.0004
Bypass of VV & CV (diagnostics window) isolation system fails on 0.021
demand
Air leak detection in CV 0.004
Air leak isolation from CV 0.001
Emergency power supply system fails to activate on demand 0.0009
HTS boundary fails to retain radioactive inventories 0.067
PLASMA FACING COMPONENTS
Impurity ingress 0.6
Water ingress 0.4
DIV damaged by electromagnetic loads given disruption 0.005
DIV damaged by RAE given disruption by impurity ingress 0.075
DIV damaged by RAE given disruption by water ingress 0.45
FW damaged by electromagnetic loads given disruption 0.005
FW damaged by RAE given disruption by impurity ingress 0.075
FW damaged by RAE given disruption by water ingress 0.45
Windows damaged by electromagnetic loads given disruption 0.005
Windows damaged by RAE given disruption by impurity ingress 0.0015
Windows damaged by RAE given disruption by water ingress 0.009
Windows fail due to overpressure given rupture disks fail to open 0.02
MAGNET SYSTEMS
TF coil fails due to overpressure given He relief system fails 0.5
Arcing in TF coil given TF coil structure does not fail due to He 0.1
overpressure
Arcing in TF coil given TF coil structure fails due to He overpressure 0.2
Missile generation given no arcing + PFs discharged + CS undischarged 0.1
Missile generation given no arcing + PFs undischarged + CS discharged 0.3
Missile generation given no arcing + PFs and CS undischarged 0.5
Missile generation given arcing + PFs discharged + CS undischarged 0.2
Missile generation given arcing + PFs undischarged + CS discharged 0.4
Missile generation given arcing + PFs and CS undischarged 0.6
Coil displacement given PFs discharged + CS undischarged 0.5 [5-15] 0.1
Coil displacement given PFs undischarged + CS discharged 0.6
Coil displacement given PFs and CS undischarged 0.7
Any coil fails due to overpressure given He relief system fails 0.5
VACUUM VESSEL CONFINEMENT BARRIER
VV fails due to electromagnetic loads given disruption 0.0001
VV fails due to overpressure given rupture disks fail to open 0.5 2 [5-13]0.0001
VV fails due to H detonation/explosion given VV PHTS and RDs 0.005 3
succeed
VV fails due to H detonation/explosion given VV PHTS succeeds and 0.01 4
RDs fail
VV fails due to H detonation/explosion given VV PHTS fails and RDs 0.015 5
succeed
VV fails due to H detonation/explosion given VV PHTS and RDs fail 0.026
VV fails due to arcing given arcing 0.01 7
VV damaged by missile given missile generation 0.1 a
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VV.damaged by displaced coil given displaced coil 0.5 9
VV damaged by ozone explosion in CV given ozone explosion 0.2 10
CRYOSTAT VESSEL CONFINEMENT BARRIER
Ozone explosion 0.0004
Loss of CV vacuum given unisolated small air leakage in the CV 0.5 1
CV fails due to arcing given arcing 0.1 12
CV fails due to overpressure from LOCA (water) inside the cryostat 0.01 1
CV fails due to overpressure from cryogen release inside the cryostat 0.01 "
CV fails due to missile given missile generation 0.01 15
CV fails due to displaced coil given displaced coil 0.01 16
CV overpressure suppression system fails 0.0001 17
CV fails without being challenged by off-normal events 1.OE-03 1
CV fails due to overpressure from in-vessel LOCA given CV OP sys fails 0.95 1
CV fails due to hydrogen explosion in VV (VV integrity lost) 0.001 20
CV integrity lost due to ozone explosion given ozone explosion 0.5 21
CONFINEMENT BARRIERS RETENTION FACTORS
Vacuum Vessel 0.1 2
Cryostat Vessel 0.25 23
Tokamak Pit, CANDU 0.5
Tokamak Pit, current 0
TOKAMAK PIT
Tokamak Pit, CANDU fails 0.01
Tokamak Pit, current fails 0.1
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Appendix E: Single Attribute Utility Functions
The single attribute utility function in Visual Basic language is defined below [8-14]:
Function utility(x, a, b, r, c)
If ((b-a) <0Orr<Q0Orr> 1 Orc<-1 Orc> 1 Orb < 0 Ora<)Then
utility = "check parameters"
Else
M = a + r * (b - a)
If c < 0 Then
h=c*(1 -r)
Else
h=c*r
End If
If x < a Then
linear = 1
Else
If (x > b) Then
linear = 0
Else
linear= 1 - (x - a) / (b - a)
End If
End If
If ((x < a) Or (x > b)) Then
triang = 0
Else
If (x < M) Then
triang = h * ((x - a) / (M - a))
Else
triang = h * ((b - x) / (b - M))
End If
End If
utility = linear + triang
End If
End Function
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Construction Cost
Table E-1: Single Attribute Utility Function Parameters for Construction Cost
Single Attribute Utility Function Parameters
a 200 [$M]
b 500 [$M]
r 0.5
c 0.5
0.90
0.80
O.70-
0.60
0.50
0.40
0.30
0.20
0.10
0.00
329 408
Construction cost ($M)
171 250
Figure E-1: Utility Function for Construction Cost
277
-
.2
D
487
Constructibility
Table E-2: Single Attribute Utility Function Parameters for Constructibility
Single Attribute Utility Function Parameters
a
b
r
c
0
5
0.5
0.5
1.00
0.90
0.80
0.40
4.
020
00
Constuc~ty
Figure E-2: Utility Function for Constructibility
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Project Completion Time
Table E-3: Single Attribute Utility Function Parameters for Project Completion Time
Single Attribute Utility Function Parameters
a
b
r
c
9 [yr]
15 [yr}
0.5
0.5
1.00
0.90
0.80
0.70
0
'r 0.60
S0.50
0.40
S030
0.20
0.00
8.77 '10.45 12.13 13.81 15.49
Project completion time (yr)
Figure E-3: Utility Function for Project Completion Time
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Public Attitude
Table E-4: Single Attribute Utility Function Parameters for Public Attitude
Single Attribute Utility Function Parameters
a
b
r
c
ao
.2
I
10
0.5
0.5
1.00
0.90 -
0.80 -
0.70-
0.60
0.50 -
0.40 -
0.30-
0.20 -
0.10
n0n0 I I~ I
1 2 2 3 4 5 5 6 7
Public attitude
7 8 9 10
Figure E-4: Utility Function for Public Attitude
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.0
Radiological Confinement
Table E-5: Single Attribute Utility Function Parameters for Radiological Confinement
Single Attribute Utility Function Parameters
0 [grams]
4110 [grams]
0.5
0.7
1.00
0.90
0.80
0.70
0.60
S0.50
S0.40
0.30
0.20
0.1*0
0.00
0 822 1644 2466 3288 4110
Tritium release (grams)
Figure E-5: Utility Function for Radiological Confinement
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a
b
r
c
Appendix F: Visual Basic Functions for K Factor and
Multi-attribute Utility Function
The K factor is calculated in EXCEL as a function of ki factors using the following Visual Basic
function:
Function findK(kArray)
xacc = 0.0000001
xacc2 = 0.02
MAXIT = 500
a = -1.000000001
b = -0.00001
c = 0.000001
d = 100000
theSum = Application.Sum(kArray)
If theSum <= (1 - xacc2) Then
fl = bigK(c, kArray)
Do While fI * bigK(d, kArray) < 0
d = 0.8 * d
Loop
d = d / 0.8
findK = findBigK(c, d, kArray, MAXIT, xacc)
Else
If theSum >= (1 + xacc2) Then
findK = findBigK(a, b, kArray, MAXIT, xacc)
Else
If Abs(theSum - 1) < xacc2 Then findK = 0
End If
End If
End Function
Function bigK(K, kArray)
Product = 1
For Each x In kArray
Product = Product * (K * x + 1)
Next x
bigK = K + 1 - Product
End Function
Function findBigK(xl, x2, kArray, MAXIT, xacc)
fl = bigK(xl, kArray)
fh = bigK(x2, kArray)
If (fl * fh > 0) Then
findBigK = "Root must be bracketed in findBigK"
Else
If (fl < 0) Then
xl = x1
xh = x2
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Else
x = x2
xh = x1
swap = fl
fl=fh
fh = swap
End If
dx = xh - x
j= 1
Do While j <= MAXIT
rtf = x + dx * fl / (fl - fh)
f = bigK(rtf, kArray)
If (f < 0) Then
del = xl - rtf
xl = rtf
fl= f
Else
del =xh - rtf
xh = rtf
fh = f
End If
dx = xh - xl
If ((Abs(f) < xacc * xacc) Or Abs(del) < xacc) Then
findBigK = rtf
Exit Do
Else
findBigK = "Maximum number of iterations exceeded in findBigK"
End If
j=j+1
Loop
End If
End Function
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The MAU function is calculated in EXCEL as a function of K and ki factors using the following
Visual Basic function:
Function MAU(kArray, uArray, K)
If K = 0 Then
N=0
For Each x In kArray
N=N+ 1
Next x
MAU =0
i=1
For i = 1 To N Step 1
MAU = MAU + (kArray(i) * uArray(i))
Next i
Else
N=0
For Each x In kArray
N=N+1
Next x
MAU =1
i=1
For i = 1 To N Step 1
MAU = MAU * (K * kArray(i) uArray(i) + 1)
Next i
MAU = (MAU - 1) / K
End If
End Function
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Appendix G: MATHCAD File for Response Surface
Coefficients of Gamma Distribution Parameters for
Frequency Distribution of Tritium Releases
p0_7 :=0.01
p1-7 := 10 6
p2_7 :=0.9
pO- 9 :0:5
p1_9 : -6
p2_9 :=0.9
rf0_22:=z 0.1
rf1_22:=0
rf2_22 :=0.9
aG :=0.00548
al_7 :=0.00554
a2_7 :=0.0034
al_9 :=0.00793
a2_9 :=0.0693
al_22 :=0.0122
a2_22 :=0.00406
all_7a9 :=0.00855
all_7a22: z 0.00546
all_9a22 := 0.00809
bO := 525
bl_7 :=518
b2_7 102
bl_9= 188
b2_9 :=625
bi_22 := 538
b2_22 := 160
blI_7a9 := 173
bIl_7a22 :577
b1i_9a22 :196
285
Aa :=aO
RI_7a:= al_7- aO
(p1_7 - pO_7)-(p1_7 - p2_7)
R2_7a:= a2_7 - a0
(p2_7 - pO_7) -(p2_7 - p 1-7)
RI_9a:= al_9- aO
(p1_9 - p0_9)-(p19 - p2_9)
R2_9a:= a2_9- aO
(p2_9 - p0_9)-(p2_9 - p1_9)
RI_22a,= al_22- aO
(rfl_22- rf0_22)-(rfl_22- rf2_22)
R2_22a.= a2_22- aO
(rf2_22- rff_22)-(rf2_22- rfl_22)
Aa =0.00548
R _7a=0.006667
R2_7a = -0.002597
RI_9a=0.005444
R2_9a=0.177278
RI_22a=0.074667
R2_22a=-0.001972
B_7a:= R1_7a (p0_7 - p2j7) tR2_7a(p_7 - p1-7) B_7a =-0.00596
B_9a zR1_9a(p09 - p2_9)+ R2_9a(p0_9 - p1_9) B_9a =0.086461
B_22a: = R1_22a (rf0_22- rf2_22)+ R2_22a(rf0_22- rff122) B_22a =-0.059931
C_7a =R1_7a+ R2_7a C_7a =0.004071
C_9a:= R1_9a+ R2_9a C_9a=0.182722
C_22a.=R1_22a+ R2_22a C_22a=0.072694
D_7a9a:= a. + al I_7a9- al_7- al_9 D_7a9a =0.112011
(p1_7 - pQ_7)-(p19 - p0_9)
D_7a22a:= aO+ al 7a22- al_7- al 22 D_7a22a=-6.80068
(p1_7 -- pO_7)-(rfL_22- rf0_22)
D_9a22a:= aO+ al 19a22- al_9 - al_22 D_9a22a=-0.1312
(p1_9- p0_9).(rfl22- rf0_22)
a(p7, p9, rf22) :=Aa ...
+ (B_7a+ C_7a-(p7 - p0_7) + D_7a9a-(p9 - p0_9) + D_7a22a(rf22- rf0_22))-(p7 - p0_7)
+ (B_9a- C_9a-(p9 - p0_9) + D_9a22a(rf22- rff_22))-(p9 - pO- 9 )
+ (B_22a+ C_22a(rf22- rf0_22) )-(rf22- rf0_22)
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Ab :=bO
RI_7b:= bl_7- bO
(p1_7- pO7)-(p1_7 - p2_7)
R2_7bh b2_7 - bO
(p2-7- pO-7)-(p2-7 - p1- 7)
R1_9b:= bl_9- b
(p1_9- p0_9)-(pl_9- p2_9)
R2_9b = b2_9 - bO
(p2_9- pO_9)-(p2_9- p1_9)
R1_22b:= bl_22- bO
(rfl_22- rf0_22)-(rfl_22- rf2_22)
R2_22b:= b2_22- bO
(rf2_22- rf0_22).(rf2_22- rfl_22)
Ab = 525
RI_7b=-777.856428
R2_7b=-528.090474
RI_9b=-748.891219
R2_9b=277.778086
RI_22b= 144.444444
R2_22b=-506.944444
B_7b :RI_7b(p0_7- p2_7) + R2_7b(p0_7 - p1_7)
B_9b =RI_9b(p0_9- p29)+ R2_9b(p0_9- p1_9)
B_22b:= RI_22b(fQ._22- rf2.22) + R2_22b(rfO_22- rf1_22)
C_7b. = Rl_7b+ R2_7b
C_9b =R1_9bt R2_9b
C_22b:=Rl_22b+ R2-22b
D_7a9b: bO+ bI1-7a9- b1 7- b1=9
(p1_7 - pQ_7)-(p19 - p0_9)
D_7a22b z bO + bl 17a22- bl_7 - bL22
(p1_7 - pO_7)-(rfL_22- rfO_22)
D_9a22b: = bO+ b 19a22- bl 9- b 122
(p19 - p0_9).(rfL_22- rffO22)
B_7b =687011844
B_9b =438.445253
B_22b=-166.25
C_7b =-1.30594-1f 3
C_9b =-471.113132
C_22b=--362.5
D_7a9b=-1.60016310
D7a22b=4.60046104
D_9a22b=-100.0002
b(p7,p9,rf22) z:Ab ...
+ (B_7b+ C_7b(p7 - p0_7) + D_7a9b(p9 - p0_9)+ D_7a22b(rf22- rfo22))-(p7- p0_7)
+ (B-9b + C_9b-(p9 - pO_9) + D_9a22b(rf22- rf(_22))-(p9 - p0_9) ...
+ (B_22b+ C_22b(rf22- rfC_22))-(rf22- rf0_22)
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a( p7, p0_9 , rf0_22 ) b( p7, p0_9 , rf0
a( pO-7 , p9 ,rfO22 ) b( p07 , p9 , rfO22)
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Figure G-1: Product (ab) versus each of the three parameters: p7, p9, rf22
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